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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

VOTING AS A (MANDATORY) DUTY: CITIZEN ATTITUDES, POLITICAL
ENGAGEMENT, AND PARTY OUTREACH UNDER COMPULSORY VOTING
Political participation is paramount to the well being of a democracy. Concerns
over low turnout rates across the world have prompted a growing body of research on the
potential for political institutions to foster electoral participation. Amongst those
institutions, compulsory voting is found to have the largest and most robust impact on
maximizing participation rates. Under this system, eligible citizens are required by law to
go to the polls on election day, and are subject to penalties if they fail to do so. Beyond
its positive impact on turnout, we know far less about what other aspects of the
democratic process are influenced by compulsory voting. The main goal of this
dissertation is to inform the debate on how and when the effects of compulsory voting
extend beyond voter turnout. Specifically, I draw on numerous sources of survey data
across the world to investigate the impact of compulsory voting (herein CV) on three
distinct political aspects: citizen attitudes towards voting, political engagement, and elite
campaigning.
The first step in understanding the broader effects of CV is to examine whether it
influences citizens’ perceptions of the democratic act of voting. In chapter two, I develop
a detailed theoretical framework that highlights whether compulsory voting increases
citizens’ feelings of civic duty, or generates resentment amongst eligible voters. I also
argue that the impact of CV on attitudes could be neutral—by devaluing the act of voting
and making individuals indifferent towards the democratic process. Using a hierarchical
modeling technique and survey data from Latin America, I show that voters living under
CV are no more likely to report either increased feelings of civic duty or higher rates of
resentment, compared to their counterparts under voluntary voting. Instead, individuals
who are required to turn out by law are slightly more likely to feel indifferent towards
electoral participation. Then, chapter three takes advantage of the recent abolition of
compulsory voting in Chile to evaluate whether CV laws promote political engagement
beyond election day. An empirical analysis of public opinion surveys over a 10-year
period pre and post reform shows that rates of political engagement—specifically,
watching and reading political news and discussing politics with family—are

significantly higher under compulsory than under voluntary voting, and this is especially
the case for those with lower levels of education. These findings suggest that when
presented with the task of turning out at the polls, citizens seem to incur the extra costs
necessary to make an informed decision.
Finally, in chapter four I investigate whether mandatory voting laws alter the way
political parties decide to engage in outreach during political campaigns. Using a
comprehensive dataset of post-election surveys of over 40,000 individuals in 27 different
countries, I find that political elites do adjust to their institutional context—when voting
is mandatory, parties invest in campaign outreach at similar levels (not less) than when
voting is voluntary, and that this outreach is much less skewed towards individuals of
higher socioeconomic status compared to when voting is voluntary. I also show evidence
that parties under CV are more likely to engage in persuasion rather than mobilization via
party outreach. Taken together, this dissertation provides a comprehensive analysis of
how maximizing electoral participation through a legal requirement to vote shapes
individual and elite behavior, contributing to our understanding of the implications of
political institutions for the quality of representative democracy worldwide.

KEYWORDS: Compulsory Voting, Mandatory Turnout, Attitudes Towards Voting,
Political Engagement, Party Outreach
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The 2016 Presidential Election in the United States was a contentious one. Apart
from lively debates on health care, immigration, and national security, candidate Bernie
Sanders addressed an issue that has failed to garner much public attention—voter turnout.
A quote posted on his twitter page touted that “if we truly believe in a vibrant democracy,
then we [the U.S.] must have the highest voter turnout in the world.”1 Indeed, electoral
participation is often considered an integral feature of a healthy democratic system (Dahl
1971; Franklin 2004; Norris 2002). A large body of research has examined factors that
can influence participation rates. One of the most robust and consistent findings in this
literature is that one political institution in particular has the potential to significantly
increase participation—Compulsory Voting (CV hereafter) (Geys 2006). While
maximizing voter turnout by mandating that all eligible voters turn out at the polls might
seem like an attractive option for countries where participation rates are waning, this
institution remains a controversial one. In particular, critics and proponents of
compulsory voting point to many potential desirable and undesirable second-order effects
that extend beyond high voter turnout. The main goal of this dissertation is to inform the
debate on how and when the effects of compulsory voting extend beyond participation at
the polls. In particular, I assess the impact of CV on three main aspects of the democratic
process: citizen attitudes towards voting, political engagement beyond turnout, and elite
campaigning via party outreach.

1

Bernie Sanders, Twitter post, August 15, 2015, 7:58 p.m.,
https://twitter.com/berniesanders/status/632702839534391296
1

A total of 26 countries in the world employ some form of compulsory turnout law
today. The adoption (or abolishment) of this institution has been debated for decades. In
the U.S., for instance, the possibility of instituting a compulsory law for elections was
presented as early as 1770 in the state of Georgia and later in 1910 in the state legislature
of Oregon. In 1997, the issue was revived as Arend Lijphart (1997) proposed compulsory
voting as the solution to the country’s low and unequal turnout. Even more recently,
President Barack Obama has been quoted saying that “it would be transformative if
everybody voted” when asked about the fact that other countries have mandatory voting
laws (Sonin 2015).
In a comparative perspective, other countries have actively engaged in the CV
debate. Australia’s mandatory voting laws are often met with opposition and criticism
(Hill 2010), and Chile recently abolished their compulsory voting law after extensive
political debate (Barnes and Rangel 2014). Both Britain and Colombia have introduced
legislation to adopt compulsory voting in the past two years (Marty 2014; Padmanabhan
2015).2 The institution has drawn even more attention as average rates of voter turnout
continue to steadily decline across the world (Blais and Rubenson 2013). Although the
assertion that CV produces higher turnout rates has been well investigated and
empirically supported, we still know little about the effects CV has on a number of
additional political factors. As Birch (2009, iv-x) summarizes:
Approximately one-sixth of all the states in the modern world that hold elections
hold them under a compulsory voting regime. This is a substantial number, in
comparison to the number that employ certain other political institutions—such as
2

In Colombia, the legislation was introduced in 2014, and is still being debated today.
The bill introduced in the UK parliament in 2015 is no longer under consideration.
2

the single-transferable vote or the double ballot—which have received
considerably more treatment in the academic literature.
This is not to say that scholars have largely ignored this institutional design.
Earlier work on the topic focused largely on voter turnout as an outcome. More recently,
the literature has shifted towards examining other substantive outcomes. These include,
for instance, a focus on political engagement, gendered and socioeconomic patterns of
participation, partisan electoral gains, economic voting, and political sophistication. A
variety of quantitative techniques have been applied. Methods used to study the
byproducts of CV include the use of survey data and cross-national analyses (e.g., Birch
2009; Córdova and Rangel 2017; Singh and Thorton 2013), single country studies (e.g.,
Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid 2016; Fowler 2013, Irwin 1974), and experiments
(Loewen, Milner, and Hicks 2007, Shineman, forthcoming).
Despite the increase in research on this topic, much of the empirical evidence
provided thus far has offered mixed results. For instance, in a comprehensive study of the
impact of CV on several political outcomes, Birch (2009) finds that CV matters little
beyond promoting electoral participation. A lack of consensus still exists about how CV
influences political engagement (Carreras 2016). Evidence that CV benefits left-leaning
parties, as typically argued, is mixed (Miller and Dassonneville 2016). This lack of
consistent evidence highlights the need for a sustained effort to provide policymakers
with valuable information when considering CV as a political institution. My dissertation
addresses a number of shortcomings in the existing literature that will allow for a better
understanding of the exact mechanisms that may (or may not) lead CV to have an
influence on democratic politics, in addition to its impact on voter turnout.

3

The first step in understanding the broader effects of compulsory voting is to
examine whether it influences citizens’ perceptions of the democratic act of voting. The
first empirical component in this dissertation, then, examines whether compulsory voting
promotes feelings of civic duty or resentment amongst the population, while also
considering a potential for CV to increase feelings of indifference towards voting. The
second empirical element asks how and when compulsory voting laws influence political
engagement beyond voting. The final research question asks how campaigns are shaped
by institutional context, by analyzing patterns of party outreach in the presence and
absence of compulsory voting. In the remainder of this chapter, I first provide a general
discussion of compulsory voting laws across the world, followed by a short review of
what we currently know about the effects of this institutional design. Then, I elaborate on
the shortcomings of the existing literature and how the research presented in this
dissertation helps fill those gaps. The final part provides an outline of the dissertation,
which highlights some of the theoretical expectations and previews some of the main
findings.
Compulsory Voting Around the World
The UK Electoral Commission defines compulsory voting as “a system of laws
mandating that enfranchised citizens turn out to vote, which is usually, though not
always, accompanied by a system of compulsory voter registration” (Electoral
Commision 2006, 3). Similarly, Birch (2009, 2) describes the institution of compulsory
voting as “the legal obligation to attend the polls at election time and perform whatever
duties are required there of electors.” It is common for compulsory voting to be
misunderstood as a compulsion to vote for a given candidate (Keaney and Rogers 2006).
However, countries with CV simply require citizens to turn out to cast a ballot, regardless
4

of whether it is valid or not. Individuals have the option to vote blank or spoil the ballot.
Due to this misconception, compulsory voting is sometimes referred as “compulsory
turnout,” highlighting that it merely represents the legal obligation to cast a ballot and not
the obligation to select a candidate against a citizens’ will (Keaney and Rogers 2006).
Compulsory voting laws are not consistent across all countries. First, there is
variation in how these laws are codified. Some countries explicitly state in their
constitution that voting is compulsory. For instance, Article 37 of Argentina’s
Constitution states that “suffrage is universal, equal, secret, and mandatory” (Arg Const.
art. 37). Compulsory laws in Australia, by contrast, are not formally written in the
constitution, but are rather enforced via federal law (Birch 2009). Another variation is in
terms of who is required to turn out. In some countries, like Ecuador, voting is
compulsory only for those who are literate. In others, voters who reach a certain age (70
years old in Luxemburg, 75 years old in Peru) are no longer required to vote. In
Argentina and Brazil, voting is compulsory once an individual turns 18, but voluntary for
those between 16 and 18 years of age (IDEA 2017).
Most importantly, the extent to which CV laws are enforced and the penalties for
not complying vary significantly by country. Failure to vote in Brazil can result in the
inability to obtain a passport, and monetary fines (IDEA 2017). In Singapore, those who
abstain are automatically removed from the registry and required to reapply with an
explanation. Conversely, while voting is a legal obligation in Mexico, non-voters are not
necessarily subject to any sanctions. The same is the case in Greece, which lifted oncestrong sanctions in 2000 (IDEA 2017).

5

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) is an
intergovernmental organization that publishes research on democratic participation
worldwide, and maintains a record of CV implementation and abolishment in different
countries. Currently, it identifies 26 countries where voting is compulsory. Table 1.1
highlights the presence of CV laws, sanctions, and enforcement in each country. Figure
1.1 presents a visual representation of the spatial presence of compulsory voting across
the world, according to IDEA (2017).
Compulsory voting was primarily introduced in the twentieth century around the
world, as countries began to democratize or expand the franchise (Birch 2009).3 Several
explanations exist for its adoption, although reasons vary by country and context. Some
countries adopted CV in order to strengthen democratic legitimacy and further engage the
public (Birch 2009). Others hoped that it would reduce corruption and electoral abuse
once electorates started to grow and more individuals got the right to vote (Murray 1998).
Another widespread and perhaps counterintuitive explanation for implementation,
especially in Europe and Latin America, was that conservative parties in the 20th century
feared that mass enfranchisement of the working class would promote participation of
left-leaning indiviuals. Therefore, conservative parties chose to adopt CV in order to
ensure their survival by forcing citizens who would otherwise not be mobilized by the left
to turn out to vote (Birch 2009; Boveda 2013; Maldonado 2015). Finally, compulsory
voting is also thought to be simply a product of diffusion effects or colonial history
(Massicotte, Blais, and Yoshinaka 2004). While many explanations exist, the adoption of

3

See Birch (2009), page 36 for a detailed account of dates in which compulsory voting
were adopted.
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compulsory voting primarily took place very early on most countries’ development into
nation-states or democratization (Birch 2009).
Table 1.1. Countries with Compulsory Voting in 2017
Country with
Compulsory
Voting

Generally
Enforced?

Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Costa Rica
Cyprus
D.R. Congo
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
Gabon
Greece
Honduras
Lebanon
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Mexico
Nauru
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Singapore
Switzerland*
Thailand
Turkey
Uruguay

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
n/a
No
Yes
No
n/a
No
No
n/a
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
n/a
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Explanation
x
x
x

Sanctions
Civil Rights
Fine
Infringements/
Disenfranchisement
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x

x

x

x
x

x
x

x
x

Other

x

x
x

x

x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x

Notes: In Switzerland, CV is only practiced in one Canton (Schaffhausen). No sanction
and enforcement information available for the D.R. Congo, Gabon, and Lebanon.
Explanation requires non-voters to provide legitimate reason for abstaining. Fines vary
by country. Civil rights infringements include inability to access certain public services if
no proof of voting is provided. Disenfranchisement can happen in certain cases if an
individual fails to vote for a number of consecutive elections within a given timeframe
(varies by country). “Other” sanctions could include difficulty getting a job within the
public sector, or social sanctions that are less formalized. Source: IDEA (2017).

7

Figure 1.1. Compulsory Voting Across the World

Notes: Figure 1.1 shows a spatial representation of countries that have compulsory voting
laws across the world in 2017. Source: IDEA (2017)
Questions Surrounding Compulsory Voting
The benefits and consequences of compulsory voting have been debated for
decades. The 1970s abolition of compulsory voting in the Netherlands, however,
prompted a more scholarly discussion on the effects of the institution, and by 1996,
Arend Lijphart’s famous Presidential Address to the American Political Science
Association advocating for the adoption of compulsory voting in the United States
stimulated a new wave of discussion on mandatory voting laws (Lijphart 1997).
Countries that currently have CV laws, such as Australia, have had their fair share of
debates regarding its abolition (Hill 2010; Lever 2010b). Other countries with voluntary
voting laws, such as Britain, Canada, Colombia, and India, have considered its
introduction. Most recently in 2011, election law reform in Chile generated several rich
discussions on the advantages of maintaining or abolishing CV in the country (Barnes
and Rangel 2014).

8

The questions surrounding compulsory laws tap into several political dimensions.
One aspect is normative—whether mandating that voters go to the polls is democratic or
not. Here, the tension is between those who believe that voting is a civic duty and
therefore should be mandated, and those who value the freedom to choose not to
participate. Another leading question seeks empirical evidence of the institution’s ability
to promote higher turnout rates. Relatedly, scholars also contemplate whether mandatory
turnout for all eligible citizens has the potential to erase inequalities in the electorate. A
growing body of research has also begun to investigate whether the effects of CV extend
beyond voter turnout. Scholars often deliberate on whether CV increases or decreases
political engagement beyond the ballot box, and the institution’s influence on levels of
political knowledge. Finally, recent studies of CV focus on how it may be influential in
determining electoral outcomes. I summarize the current debates surrounding compulsory
voting laws in Table 1.2. 4
Within these dimensions—particularly the ones that contemplate the effect of CV
beyond voter turnout—CV is often theorized to produce opposing outcomes. For
instance, while some argue that CV leads to more political education, others highlight
potential explanations as to how CV could actually reduce political education. Given the
rich variation in theoretical expectations, scholars have made efforts to empirically test
many propositions in order to settle any existing debates or to provide policymakers with
more guidance. In what follows, I discuss the theoretical arguments for each of the
dimensions from Table 1.2, and provide a summary of the empirical evidence that has
evaluated existing claims.
4

Briggs and Chelis (2010) provide a similar classification of the literature on compulsory
voting.
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Table 1.2. Questions Surrounding Compulsory Voting Laws
Positive Expectations

Negative/Null Expectations

The Normative
Question

CV enhances democracy,
legitimacy, voting as a
civic duty

CV undermines democratic
freedom, promotes
resentment

The Turnout
Question

CV increases voter turnout

CV has no effect on voter
turnout

The Unequal
Electorate Question

CV promotes equal turnout

CV does not promote a
balanced electorate

The Political
Engagement
Question

CV increases political
engagement beyond voting

CV decreases/does not affect
political engagement beyond
voting

The Electoral
Outcomes Question

CV benefits left-leaning
parties

CV has no effect on electoral
outcomes

The Normative Question
Scholars and politicians have long debated whether compulsory voting is a moral
institution. Those who defend CV highlight that high voter turnout is paramount for the
promotion of democracy (Brennan and Hill 2014). High levels of turnout indicate
stronger legitimacy as the elected government is more representative of the majority of
the citizenry (Franklin 2004; Dahl 2006). Citizens who want to demand accountability
from their governments should exercise their duty to vote, and this requirement
essentially creates a binding contract between individuals and representatives (Jackman
1999). Back in the 1920’s, a legislator in Oregon stated that “it is not just the vicious who
refuse to vote, but those who do not take their franchise rights seriously, those who
permit others to run the government, and then spend their spare moments protesting
because it is not run to suit them… the votes of many of these people are worth getting"
(Barnett 1921, 266). In other words, it is important that all citizens express their
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preferences, and that government is not a mere reflection the wishes of a small section of
the population.
In this normative debate, those against compulsory voting emphasize that forcing
people to vote is undemocratic and might instead generate resentment among citizens
(Henn and Odfield 2016; Lever 2010a; Senado 2012). It is argued that mandatory voting
is a violation of the democratic freedom to choose, which is “the cornerstone of liberal
democratic practices” (Briggs and Chelis 2010, 5). Just as democracy grants citizens the
right to vote, it also grants citizens the right not to vote. Forcing people to vote can
provoke resentment and lead citizens to question their ability to choose against
participating without being subject to punishment by the state. Brennan (2014, 82) also
argues that citizens can contribute to a democratic society in a number of ways, and not
voting is simply a poor reason to regard those individuals as “free riders” or to claim they
are not doing their civic part.
Overall, the normative question surrounding compulsory voting is a complicated
one. While some of these arguments are difficult to test empirically, a couple of studies
have tried to provide some evidence on whether individuals who are subject to CV laws
report certain feelings that can speak to the morality or democratic value of the
institution. Singh (2016) shows that compulsory voting is associated with decreased
satisfaction with democracy, especially for those who view democracy negatively to
begin with. He argues this is because external coercion by the state can be associated with
decreased interest in its democratic status, and lower belief in the legitimacy of the
system. Using the World Values survey, Lundell (2012) finds that compulsory voting has
a small but positive impact on trust in political institutions, suggesting CV can actually
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enhance institutional legitimacy. These findings, however, promote conflicting answers
as to whether CV strengthens or harms democracy, as both sides of the normative debate
claim.
The Turnout Question
Compulsory voting is most often referenced when issues of low participation are
emphasized. This is because, in theory, it is difficult to argue against the contention that
CV increases voter When all eligible voters are mandated by law to turn out, it is
reasonable to expect that a higher number of voters will show up at the polls. Compulsory
voting increases the costs of abstaining by imposing penalties on those who don’t show
up at the polls (Panagopoulos 2008). This expectation assumes that individuals living in
countries where voting is compulsory are both aware and willing to abide by the law.
Indeed, a large number of studies confirm that CV does in fact significantly increase
voter turnout rates anywhere from 10 to 18 percentage points (Baek 2009; Bechtel,
Hangartner, and Schmid 2015; Franklin 1999, 2004; Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004;
Hirczy 1994; Hoffman, León, and Lombardi 2017; Jaitman 2013; Norris 2004;
Quintelier, Hoodhe, and Marien 2011; Singh 2011).
Because in order to actually spur turnout, individuals should be both aware and
compliant with the law, research also shows that the effect of CV on turnout is stronger
when penalties for abstaining are strong and strictly enforced (Blais, Massicotte, and
Dobrzynska 2003; León 2017; Panagopoulos 2008; Singh 2011). When stronger penalties
are enforced, the cost of abstaining is higher, thus motivating compliance with the law. It
is also more likely that when penalties are strongly enforced—the need to pay a fine or
the inability to apply for a federal loan—individuals will be more aware of the existence
of the law and the costs that non-compliance produces. Overall, the turnout question has
12

received the most attention in the CV literature, and there is overwhelming evidence to
support the idea that CV works to increase voter turnout. The institution promotes high
turnout rates even in institutional contexts where participation is expected to be low, such
as when elections are non-competitive or district sizes are high (Barnes and Rangel
2017). In a review of aggregate-level studies of turnout, Geys (2006, 652) confirms that
“the effect of compulsory voting on turnout is one of the robust findings in studies that
analyze cross-national variation in voter turnout.”
The Unequal Electorate Question
Another dimension of CV as an institution is its potential to promote equality in
the electorate. Compulsory voting is argued to erase electoral biases, since certain groups
of citizens are systematically less likely to turn out when voting is voluntary (Carreras
and Castañeda-Angarita 2014; Smets and van Ham 2013; Verba et al. 1993). When
voting is mandatory, however, those who are least likely to turn out under voluntary
systems (marginalized citizens) are more likely to participate, because participation is
now required (Gallego 2015). This was Lijphart’s (1997, 2) focus when advocating for
the institution—stating that “the most obvious way to make voting more equal is to
maximize voter turnout.” When all enfranchised citizens regardless of age, income,
education, or gender are subject to non-voting penalties, the likelihood that the postelection electorate reflects a closer make up of the true citizen population is much higher
than when citizens are not required to turn out.
Empirical research does find some support for this hypothesis (Carey and
Horiuchi, forthcoming). Compulsory voting is found to decrease the voting gap between
low and high-income voters (Fowler 2013), and it narrows the gap between highly
educated and less educated individuals (Gallego 2015; Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998). CV
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also mobilizes a higher number of young voters to turn out, erasing generational
differences in voting (Irwin 1974; Singh 2011). Recent work also finds a positive effect
of CV in decreasing the gender gap in electoral engagement beyond voting (Córdova and
Rangel 2017), and an improvement on rates of income inequality (Chong and Olivera
2008). Still, compulsory voting might not necessarily eliminate any inequalities in the
electorate. In many cases, gaps in participation among disadvantaged groups still persist
even when turnout is mandatory (Cepaluni and Hidalgo 2016; Power 2009). While
making voting mandatory might not necessarily promote one hundred percent equal
participation, it is unlikely that it would harm advances in political equality.
The Political Engagement Question
The previous debates have focused on issues of electoral participation at the ballot
box under compulsory voting. More recently, scholars have considered the effects of CV
beyond turnout. Although we know that CV increases voter turnout, it is unclear whether
it also increases participation in other aspects of democratic politics. An important line of
research examines the impact of CV on political engagement. Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady (1995, 38) define political engagement as “activity that has the intent or effect of
influencing government action—either directly by affecting the making or
implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who
make those policies.” As this is a broad definition, there are many indicators of political
engagement. These could be political (such as persuading others, making campaign
contributions), acts of public voice (signing petitions or protesting), or cognitive (paying
attention to the news, or levels of political knowledge) (Zukin et al. 2006). Accordingly,
research investigating the effect of compulsory voting on political engagement has
examined a multitude of engagement outcomes.
14

Theoretically, CV could influence engagement in positive, negative, or neutral
ways. On the one hand, compulsory voting could motivate individuals to engage further
with the polity once they turn out to vote. Compelling citizens to vote might increase
citizens’ interest in the political process, generate higher levels of political information
and support a more engaged citizenry (Jakee and Sun 2006; Lijphart 1997; Shineman
2009). There is some cross-national evidence to support these contentions, especially
when it comes to cognitive engagement. Studies show that countries with CV report
slightly higher levels of political knowledge (Berggren 2001; Gordon and Segura 1997),
and that this effect is stronger among low educated voters (Sheppard 2015). Experimental
work also shows that incentivizing participation through penalties can motivate citizens
to seek out more political information (Shineman, forthcoming). Individuals living under
compulsory voting rules are also more likely to report higher rates of party attachment
(Singh and Thorton 2013).
On the other hand, compulsory voting could decrease individuals’ rate of political
engagement because it makes citizens resent participating in politics after being coerced
to vote. Given that non-voters are found to be less politically knowledgeable and
informed than voters (Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003; Converse 1964), others argue
that the inclusion of uninformed voters into the voting electorate might add noise or bias
in electoral patterns (Saunders 2010). Having more uninformed voters turning out could
in turn affect overall levels of political knowledge in the electorate, ultimately producing
sub-optimal electoral outcomes (Ballinger 2006).
Some studies show that CV systems do indeed produce a higher number of
invalid and random votes (Power and Garand 2007), especially among those who lack
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literacy or language skills (McAllister and Makkai 1993; Power and Roberts 1995). No
empirical evidence, however, indicates an explicit negative effect on political
engagement. A number of studies find a null relationship between CV and levels of
political information (Birch 2009; de Leon and Rizzi 2016; Loewen, Milner, and Hicks
2007), and other general measures of political engagement, such as attending party
meetings (Carreras 2016), and contacting political leaders (Birch 2009). Answers
regarding this specific question, therefore, remain unclear.
The Electoral Outcomes Question
Finally, compulsory voting can have implications for electoral outcomes. Many
scholars have argued that near-universal voter turnout produced by CV laws would
disproportionally benefit one type of party over the other. More liberal, left-leaning
parties are among those who benefit from CV laws, since voters who are encouraged to
turn out under CV are more likely to be of low income and education and thus more
inclined to support liberal policies (Green and Schwam-Baird 2016; Tucker, Vedlitz, and
DenNardo 1986). Empirical studies focused on how CV impacts electoral outcomes,
however, have found mixed support for the proposition that higher and more equal voter
turnout would benefit leftist parties, with some studies finding no effect (Ferwerda 2014;
Hoffman, León, and Lombardi 2017; Jackman 1987; Miller and Dassoneville 2016), and
others finding a positive effect (Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid 2016; Fowler 2013;
Jensen and Spoon 2011).
Taken together, the voter turnout question seems to be the only dimension of the
effects of compulsory voting that has found clear answers through empirical research.
The additional consequences and substantive impacts of CV still remain unclear. This
lack of consistent evidence only adds to the controversy surrounding this political
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institution. In the next section, I identify some key ways to expand the existing literature,
and discuss how this dissertation helps inform the existing questions surrounding
compulsory voting.
Contributions
A review of the different questions surrounding this controversial institution
suggests more research is needed to determine what kinds of democratic political
processes are affected when voting is mandatory. In this dissertation, I empirically assess
the impact of compulsory voting on three specific outcomes: citizen attitudes towards
voting, political engagement beyond turnout, and political campaigning via party
outreach. In the paragraphs that follow, I discuss how these analyses make important
extensions to the previously mentioned dimensions.
At its core, the normative debate on CV taps into the notion of voting as a civic
duty. It posits that countries with compulsory voting laws are fostering this civic duty to
vote, while at the same time perhaps creating resentment amongst those who think
mandatory turnout violates democratic freedom. While some studies have contributed to
this debate by assessing CV’s impact on satisfaction with democracy (Singh 2016) and
trust in institutions (Lundell 2012), no study has yet to test the direct effect of compulsory
voting on citizen’s feelings towards going to the polls. By better understanding whether
CV does (or does not) promote feelings of civic duty or resentment among individuals,
we can at least understand where people who are compelled to vote stand and whether
arguments that posit particular attitudinal effects of compulsory voting are empirically
supported.
This part of the dissertation also speaks to existing shortcomings in the debates on
political engagement and political knowledge. Specifically, parts of this literature
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mention the impact of CV on individual attitudes as mechanisms through which CV
influences behavioral outcomes. For instance, work that associates CV with increases in
political information and engagement note that this can happen partly due to CV’s
potential to promote a sense of civic duty (Engelen 2007; Jackman 1999; Shineman
2009). Similarly, one of the reasons why CV is expected to decrease overall levels of
political engagement is that it provokes feelings of resentment amongst individuals
(Carreras 2016). These propositions, however, have largely been assumed to date. In
order to understand how CV influences substantive outcomes such as political knowledge
or engagement, it is critical for us to better understand how CV impacts the way citizens
perceive the act of voting to begin with, as such perceptions are often posited as key
mechanisms motivating behavior.
The second component of this dissertation contributes directly to the Political
Engagement Question. Apart from a lack of consistency in the findings, existing
empirical studies fail to establish a clear causal link between compulsory voting and
levels of political engagement, or have used less than ideal ways to capture compulsory
voting laws.5 Further, studies in this area tend to either focus on one narrow and specific
political engagement measure, or attempt to predict a large number of political outcomes
that are somewhat related to political engagement in tandem. This discrepancy makes it
difficult to judge under what circumstances CV actually influences political engagement.
I overcome some of these shortcomings by examining the abolition of compulsory
voting in Chile, and carefully distinguishing between different types of political
engagement and the theoretical mechanisms that they are associated with. Specifically, I
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I expand on these critiques in Chapter 3.
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use survey data over the course of 11 years pre and post reform in Chile and investigate
six features of political engagement. In doing so, this research provides a nuanced and in
depth empirical investigation into which specific political engagement outcomes should
be influenced by CV and why that should be the case.
In addition, this part of the dissertation also contributes to the Unequal Electorate
question by examining not only whether CV increases engagement, but also whether it
increases engagement differently for some groups versus others. Specifically, I look at
how an individual’s level of education is an important moderating factor in how CV
impacts political engagement. This investigation takes the unequal electorate question—
which largely focuses on turnout—and expands it to a more substantive political
outcome. By doing this, I am directly contributing to a burgeoning body of literature that
has tried to understand how voting institutions can impact individuals differently,
depending on their level of income, education, or even gender (Carreras 2016; Córdova
and Rangel 2016).
The final component of this dissertation addresses missing pieces in the Electoral
Outcomes Question. This dimension is distinctive within the larger debate on compulsory
voting because most existing literature focuses primarily on its impact on individuals, and
not political elites. The electoral outcome debate shifts this dynamic and instead
contemplates whether CV can influence aggregate-level electoral outcomes. It is still
unclear whether CV benefits one party over another. But, this literature has yet to
consider how political elites might update their electoral strategies when working under
compulsory voting laws. I develop an in-depth theoretical framework that generates
expectations as to how CV plays a role in elites’ decisions prior to elections in terms of
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party outreach, and then test these implications empirically. Specifically, I investigate
how compulsory voting affects the amount of party outreach during campaigns, the
potential targets of outreach, and which parties are likely to lead outreach efforts.
Dissertation Outline
This first chapter (Chapter 1) has aimed to preview the research questions
motivating this project, provide an overview of the definition of compulsory voting and
its manifestation across the world, and to highlight how the dissertation complements and
helps inform the existing debates in the compulsory voting literature. The body of the
dissertation (Chapters 2, 3, and 4) has three main empirical components. Each of these
investigates the impact of CV on distinct political outcomes, and therefore each chapter
has its own introduction, review of the literature, theoretical framework, research design,
empirical analysis, and concluding remarks. All three empirical chapters can, thereby, be
treated and read as stand-alone research projects. But, as all of these empirical pieces
share a common theme, I elaborate on the overarching scholarly and policy implications
of this dissertation in a concluding chapter (Chapter 5).
In more detail, Chapter Two develops and tests expectations of how CV
influences citizens’ feelings towards voting. First, I discuss why the institution of CV
should have an effect on citizens’ perceptions of going to the polls on election day. I
propose theoretical mechanisms for how CV can foster feelings of civic duty or
resentment amongst its population. I also argue that the impact of CV on attitudes could
be neutral—by devaluing the act of voting and making individuals indifferent towards the
turnout process. I use survey-data from the Latinobarómetro Database,6 as Latin America
is a region where compulsory voting is prevalent but not absolute, to estimate citizens’
6

For more information on this data source, see page 36.
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feelings when they go to the polls. A set of hierarchical multinomial logit models show
that contrary to common arguments for and against CV, mandatory turnout does not lead
citizens to feel a higher sense of civic duty, nor does it increase rates of resentment
towards the process. I do, however, find that under CV, there is a higher probability that
an individual will report feeling indifferent towards voting.
Chapter Three uses a unique research design to test whether compulsory voting
influences political engagement beyond voter turnout. I leverage novel public opinion
data from Chile7—a country that abandoned compulsory voting in 2011—over an elevenyear timeframe to investigate whether levels of political engagement were higher under
compulsory versus voluntary voting. In doing so, I also carefully distinguish between six
different aspects of political engagement, and develop nuanced theoretical expectations
of how CV might influence different aspects of engagement for different reasons. I find
that compulsory voting does promote higher rates of political engagement, but primarily
in a private way—citizens under CV are more likely to individually absorb political
information by watching and reading about the news, but not necessarily more likely to
discuss politics around their friends or actively engage in political activity.
In Chapter Four, the focus shifts from citizens to political elites to examine how
CV influences campaign behavior. I argue that compulsory voting can affect three main
elements of campaign strategy: (1) how much party outreach there is; (2) who is the
target of outreach; (3) who is leading the outreach. In particular, I develop expectations as
to how overall levels of party outreach change when the electorate expands under CV,
and why compulsory voting should encourage parties to reach out to traditionally
7

Data comes from Chilean think thank Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP). For more
information on this data source, see pages 76-77.
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marginalized voters. Then, I examine whether members of a specific party ideology have
a higher incentive to mobilize voters under compulsory voting in comparison to if they
were conducting campaigns under voluntary voting. Using data from the Comparative
Study of Electoral Systems (CSES),8 I employ a comprehensive cross-national analysis of
27 countries across the world to test my expectations. Results show that political elites do
adjust to their institutional domain—when voting is mandatory, parties invest in
campaign outreach at similar levels (not less) than when voting is voluntary, and that
outreach is also less skewed towards individuals with higher socioeconomic status. I also
show evidence that parties under CV are more likely to engage in persuasion rather than
mobilization via party outreach.
Finally, in Chapter Five, I summarize the main results of the dissertation and
discuss how they, in tandem, contribute to our overall understanding of the impacts of
mandatory voting across the world. I also elaborate on this research’s broader
contributions to the scholarly literature on political institutions and political behavior,
while also commenting on the policy implications to be drawn from the material
presented here. I conclude by suggesting fruitful avenues for future research in order to
address possible questions that remain.

8
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Chapter 2
Attitudes Towards Voting: Evaluating Civic Duty, Resentment, and Indifference
Under Mandatory Turnout

Elections represent one of the most important aspects of democracy (Dahl 1971).
Despite the importance of electoral participation, many democratic countries have
recently reported rates of voter turnout well below 50 percent.9 Extant research has noted
that certain electoral institutions can motivate citizens to participate.10 Can electoral laws
also influence citizens’ attitudes towards the democratic process? One mobilizing
institution designed to manufacture high turnout rates—compulsory voting (CV)—has
been a successful tool for maximizing political participation (Baek 2009; Franklin 1999,
2002; Hoffman, León, and Lombardi 2017; Quintelier, Hoodhe, and Marien 2011). Still,
the adoption or abolition of this voting system remains a controversial issue for its
potential consequences beyond turnout (Brennan and Hill 2014). While many scholars
have gone on to investigate the more substantive impacts of CV, this research addresses
an overlooked, albeit highly contentious, argument: How does compulsory voting
influence citizens’ attitudes towards the democratic process of voting itself?
Existing arguments for and against this voting institution typically categorize
compulsory voting into promoting either positive or negative attitudes amongst voters.
On the one hand, the continuous act of voting under CV and the sense of inclusiveness it
promotes may trigger a sense of civic duty, which can in turn make citizens more
politically engaged (Blais 2000; Engelen 2007; Keaney and Rogers 2006). On the other
9

For example, countries such as the United States, Colombia, and Switzerland all
recorded turnout rates lower than 50 percent in their most recent legislative elections.
Data available at: http://www.idea.int/vt/.
10
See Cancela and Geys (2016) for a review of this literature.
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hand, forcing individuals to vote might generate resentment among the population, by
coercing voters to incur the costs of turning out and violating the premise of democratic
freedom (Brennan 2014; Birch 2009; Senado 2012). In this paper, I examine empirical
evidence for these arguments and also develop an alternative theoretical implication that
considers how the context surrounding CV laws might increase the likelihood that
citizens simply feel indifferent towards voting. I argue that the shift away from the
relevance of turning out, combined with the reduced costs of turning out produced by
voter-friendly institutional design, should minimize both negative connotations and
positive associations with voting. Drawing on survey data from Latin America, I employ
a hierarchical multinomial technique to test my theoretical expectations.
The contributions of this research are numerous. First, I unpack previous
arguments for and against CV by further developing the theoretical mechanisms that can
cause mandatory turnout to affect citizen attitudes towards voting, thus directly
contributing to the broader institutions literature that aims to better understand the
implications of voter mobilization efforts (e.g., Bedolla and Michelson 2012; Green and
Gerber 2015). Additionally, I also offer an alternative theoretical expectation about a
potential attitudinal effect of CV that has not been considered before. In doing so, this
article also contributes to the voting literature, which has mostly focused on voter
abstention as the equivalent of political indifference (e.g., Fife-Schaw and Breakwell
1990; Hastings 1956; Mayo 1959), by showing that indifferent attitudes can be also
displayed in the presence of active voting behavior. Third, this research presents the first
attempt to empirically test existing and new theories about the direct effects of CV on

24

citizen attitudes towards voting, offering new evidence and further nuance to theoretical
mechanisms that have largely been assumed to date.
Finally, this research has important implications for policymakers who continue
to consider the adoption or abolition of compulsory voting. The recent electoral law
reform that took place in Chile in 2011, for instance, generated much debate among
legislators who argued both for and against the abandonment of CV laws in the country
(Barnes and Rangel 2014). Amongst these arguments, the issue of how CV affects citizen
attitudes towards democracy and political participation was prominent. Other countries
have recently begun to consider implementing a formal requirement to vote (Marty
2014). Although the observation of aggregate effects post-reform might provide
policymakers clues as to how voting laws affect citizen behavior, such conclusions paint
an incomplete picture of the psychological and intrinsic effects voting laws have on
citizens’ attitudes. By providing a direct theoretical and empirical account of individual
attitudes towards voting, this research will better inform those who primarily evaluate
support or opposition for election law reform on the basis of overall citizen perceptions
and willingness to engage with the polity in a meaningful way.
Compulsory vs. Voluntary Voting: An Unsettled Debate
Although many factors explain voter turnout, compulsory voting laws are argued
to be one of the only ways to ensure near-universal political participation (Gallego 2015;
Geys 2006). Countries with CV laws report average turnout rates approximately 10 to 18
percentage points higher than countries with voluntary voting (Baek 2009; Blais and
Aarts 2006, Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; Jaitman 2013), and this effect is even
stronger when sanctions penalizing non-voters are in place and enforced (Panagopoulos
2008, Singh 2011). This is not surprising—when voting is required by law, the cost of
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abstaining is often higher than the cost of turning out, encouraging participation
regardless of institutional constraints or individual resources.
Despite producing a large turnout bonus, compulsory voting remains a
controversial institution. Arguments in favor of CV highlight that high voter turnout is
paramount for the promotion of democracy, legitimacy, and representativeness. High
levels of turnout indicate stronger legitimacy as the elected government is more
representative of the majority of the citizenry, indicating signs of a healthier democracy
(Ballinger 2006; Franklin 2004). Further, CV has the potential to erase electoral biases,
since those who are least likely to turn out under voluntary systems (marginalized
citizens) are required to participate (Córdova and Rangel 2017; Gallego 2015). Finally,
compulsion should increase citizens’ interest in the political process and generate higher
levels of political information and more engaged citizens (Jakee and Sun 2006; Lijphart
1997; Shineman, forthcoming).
Arguments against compulsory voting emphasize that forcing people to vote can
be considered undemocratic and counterproductive (Barnes and Rangel 2014; Lever
2010a). Also, given that non-voters are found to be less politically knowledgeable and
informed than active voters (Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003; Converse 1964), the
inclusion of uninformed voters into the voting electorate might add noise or bias in
electoral patterns (Jakee and Sun 2006; Saunders 2010). Having more uninformed voters
turning out could in turn affect overall levels of political knowledge in the electorate,
ultimately producing sub-optimal electoral outcomes (Ballinger 2006; Loewen, Milner,
and Hicks 2007). Relatedly, the participation of non-voters under CV might increase the
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level of invalid or random votes, which can then raise questions regarding the system’s
legitimacy (Mackerras and McAllister 1999; Power and Garand 2007).
In an attempt to settle the existent debate, many scholars have gone on to
empirically test some of the arguments for and against CV. For instance, compulsory
voting is found to decrease the voting gap between low and high-income voters (Fowler
2013), and between highly educated and less educated individuals (Gallego 2015;
Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998). CV also mobilizes a higher number of young voters to turn
out, erasing generational differences in voting (Irwin 1974; Singh 2011). More recent
work has also found a positive effect of CV in decreasing the gender gap in electoral
engagement beyond voting (Córdova and Rangel 2017). At the same time, CV is found to
produce higher numbers of invalid and random votes (Power and Garand 2007, Uggla
2008). Mixed evidence still exists on whether higher and more equal voter turnout would
benefit leftist parties (Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid 2016; Ferwerda 2014, Hoffman,
León, and Lombardi 2017; Jensen and Spoon 2011) and whether CV increases or
decreases levels of political knowledge and engagement (Birch 2009; Loewen, Milner,
and Hicks 2007, Shineman, forthcoming, Singh and Thorton 2013).
Although most of the empirical literature on this topic focuses on aggregate
patterns of behavior, there have been no attempts to empirically assess how this
institutional design might individually influence citizens’ attitudes. As such, this research
provides the first empirical assessment of how CV influences attitudes towards the
democratic process of voting itself. This research also offers a fruitful way to move the
existent debate forward, given that much of the current literature highlights the influence
of CV on citizens’ attitudes as a mechanism leading to more substantive outcomes.
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Scholarship on a potential positive effect of CV on political sophistication, for instance,
often incorporates the mechanism of increased civic duty as part of the main theoretical
framework (Engelen 2007; Gordon and Segura 1997; Jackman 1999). For example, when
summarizing the arguments in the literature, Shineman (2009, 3) notes that “simply
requiring people to vote will awaken in them a stronger sense of civic duty, a deeper
political interest, and it will lead to a more politically aware society.” The actual
proposition that CV instigates a sense of civic duty among voters, however, has not been
systematically and empirically tested to date. In the next section, I develop expectations
about how mandatory voting laws changes citizens’ perceptions of the act of voting,
which could consequently influence voting behavior and other political outcomes.
Mandatory Turnout and Citizen Attitudes Towards Voting
In his seminal book, Downs (1957) argued that voting can be explained as a
rational decision calculus. The likelihood that an individual will vote depends on the
probability that their vote will make a difference (p), the individual’s utility of voting (B),
and the costs of turning out (C). Voters should only turn out when they believe that the
benefits outweigh the costs (pB > C). Accordingly, scholars have identified several
factors that either increase the probability of votes mattering (p), or decrease the costs of
voting (c), and thus encourage turnout. Given that the probability of benefits outweighing
the costs of turning out is extremely low, a main conclusion established by Downs (1957)
is that voting should be considered irrational. And yet, we still see people turn out to vote
in relatively large numbers. Scholars have argued that in addition to rational calculations,
voters also tend to consider the psychological benefits of turning out—citizens might vote
because it “makes them feel good” or because they think is what good citizens ought to
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do (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Essentially, it means adding another term to Downs’
equation, (D), that represents the psychological benefits of turning out (pB+D > C)
Indeed, research shows that individuals are largely driven by these psychological
benefits when going to the polls. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) find that turnout is 70
percentage points higher for those who indicate having a strong sense of civic duty in
comparison to those who do not. Other research shows that civic duty is one of the most
important motivations driving the willingness to vote (Blais 2000; Clarke et al. 2004;
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Even though a great deal of research examines how
big a role the “D” term plays in motivating electoral participation, fewer studies have
focused on predicting the “D” term in the rational voting calculus.
On average, a substantial number of individuals believe voting is a civic duty.
Blais (2000) reports that in the United States, 84 percent of surveyed university students
indicate support for the statement that voting is a citizen’s duty. The number is even
higher for a sample of Canadian students—99 percent for those in Quebec and 92 percent
in British Columbia. Individuals with higher levels of political interest tend to feel a
higher sense of civic duty, which is not surprising. Blais (2000) also finds that women,
older individuals, and those with higher degrees of religiosity also report higher rates of
civic duty. With a focus on individual level determinants, the study does not, however,
consider institutional design as a predictor of civic duty.
What remains to be studied is how certain election laws—such as compulsory
voting—can change or influence the psychological or intrinsic value of voting, which
could ultimately determine a citizens’ willingness to engage with the democratic system
as a whole. While we often associate the “D” term with a sense of civic duty, other
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psychological attitudes could change one’s calculation regarding voting. In particular to
compulsory voting, the two main factors mentioned in most normative discussions relate
to positive (civic duty) or negative (resentment) emotions. In the next section, I discuss
theoretical mechanisms behind these two commonly cited attitudes, and also propose an
alternative expectation for how CV should influence individual attitudes. I highlight the
importance of taking into account contextual factors and argue that CV may also yield a
more indifferent electorate.
Compulsory Voting and Civic Duty
A relatively common argument in the compulsory voting literature is that CV has
a positive impact on individual’s attitudes. Some existing literature suggests that CV can
increase rates of political engagement and knowledge because it increases one’s sense of
civic duty (Engelen 2007; Lijphart 1997). The theoretical mechanism promoting that
claim, however, remains underdeveloped. I contend that there are several reasons to
expect CV laws to positively affect individuals’ feelings towards the act of voting.
First, mandating that all eligible citizens turn out in every election consequently
creates a habit of voting, directly influencing citizen behavior. Previous works show that
in CV systems, voting is likely to become a habit even for those who would be
considered non-voters under voluntary systems (Blais and Achen 2010; Gerber, Green,
and Schachar 2003). Once voting becomes a habit, participation patterns are likely to
spill over into other types of political involvement, and politics becomes a more
significant part of citizens’ lives (Lijphart 1997; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1995; Wertheimer
1975). As Jakee and Sun (2006, 64) put it, “the more people vote, the more they become
civic and politically minded.” Thus, having to vote election after election, an individual
living under CV is likely to develop a stronger sense of civic duty.
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Additionally, one of the main concerns involving low voter turnout rates is that
young voters are increasingly less interested and involved in politics (Engelen 2007;
Keaney and Rogers 2006). Research shows, however, that young people’s participation is
significantly influenced by the presence of active voters in the household (i.e., parents)
(Fieldhouse and Cutts 2012). When children are exposed to political participation from a
young age as they observe their parents and other relatives going to the polls, they are
more likely to perceive it as an important act and a civic duty. Plutzer (2002, 43) also
argues that “parental political involvement can provide both behavior to model and
campaign-relevant information that children rarely get from formal schooling.” When
voting is compulsory, the likelihood that a young individual will also observe their
parents participating often is much higher, which in turn makes them better able to
internalize the norm to vote, ultimately increasing the likelihood that the act of voting is
perceived as a civic duty from a younger age (Engelen 2007).
Compulsory voting can also incite feelings of civic duty via a more symbolic
mechanism. Making voting a requirement can send a signal that the government values
every citizen’s participation, and is committed to incorporating as many individuals into
the electorate as possible. An Australian politician explains that “Compulsory voting
allows the entire electorate to feel that they have a degree of ownership in government
and its decisions. People feel they are part of the loop and matter. It avoids the
marginalization, hostility and sense of remoteness found in the US” (Australia 1997,
124).
Thus, compulsory voting can be perceived as an inclusive institution rather than
an alienating one. This can, in turn, foster an individuals’ sense of civic duty and
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likelihood that one perceives voting as a positive civic obligation. Taken together, the
voting habit created by CV laws, the early exposure to participation in the household, and
the symbolic effects that make citizens feel included lead to my first general hypothesis:
H1: Compared to those living under voluntary voting, voters living under
compulsory voting are more likely to perceive voting as a civic duty.
Compulsory Voting and Resentment
The counter argument to the belief that CV increases feelings of civic duty is that
coercing people to turn out generates resentment. This could be the case for a variety of
reasons. First, it is well established that turning out to vote is costly, especially for lowincome or disadvantaged voters (e.g., Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978;
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Requiring citizens to turn out by law virtually forces
voters to incur the costs of going to the polls against their will. The disregard for
individuals’ own resources can generate resentment and cause voters to feel negatively
about the act of voting itself. Going back to the rational theory of voting, compelling
citizens to incur the costs of voting (C) can decrease one’s psychological and intrinsic
value (“D” term) attached to the process, instead generating more resentment and
decreasing the chances a potential voter would turn out if not required by law.
Indeed, Hooghe and Pelleriaux (1998) asked respondents in Belgium whether
they would still go vote if CV were abolished in the country. They find that about 30
percent of respondents indicated they would never vote again if CV laws were
eliminated. A similar study of Brazil also finds that a large proportion of voters indicated
a wish to abstain if CV laws were no longer in place (Elkins 2000). Significant declines
in aggregate turnout in countries that have actually abolished compulsory voting in
practice (i.e., Venezuela and Chile) corroborate these hypothetical outcomes (Barnes and
32

Rangel 2014; Birch 2009), suggesting that it is possible for CV laws to negatively
influence citizens’ attitudes towards voting.
Symbolically, a particular argument supporting the fact that CV laws create
negative attitudes is that people living under democratic institutions should have the
freedom and right to choose not to vote. As emphasized by an Australian policymaker,
“the assertion that voting is a ‘right’ means little if one can be imprisoned for
conscientiously choosing not to exercise that right” (Jackman 1999, 31). Similarly, Hill
(2010) explains that in Australia, many individuals who abstain invoke the principle of
democratic choice and freedom of expression as objections to compulsion. When Chilean
lawmakers were debating whether to abolish compulsory voting in 2011, for example,
political opponents of CV specifically argued that forcing citizens to participate against
their will could provoke resentment, consequently discouraging political education
(Barnes and Rangel 2014). As Birch (2009, 63) puts it, “obliging people to vote may
alienate the unengaged even further… for this reason the introduction of compulsory
voting may be counter-productive.” Overall, forcing individuals to incur costs and
disregarding one’s democratic freedom to abstain can nurture feelings of resentment
towards voting. Based on the combination of these arguments, my second general
expectation is:
H2: Compared to those living under voluntary voting, voters living under
compulsory voting are more likely to report feelings of resentment towards the act
of voting.
Compulsory Voting and Indifference
Although most existing arguments for how CV influences citizen attitudes
highlight clear positive and negative consequences, I also argue that mandatory voting
33

laws can promote feeling of indifference for voters. The two previous attitudinal
outcomes cite convincing arguments as to why we should expect either strong positive or
negative feelings amongst voters.
But, I argue that important contextual features of compulsory voting may mitigate
some of these positive and negative effects, fostering instead more neutral feelings. First,
even though voting is costly and CV drives citizens to incur the costs, one overlooked
aspect of this institutional design is that it is typically coupled with other institutions that
are designed to decrease the cost of voting, such as concurrent elections, automatic
registration, and voting on weekends. The vast majority of countries in Latin America
with CV laws, for instance, hold concurrent elections. Every Latin American country that
requires citizens to turn out to vote holds their elections on a Sunday in order to
maximize turnout and minimize the likelihood that voters would have to abandon work or
personal duties to go the polls. The result is that voters do not incur extremely high costs
of voting that are typically associated with voluntary voting systems, which would
subsequently minimize fears that CV might lead to negative attitudes. Instead, it can
contribute to feelings of indifference towards an institution that might be a burden but not
as costly as typically imagined.
Second, elite behavior related to voter turnout can mitigate the positive effects
associated with CV laws. Under voluntary systems, candidates often highlight the
importance of turning out, and engage in multiple “Get out the Vote” (GOTV)
campaigns. In these countries, voting is regarded as an important and crucial act, and this
message is constantly displayed and circulated. Indeed, it is not uncommon for political
parties and donors to allocate significant funds towards GOTV efforts (e.g., Green and
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Gerber 2015, Stone 2012). Meanwhile, CV should, in theory, minimize mobilization
efforts and shift attention away from simply turning out and towards policy issues or
voter persuasion. Therefore, a lack of focus on intensive mobilization fails to invoke the
kind of excitement or sense of fulfillment that occurs under voluntary voting rules.
Additionally, the novelty of voting is minimized under compulsory voting. Take
the United States, for example. During elections, voters often receive an “I voted” sticker
which publicizes their participation. Because voting is voluntary and a large percentage
of the population does not participate, receiving this sticker makes individuals feel as if
they have partaken in an important act that should be publicized. But, once voting is a
mandatory requirement in which all citizens are required to partake in, voting loses its
novelty. Individuals no longer feel as if they are performing an extraordinary act, rather
they are simply complying with the law and doing something all other individuals are
required to do as well, contributing to feelings of indifference. Taken together, the
presence of institutions that reduce the costs of turning out and the lack of emphasis on
the importance of going to the polls combine to create an image of voting as not terribly
costly but also not terribly novel, lead individuals to feel indifferent towards voting.
H3a: Compared to those living under voluntary voting, voters living under
compulsory voting are more likely to feel indifferent or apathetic about voting.
Similarly, the shift away from highlighting the importance of voting and the lack
of novelty drawn from something that the whole population is required to do should
decrease individuals’ satisfaction when going to the polls. Gans (2001) argues that those
who suffer from political indifference are less likely to draw satisfaction from political
acts, suggesting that the same mechanisms proposed above to produce feelings of
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indifference can also be displayed as lower feelings of satisfaction instead. Therefore, I
include a complimentary hypothesis:
H3b: Voters living under compulsory voting are less likely to draw satisfaction
from voting, when compared to those living under voluntary voting.
Data and Methods
To evaluate individual attitudes towards voting, I use a hierarchical modeling
strategy with a survey question available in the 2010 Round of the Latinobarometro
Project Survey fielded in 18 Latin American countries. The Latin American region is an
excellent setting in which to examine the question of CV’s impact on attitudes toward
voting, since it holds the majority of countries with compulsory voting. Although
compulsory voting is prevalent in the region, 5 out of 18 countries have voluntary voting
systems, offering adequate variation for comparing attitudes in compulsory systems to
voluntary systems. Further, focusing on a single region allows me to obtain interesting
variation on the main independent variable, while at the same time holding constant a
number of cultural and historical factors that might potentially confound citizen attitude
formation (Inglehart 1988; Lijphart 1975). In this section, I describe the variables used to
test my hypotheses and the methods applied.
Dependent and Independent Variables of Interest
To evaluate citizens’ attitudes towards voting, respondents were asked the
following question: “Which of the following statements is the closest to your feelings,
when you go to vote?” Respondents could select one of the following answers: (a) I have
a feeling of satisfaction…(coded as satisfaction); (b) I do it only because it is my
duty…(coded as civic duty); (c) I feel upset, it is just a waste of time… (coded as
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resentment); (d) I don’t feel anything in particular…(coded as indifference); (e) I don’t
vote.11
The format of this question is not the traditional way in which civic duty is
typically captured. But, using this questions allows for a much more nuanced
investigation of citizens’ attitudes towards voting. Most measures of civic duty simply
ask respondents whether they think voting is a civic duty, or whether voting is important
to be considered a good citizen (Blais and Galais 2016). More recently, Blais and Galais
(2016) have proposed a battery of questions related to voting and citizens’ responsibilities
to measure civic duty. However, none of these measures capture alternative (and
particularly negative) psychological responses to the act of voting. Hence, in order to test
which side of the normative debate on the positive or negative attitudinal impacts of
compulsory voting, a direct question offering a variety of possible outcomes is needed.
Thus, this measure allows me to capture whether CV has a positive, negative, or neutral
impact on voters.
The main explanatory variable is compulsory voting, which I code in two
different ways. First, a dichotomous measure of compulsory voting is coded as a 1 if
voting is compulsory in a particular country and a 0 if voting is non-compulsory. A
second categorical measure, enforced CV takes into account the presence of enforcement
mechanisms, and countries where voting is compulsory and enforced receive a (2),
countries where voting is compulsory but unenforced receive a (1), and countries where
voting is voluntary receive a 0. These data were drawn from the International Institute for
Democratic and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), which identifies which countries around
11

See Table A1 in Appendix A for the Spanish translation of the question and answer
options.
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the world practice compulsory voting. In the sample, Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia,
El Salvador, and Nicaragua do not have compulsory voting rules.12 Seven other countries
have relatively unenforced compulsory voting laws, and 6 other have enforced CV
rules.13
Control Variables
I control for several variables that might affect how citizens perceive the act of
voting. At the individual level, age can be an important factor influencing attitudes, as
older individuals are found to report higher feelings of civic duty (Blais 2000) as well as
overall rates of political engagement (Verba and Nie 1972). Additionally, socioeconomic
status is known to affect citizen political participation (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978, Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Thus, I control for education and income. I also control for
political interest, satisfaction with democracy, and minority. Finally I also take into
account whether the individual indicated a willingness to vote in an upcoming election
(voter).14 All individual-level variables were drawn from the same Latinobarometro
Survey (2010) from which the dependent variables were drawn.15

12

See Table A2 in Appendix A for a complete list of all countries included in the analysis
and their respective compulsory voting coding.
13
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Paraguay
are considered to have weak enforcement of CV laws. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador,
Peru, and Uruguay have enforced CV laws.
14
This variable is different from the dependent variable’s option to select “I Don’t Vote.”
This is because selecting “I Don’t Vote” implies the individual has little to no experience
with voting, or is not able to express how they feel towards voting. Instead, the
independent (control) variable voter is based on a question that asks individuals whether
who would they vote for if an election took place on Sunday. If individual expressed a
vote choice, they are coded as being a voter, and those who expressed not voting if an
election would take place are coded as a non-voter.
15
See Table A3 in the Appendix A for a complete description of each control variable,
and Table A4 for descriptive statistics for all control variables.
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At the country level, I control for the level of democracy and economic
development for each country. Data on democracy comes from the Freedom House’s civil
liberties and political rights ratings (Freedom House 2014). This variable was
transformed in order to report states with higher scores in the freedom house scale as
more democratic, while lower scores reflect less democratic states.16 Economic
development is measured as Gross Domestic Product GDP per capita from the World
Development Indicators (World Bank 2014), with higher levels indicating more
developed countries.17
Methodology
One important feature of the data in this study is that observations are clustered at
different levels of analysis. Specifically, the data are clustered at two levels: individual
respondents 𝑖 (level 1) nested within countries 𝑗 (level 2). The main explanatory variable
is compulsory voting, which is recorded at the country level. The outcome variable,
citizen attitudes, is measured at the individual level through public opinion data. To
account for the nested nature of the data, I estimate a hierarchical model across two levels
of analysis: respondents nested within countries (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). In
addition, the outcome variable is based on a survey question that allows individuals to
select one of many categorical outcomes. That is, a respondent will select an answer in
comparison to all other answer choices they were provided with. Given that these answer
options are categorical and not structured as an ordinal scale, I employ a hierarchical
multinomial logit model, which predicts the likelihood of selecting a specific answer in
16

Democracy data comes from the 2011 Freedom House Report, which includes
information from the year 2010.
17
This variable is introduced in the models by taking the logarithm of the GDP values
recorded.
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comparison to a specific baseline. The model specification for testing the main
hypotheses is as follows: 18
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑗 + 𝛾10 𝐴𝑔𝑒1𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾20 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾30 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾40 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡4𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾50 𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦5𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾60 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟6𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾70 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒7𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾80 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦8𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾02 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎2𝑗 + 𝛾03 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙3𝑗
+ 𝑈0𝑗 + 𝑅𝑖𝑗

where 𝑈0𝑗 represents the random effects for the intercept across countries, and 𝑅𝑖𝑗 are
errors at the individual level.
Cross-Country Variation
The question on citizens’ feelings towards voting contains a lot of information.
Individuals are able to select one out of many responses. To better visualize the
distributions, Figure 2.1 graphs the percentage of respondents in each country selecting
each possible answer. One preliminary observation that can be drawn from these
descriptive stats is that a plurality of voters in every single country identifies feelings of
civic duty as the defining sentiment when they vote. In many countries, a large majority
of voters report a sense of civic duty. Thus, regardless of the voting system, a great
number of voters in the Latin American region recognize voting as a civic obligation.
This is consistent with previous work that shows most people, in general, agree that
voting represents an act of civic duty (Blais 2000; Blais and Galais 2016).
While it is apparent that individuals in most countries report high rates of feelings
of civic duty, much more variation exists for the selection of other responses, such as
resentment, or feelings of indifference. For instance, Ecuador, reports the highest
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This model only assumes random effects for the intercept.
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percentage of citizens identifying civic duty as the reason why they vote (over 60
percent) amongst countries. At the same time, Ecuador reports one of the highest rates of
voter indifference in comparison to other countries (approximately 20 percent). Uruguay
and Venezuela, by contrast, have much more similar rates of citizens reporting both civic
duty and satisfaction. Rates of resentment, overall, seem to be pretty low across most
countries, while satisfaction varies considerably. In sum, a great deal of variation is
reported within and across countries. It is difficult however, to observe any systematic
patterns across the set of responses based off of each country’s voting laws. In the next
section, I conduct an empirical investigation into which attitudes are more likely to take
shape when voting is mandatory or voluntary.
Figure 2.1. Average Levels of Attitudes Towards Voting, by Country
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Empirical Findings
I begin by first examining how, on average, compulsory voting influences a
citizen’s feeling towards the act of voting. Results from a hierarchical multinomial logit
regression analysis appear in Table 2.1. This model estimates the probability of
individuals selecting any one of the possible answers to the attitudinal question,
compared to a baseline category. Because it was the most common choice across the
sample, civic duty is used here as the baseline.19
Notably, we see that citizens living under CV rules are no more likely to report
feeling resentment, in comparison to a sense of civic duty. The same is the case for
reporting satisfaction. But, the coefficient for indifference is positive and statistically
significant, meaning that those living under CV are significantly more likely to report
feeling indifferent about voting in comparison to civic duty.
Because the significance of the results might change depending on the baseline, I
graph the marginal effects for a change in the dependent variable in order to estimate the
change in predicted probability of selecting each option. Figure 2.2 shows the change in
predicted probability of reporting a specific feeling (compared to all other possibilities)
when voting laws when going from a zero (voluntary voting) to a one (compulsory
voting). The confidence intervals indicate statistical significant differences at the 95%

19

Tables A5-A7 in Appendix A include the results when the baselines are abstention,
resentment, and satisfaction. The model with indifference as the baseline did not
converge in the statistical software used. But, one way to compare the statistical
significance of compulsory voting among all attitudes is to independently create
dichotomous variables for each (did respondent select, for instance, feeling resentment or
anything else). When disaggregating each outcome, indifference is the only attitude that
is predicted by compulsory voting (i.e., statistically significant at p<.001). These results
can be found in Table A8 in Appendix A.
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confidence level. If the confidence intervals cross the zero line, the change is not
statistically significant.
Table 2.1. The Impact of CV on Individual Attitudes Towards Voting
(Civic Duty as the Baseline)
Resentment
Indifference
Satisfaction
Don’t Vote
Compulsory Voting
0.175
0.489***
-0.091
-0.771
(0.114)
(0.087)
(0.211)
(0.616)
Age
-0.002
-0.004
0.004***
-0.037***
(0.002)
(0.052)
(0.001)
(0.003)
Female
0.045
-0.105**
-0.008
0.004
(0.068)
(0.035)
(0.038)
(0.079)
Education
-0.086
-0.108***
-0.004
-0.254***
(0.046)
(0.031)
(0.025)
(0.058)
Political Interest
-0.052
-0.145***
0.413***
-0.279***
(0.040)
(0.031)
(0.020)
(0.051)
Satisfaction with
-0.316***
-0.388***
0.196***
-0.121*
Democracy
(0.042)
(0.058)
(0.022)
(0.047)
Voter
-0.619***
0.011
0.635***
-1.684***
(0.074)
(0.020)
(0.056)
(0.081)
Income
0.026
0.061
0.075***
-0.062*
(0.026)
(0.062)
(0.015)
(0.031)
Minority
-0.209**
0.136**
0.025
-0.062
(0.079)
(0.051)
(0.045)
(0.093)
GDP per capita
0.036
-0.117**
0.135
0.096
(0.071)
(0.038)
(0.125)
(0.365)
Democracy Level
0.119*
-0.012***
-0.069
0.144
(0.051)
(0.002)
(0.092)
(0.270)
Constant
-1.637**
-0.957*
-3.570***
0.341
(0.564)
(0.420)
(0.965)
(2.789)
# of Individuals
17,020
# of Countries
18
Note: Estimated coefficients indicate the impact of each independent variable on the
probability of selecting one of the options listed above over the baseline response of
Civic Duty. Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Figure 2.2 shows that a change from voluntary to compulsory voting leaves the
predicted probability of an individual selecting “civic duty” as their closest feeling when
turning out essentially unchanged, and not statistically different from zero. Contrary to
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Hypothesis 1, then, it does not appear that compulsory voting leads to higher levels of
civic duty amongst its citizenry. This null finding represents a significant departure for
the literature that has largely assumed a relationship between compulsory voting and
civic duty (Gordon and Segura 1997; Lijphart 1997). If compulsory voting has any
effects beyond increased turnout, it is likely not because it makes citizens feel more
civically minded and consider voting to be a duty.
Figure 2.2. Marginal Effect of Compulsory Voting on Individual
Attitudes Towards Voting

Notes: Figure 2.2 shows the change in predicted probability of reporting a specific
feeling (compared to all other possibilities) when the voting law goes from zero
(voluntary voting) to one (compulsory voting) with 95% confidence intervals. If
confidence intervals cross the zero line, the effect is not statistically significant.
Estimates were calculated from results in Models 1-4 in Table 2.1.
Hypothesis 2 posited that CV should instead lead to higher feelings of resentment
towards voting. If it is clear that CV does not increase civic duty, then critics of this
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institution would likely expect this to be the case. But, as Figure 2.2 shows, there is a
slight increase in the predicted probability of selecting “resentment” when voting is
compulsory, but that change is incredibly small and not statistically significant (i.e.,
confidence interval crosses the zero line). This null finding is perhaps even more
surprising, given that the chances someone living under voluntary voting would indicate
feeling resentment when voting is likely really low (rather than just abstaining). But, even
when coercing a much larger amount of individuals into the electorate, it does not seem
like the average level of resentment increases. While this finding does not provide
support for Hypothesis 2, it does show that CV does not negatively impact citizens’
attitudes significantly.
Figure 2.2 also shows that one specific outcome is statistically significant: having
a compulsory voting system increases the probability that an individual will report feeling
indifferent towards voting. Specifically, individuals that are subject to compulsory voting
laws are about 5 percent more likely to report feeling indifferent when turning out at the
polls. While this effect is not huge, it does provide support for Hypothesis 3a. By contrast,
Hypothesis 3b is not supported—CV does not significantly affect the probability that one
feels “satisfied” when going to the polls. The findings are also similar when we take into
account the level of enforcement of compulsory voting laws, as shown in Figure 2.3.20
This likely suggests that when it comes to attitudes, CV has more of a symbolic effect,
and does not necessarily need to be enforced to produce a specific pattern.
In tandem, the findings reported in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show that compulsory
voting laws do not have the attitudinal impact that is often argued and discussed. When

20

Marginal Effects were calculated from results shown in Table A9 in Appendix A.
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subjected to mandatory voting laws, individuals are no more likely to feel a higher sense
of civic duty or resentment. Instead, they are slightly more likely to feel neutral towards
the act of voting. This supports the notion that CV minimizes the novelty associated with
voting, and voting appears to be a rather routine chore that all individuals take part in,
such as paying taxes or jury duty, for instance.
Figure 2.3. Marginal Effect of Enforced Compulsory Voting on Individual
Attitudes Towards Voting

Notes: Panel A in Figure 2.3 shows the change in predicted probability of reporting a
specific feeling (compared to all other possibilities) when the voting law goes from zero
(voluntary voting) to one (unenforced compulsory voting) with 95% confidence intervals.
Panel B in Figure 2.3 shows the change in predicted probability of reporting a specific
feeling (compared to all other possibilities) when the voting law goes from zero
(voluntary voting) to two (enforced compulsory voting) with 95% confidence intervals.
If confidence intervals cross the zero line, the effect is not statistically significant.
Estimates were calculated from results presented in Table A9 in Appendix A.
Additional Analyses
As previously discussed, the question used in this study is not the traditional way
to measure attitudes towards voting, but offers the benefit of exploring a variety of
feelings and attitudes simultaneously. One critique may be that the wording of the
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question used to estimate the dependent variable—feelings towards voting—assumes that
an individual has had some type of experience with voting before. However, one answer
option is to select “I don’t vote,” which implies that the individual does not have
sufficient experience with voting and therefore has no ability to answer the question
properly. This category is important to have because it works as a form of quality control,
by offering an alternative for individuals who may otherwise randomly select an answer
(as it often happens with attitudinal questions) (Converse and Presser 1986). In this sense,
having this option increases the confidence that individuals are sincerely selecting a
feeling towards voting—especially the ones expressing indifference. Yet, the percentage
of individuals selecting that they don’t vote is incredibly small (6.32 percent in countries
with VV; 4.73 in CV).
We know from aggregate reported levels of voter turnout that the percentage of
abstainers in any given election tends to be larger than that. Even in compulsory voting
countries, turn out is not completely universal. Thus, a better way to capture whether
reported attitudes correspond to how people actually feel when they vote is to consider
actual voting behavior in tandem with reported attitudes.
In order to ensure that I am mostly capturing those who actually vote under both
systems, I take two approaches. In the main analysis presented in Table 2.1, I control for
whether an individual indicated that they would vote if an election was held this
Sunday.21 Note that the voter variable works as expected for the resentment, satisfaction
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This is based on a question that asks, “If elections were being held this Sunday, which
party would you vote for?” If the respondent identified a specific party or reported they
would vote blank, the voter variable is coded as a 1. If they responded that they would
not vote, the variable is coded as a 0. The 2010 Latinobarometro does not directly ask
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and abstain outcome. Individuals who reported willingness to vote in an upcoming
election were significantly less likely to report feeling resentment when voting, and also
less likely to say they just don’t vote in general. Voters were also significantly more
likely to feel satisfaction when voting. But, being a voter does not matter for reporting
indifference.
In order to assess whether being a voter matters depending on the institutional
design, I also conduct an analysis where voter is interacted with compulsory voting.22 I
then graph the predicted probabilities for each attitudinal outcome based on the system
and whether individual was a voter or not (see Figure 2.4). The top right graph of Figure
2.4 shows that while both voters and non-voters in CV systems report slightly higher
average levels of resentment in comparison to voters and nonvoters in VV systems, these
differences are not statistically significant (i.e., confidence intervals overlap). Statistically
significant differences exist between voters and non-voters within each system. This is
intuitive; non-voters in each system are much more likely to report feelings of resentment
in comparison to those who identify themselves as voters.

individuals if they actually voted in the previous election, as many other surveys do.
Therefore, this is the best way to approximate reported voting behavior.
22
See Table A10 in Appendix A.
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Figure 2.4. Predicted Probabilities of Individual Attitudes by Voting System
and Voting Behavior

Notes: Figure 2.4 shows the predicted probability of selecting a specific feeling,
conditioned by being a voter or not. Confidence intervals indicate statistical significant
differences at the 95% confidence level. Estimates were calculated from results presented
in Table A10 in Appendix A.
In regards to civic duty, the top left graph in Figure 2.4 shows that voters and nonvoters in both types of systems report feeling like voting is a civic duty. Here, it is
interesting to note that when it comes to perceiving voting as a civic obligation, voters
and non-voters report virtually the same patterns—meaning, nonvoters are just as likely
to report feelings of civic duty towards voting, but that does not ensure that they will
actually turn out. The bottom right graph in Figure 2.4 shows that, similar to feelings of
resentment, but in an inverse direction, voters in both VV and CV systems tend to report
significantly higher levels of satisfaction in comparison to non-voters, but that the
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differences between compulsory and voluntary voting per se are not statistically
significant.
Most importantly, however, the bottom left graph of Figure 2.4 suggests that (1)
non-voters are significantly more likely to report feelings of indifference towards voting
than voters in both systems, and (2) voters in CV are significantly more likely to report
indifference relative to voters in VV systems. Non-voters under CV are also slightly more
likely to report feeling indifferent than non-voters in VV, and this different is close to
being statistically significant. This suggests that even when you take away the most
indifferent people under compulsory voting (those who would likely by non-voters), there
is still a significant difference between voters in both systems. This provides evidence
that this effect is not only being driven by unlikely voters.
I also graph the interaction between voters/nonvoters under both systems as an
predictor of selecting the option “don’t vote” in Figure A1 in Appendix A in order to
show how selecting “don’t vote” and as attitude towards voting differs from whether the
respondent indicated voting in an upcoming election. The figure shows that both nonvoters and voters under compulsory voting system are less likely to select the “don’t
vote” category, since they are more likely to turn out due to the requirement to vote. It
also shows that non-voters in both systems are significantly more likely to say that they
“don’t vote,” consistent with the expectation that it is only people who have had less or
no experience with voting that are more likely to chose that answer to the attitudinal
question.
A second concern is that the statistically significant result that individuals living
under CV laws are more likely to report feeling indifferent might simply be a product of a
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higher number of politically uninterested voters being coerced to the polls under CV. In
other words—it is not that CV is affecting a change in attitudes, but simply that it is
including voters to its electorate that are not interested in politics and would otherwise
abstain if voting weren’t mandatory. If that is the case, we should expect that the
statistically significant effect of CV on indifference is restricted to those who are not that
interested in politics. That gap should then essentially close for those with higher levels
of political interest. In order to see if that is the case, I estimate a model that predicts
citizen attitudes using levels of political interest conditioned by the voting system.23 I
then graph the predicted probabilities to ease interpretation in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5. Predicted Probabilities of Indifferent Attitudes Towards
Voting by Voting System and Political Interest

Notes: Figure 2.5 shows the predicted probability of selecting feelings of indifference,
conditioned by an individuals’ level of political interest. Confidence intervals indicate
statistical significant differences at the 95% confidence level. Estimates were calculated
from results presented in Table A11 in Appendix A.
23

See Table A11 in Appendix A for the results.
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Figure 2.5 shows levels of indifference towards voting for each level of political
interest, and by voting system.24 The figures show that while it is clear that the more
interested an individual is, the less likely they are to feel indifferent towards voting
regardless of the voting system. Most important for my argument, however, individuals
under CV are still significantly more likely to feel indifferent than their counterparts
living under voluntary voting at every level of political interest, including those who
report “some” or “high” interest in politics. Admittedly, these statistically significant
differences are not particularly large. It does still show that indifference is not only a
product of more uninterested voters being driven to the polls under CV. Instead, it
appears compulsory voting does influence individual attitudes—even amongst those who
are particularly interested in politics.
Taken together, these findings show that while most scholars and political figures
tend to perceive the impact of compulsory voting on individual attitudes as either positive
or negative, evidence shows that the impact of CV on individual attitudes towards voting
is not as clear as expected. Unlike certain proponents of CV argue, mandatory turn out
does not inspire citizens to become more civically minded. At the same times, it appears
that concerns over CV instigating negative feelings amongst citizens have been
overstated. Instead, there is evidence that CV increases the likelihood that individuals feel
indifferent towards voting, although the magnitude of this effect is still small.

24

Political Interest is measured via the following question: “How interested are you in
politics?” The variable was recoded so that a 1 equals not at all interested, 2 low interest,
3 some interest, and 4 high interest.
52

Confirming the Null Effects on Civic Duty
The main dependent variable in this study is a useful way to capture variations in
individual’s feelings towards the democratic process because it allows for individuals to
select a variety of attitudes that provide important information about how institutional
design changes citizens perceptions. At the same time, it does not provide a conventional
way to capture civic duty. The main analyses of this study suggest that compulsory
voting does not influence an individuals’ sense of civic duty. Because this null finding
contrasts with other literature arguing the CV could positively influence individuals’
attitudes towards the political process, I conduct an additional analysis to confirm that
this is the case using more conventional measures of civic duty.
As previously discussed, one of the most common way to capture civic duty is to
ask whether an individual perceives voting as an important feature of being a good citizen
(Blais and Galais 2016). Consistent with a number of additional surveys, the 2010 round
of the Latinobarometro asks the following question: “which of the following things do
you believe you should do in order to be considered a good citizen?” Among several
potential options, if the respondent selected “you should vote,” I recorded that as
indicating a civic duty to vote. Table A12 in Appendix A indicates that compulsory
voting is not a statistically significant predictor of recognizing voting as a civic duty.
Below in Figure 2.6, I report the results graphically in order to ease interpretation.
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Figure 2.6. Predicted Probability of Civic Duty to Vote, by Voting System

Notes: Figure 2.6 shows the predicted probability of selecting voting as
important for being a good citizen. Confidence intervals indicate statistical
significant differences at the 95% confidence level. Estimates were calculated
from results presented in Table A12 in Appendix A.
In the figure, we first note that the predicted probabilities of an individual in Latin
America identifying voting as a civic duty is relatively high, somewhere between 70 and
80 percent. This is again consistent with previous literature on individuals in the United
States and Canada (Blais 2000), and with the high levels shown earlier in Figure 2.1. But,
there are no apparent differences depending on the voting system. Individuals under both
compulsory and voluntary voting are equally as likely to report feelings of civic duty (i.e.
confidence intervals overlap). This provides strong face validity to the an important
finding of this study—compulsory voting does not fundamentally change how much
individuals perceive voting to be a civic duty.
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Conclusion
Overall, the results provided in this research suggest that on average, citizens
living under compulsory voting systems tend to feel slightly more indifferent towards the
act of voting when compared to their counterparts in voluntary systems. Contrary to a
variety of scholars who argue CV laws should awaken a sense of civic duty amongst its
citizenry, individuals living under these systems are no more likely to perceive voting as
a civic duty than those living under voluntary voting. It also provides empirical evidence
against the claim that CV creates more resentful citizens. The findings also suggest that
CV can change the amount of value citizens see in actually going to the polls. This is an
important piece of evidence to be invoked when scholars, practitioners, and policymakers
highlight the potential harming or beneficial effects of voting system reform.
While this research provides empirical evidence for how mandatory voting
influences citizen attitudes, further research is necessary to unpack the mechanisms that
lead individuals to feel indifferent towards voting. Specifically, the contextual effect of
institutions that are coupled with compulsory voting in order to make turning out less
costly cannot be empirically tested in the Latin American region due to the widespread
similarity in institutional design among countries with both voluntary and compulsory
laws. We could, however, gain useful insight as to how such voter-friendly institutional
design works to influence citizen attitudes by expanding the analysis to other regions or
countries in which more significant variation exists.
Also, future research should investigate voter mobilization efforts under
compulsory voting in order to better understand why CV can lead certain individuals to
devalue their votes. A careful investigation of how individuals perceive the value of their
vote given the institutional environment they are presented with could offer scholars and
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practioners more insights as to how to engage the population as a whole. Although this
article focuses on attitudes and not political behavior, it is possible that indifferent
attitudes under CV can be behaviorally displayed as patterns of invalid or blank voting—
what some consider as the equivalent of abstention when voting is mandatory (Lavareda
1991). While the investigation of whether apathetic attitudes correspond to higher rates of
invalid voting (or less political activism) is beyond the scope of this study, a further look
into the behavioral manifestation of feelings of indifference would represent a fruitful
avenue for future research.
The effects (or lack thereof) of CV laws on individual attitudes presented in this
paper are likely the first step in a chain of events that explains how mandatory voting
influences overall political behavior and electoral outcomes, relationships that have been
vastly explored in the literature to date. While this primary link was largely unexplored to
date, it can help explain the existing lack of consensus that exists in terms of the
byproducts of CV (i.e. its impact on political sophistication or political engagement), add
nuance and empirical evidence to specific untested mechanisms assumed to be present in
driving aggregate outcomes in the presence or absence of compulsory voting. Overall,
this research contributes to our broader understanding of the psychological and intrinsic
effects of maximizing turnout via mandatory voting laws.
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Chapter 3
Political Engagement When Voting is Mandatory: Evidence From Election Law
Reform in Chile
Electoral participation is a core element of democracy (Dahl 1971). Political
participation on election day is crucial for establishing democratic legitimacy, as election
outcomes are perceived as more representative when a large part of the population turns
out to vote (Dalton 2004). Broader civic engagement also strengthens democracy
(Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993). While a considerable amount of research has
aimed to explain what cultural and institutional factors influence voter turnout and
political engagement as a whole, what do we know about political engagement when
turnout is a given? Under a system of compulsory voting, all eligible citizens are required
by law to turn out at the polls, causing turnout rates to be much higher (Bechtel,
Hangartner, and Schmid 2016; Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; Hoffman, León, and
Lombardi 2017; Singh 2011). Our knowledge of how compulsory voting (herein CV)
influences citizens’ political behavior beyond election day remains unclear.
A burgeoning body of research has started to investigate this question, but
empirical findings are mixed. For instance, experimental designs simulating mandatory
requirements to vote have found both positive (Shineman, forthcoming) and null
(Loewen, Milner, and Hicks 2007) effects. Single country studies, often using
counterfactual scenarios of institutional reform, also raise doubts as to whether CV has
any potential effects beyond voting (De Leon and Rizzi 2014; Singh, Roy, and Fournier
2017). More comprehensive cross-national studies of political engagement under CV
conclude that little to no relationship exists in the aggregate (Birch 2009; Carreras 2016),
but that enforced mandatory voting laws do help decrease engagement gaps of certain
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marginalized groups (Córdova and Rangel 2017; Dassonneville, Hooghe, and Miller,
forthcoming). This growing mixed evidence suggests we do not yet fully understand the
second-order effects of mandatory voting laws. Existing inconsistencies may be due to
variation in research designs in this literature, which at times are lacking in internal
validity or fail to capture the causal relationship between CV and engagement, or also
due to the variety of engagement outcomes examined.
This study overcomes these issues by leveraging novel public opinion data from
Chile over an eleven-year timeframe that captures a change in CV laws. The abolition of
compulsory voting in Chile in 2011 provides a unique opportunity to estimate the effects
of CV on political engagement beyond the ballot box. Apart from this type of reform
being extremely rare, the lack of quality individual survey data before and after reform
has prevented scholars from pursuing a thorough quantitative analysis of the effects of
compulsory voting beyond turnout (Selb and Lachat 2009).25 The empirical approach
used in this study allows us to more accurately capture the effect of compulsory voting on
engagement by taking advantage of an exogenous institutional change while holding
constant many other contextual and cultural factors that are difficult to isolate in crossnational analyses.
This study also makes an important theoretical contribution by carefully
distinguishing between different aspects of political engagement, and by drawing specific
connections between the many theoretical mechanisms and outcomes to be observed. I
examine the impact of compulsory voting on six distinct aspects of political engagement
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Apart from Chile, the only other countries to ever formally abandon compulsory voting
are the Netherlands (in 1970) and Venezuela and Italy (in 1993) (Gratschew 2004;
Lijphart 1997).
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related to information seeking, the information environment, and political activism—
which all rely on distinct theoretical mechanisms. In doing so, this study provides a more
nuanced picture of the ways in which a mandatory requirement to vote might affect
overall political engagement. I find that CV does increase political engagement, but in a
rather private form—citizens are more likely to individually absorb political information
by watching and reading about the news, but not necessarily more likely to discuss
politics around their friends or actively engage in political activity. All in all, this
research contributes directly to our understanding of how attempts to maximize turnout
via institutional change can affect not only electoral participation, but also broader
aspects of political engagement.
Determinants of Engagement and the Mixed Evidence on Compulsory Voting
Concerns over low turnout are prominent among scholars and political elites
across the world. High levels of turnout indicate stronger legitimacy as the elected
government depicts a more direct representation of the will of the majority (Dalton 2004;
Scully, Jones, and Trystan 2004). Higher turnout also increases the chances that the
voting electorate is more representative, suggesting that elected officials and subsequent
policies are more reflective of a wider and more diverse set of the population (Dahl 2006;
Hill and Leighley 1994; Lijphart 1999). Given the established importance of electoral
participation for the functioning of democracy, an extensive body of research investigates
what factors best predict voter turnout rates. We know, for example, that individuals of
higher socioeconomic status are more likely to turn out to vote (Smets and van Ham
2013; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1995). Older individuals tend to vote at higher rates (Leighley
1995), and in some countries, women go to the polls at lower rates than men (Córdova
and Rangel 2017; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2014).
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Research also shows that political institutions have a particularly strong impact on
an individuals’ likelihood to go to the polls (Cancela and Geys 2016; Geys 2006).
Institutions that reduce the costs of voting, such as inexpensive registration laws
(Ansolabehere and Konisky 2006; Vonnahme 2012) or concurrent elections (Hajnal and
Lewis 2003; Lijphart 1997), encourage voters to turn out at the polls. Additionally,
lowering the cost of getting to the polls by holding elections on weekends can promote
electoral participation (Franklin 2002). Institutions can also foster political participation
by increasing the value of one’s vote, sending a signal that an individual’s vote might
make a difference (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Levine and Palfrey 2007). Proportional
electoral systems (Blais and Aarts 2006; Karp and Banducci 1999), high district
magnitudes (Blais and Carty 1990; Geys 2006), and strong electoral competition (Blais
and Rubenson 2013; Engstrom 2012) all motivate electoral participation by making an
individual vote more valuable.
Yet, the strongest and most robust predictor of turnout is the presence of
compulsory voting laws (Cancela and Geys 2016). This institution encourages
participation by raising the cost of not voting, as the government is allowed to impose
sanctions or fines on those who choose to abstain altogether (Panagopoulos 2008). When
sanctions are enforced, compulsory voting is especially efficient in mobilizing
participation (Blais, Massicotte, and Dobrzynska 2003; Singh 2011). Countries with
mandatory voting requirements display turnout rates anywhere from 10 to 18 percentage
points higher than countries with no formal requirement to turn out (Baek 2009; Fornos,
Power, and Garand 2004; Jaitman 2013). Where compulsory voting was abolished,
turnout rates severely declined, such as in the Netherlands in 1970 (from 94.9 percent to
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79.1 percent within one election cycle) Venezuela in 1993 (from 81.7 percent to 60
percent) and most recently Chile in 2011 (from 86 percent to 50 percent) (Barnes and
Rangel 2014; Birch 2009; Irwin 1974).26
As certain as we are about compulsory voting increasing turnout, much debate
still exists in regards to the additional effects of compulsory voting laws. Aside from an
ongoing philosophical debate on the legality and suitability of mandatory turnout,27
scholars have recently turned their attention to studying the second-order effects of CV
that expand beyond voter election day. A burgeoning body of literature investigates
whether CV promotes engagement in other aspects of the political realm beyond the
ballot box.
Political engagement can be a rather broad term. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady
(1995, 38) define political engagement as “activity that has the intent or effect of
influencing government action—either directly by affecting the making or
implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who
make those policies.” Zukin et al (2006, 7) note that this is different than civic
engagement, which they define as “organized voluntary activity focused on problem
solving and helping others.” Political engagement can take on many forms. Typical
political indicators of engagement include not just voting but also persuading others,
volunteering for a campaign, or making campaign contributions. Cognitive engagement is
often related to actions such as discussing politics, attention to the news, and also overall
levels of political knowledge.

26
27

Here, turnout is calculated as the proportion of registered electors who participated.
See Brennan and Hill (2014) for a comprehensive discussion of this debate.
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While the factors that influence political engagement are often similar to the ones
that predict voter turnout (which in and of itself is a political form of engagement), it is
still unclear whether the positive impact compulsory voting has on voter turnout
translates into other engagement outcomes. The empirical evidence on this relationship is
far from conclusive, with some studies showing a positive effect (e.g., Gordon and
Segura 1997; Shineman, forthcoming, Singh and Thorton 2013), moderate effects (e.g.,
Birch 2009), or little to no effect (e.g., Carreras 2016; Loewen, Milner, and Hicks 2007).
These discrepancies may in part be due to the different research designs used to
investigate the question, and the types of engagement outcomes they examine. Existing
studies of CV and political engagement have used multiple empirical strategies: crossnational, large-N approaches; single-case and subnational studies; and experimental
designs.
Cross-National Designs
The most comprehensive studies of CV use cross-national data to investigate
whether levels of political engagement are higher in countries with compulsory voting
laws versus those where voting is voluntary. What is meant by political engagement,
however, varies. A few studies focus on political sophistication as the outcome—with the
theoretical assumption that CV promotes higher overall engagement with politics,
thereby raising the amount of knowledge for a given individual. These studies find small
but positive increases in the level of knowledge for those living in CV countries
(Berggren 2001; Gordon and Segura 1997), and stronger evidence that it makes political
knowledge more evenly distributed among the population (Dassoneville, Hooghe, and
Miller, forthcoming; Sheppard 2015). Focusing specifically on partisan attachment as an
aspect of engagement, Singh and Thorton (2013) argue that the higher presence of non62

sophisticated voters in the electorate of CV countries prompts individuals to make use of
shortcuts for deciding who to vote for. The authors find that rates of party attachment are
indeed higher in countries where voting is compulsory. Additionally, studies focusing on
the engagement of specific groups of the population, such as women, find that CV works
to close the gender gap in election-related forms of political engagement (Córdova and
Rangel 2017).
Other studies focusing on a more wide-ranging list of political engagement
outcomes start to cast uncertainty upon the positive findings discussed above. Birch
(2009) shows that CV has little to no impact on political knowledge, levels of political
conversation, and certain measures of political participation. In a recent and
comprehensive analysis of 21 Latin American and Caribbean countries over a period of
ten years, Carreras (2016, 155) examines the impact of CV on both cognitive (i.e.,
political interest, attention to news) and active (i.e., attendance in party meetings or
community events) forms of engagement, concluding that “compulsory voting has a
negligible effect on political engagement.”
While these studies add valuable information to our understanding of the impacts
of CV laws, cross-national designs raise doubts about the causality of the relationship
between CV and political engagement. Cross-national designs allow us to observe the
existence of a correlation, but make it difficult to establish whether CV as a single
institution is causing levels of engagement to change given that they are examining
average levels across different states at the same point in time. Although these studies
make strong efforts to control for as many confounding factors as possible, they still
investigate different individuals under a diverse set of institutions, election dynamics, and
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cultural or social elements. Cultural factors, which are possible determinants of behavior,
are especially difficult to control for in cross-national studies (Fowler and Kam 2007;
Rolfe 2012). For instance, Norris’ (2004) finding that CV matters more for turnout in
established democracies versus emerging ones is often attributed to the fact that
mandatory laws depend on broader social norms about adherence to law and authority.
These aspects can be difficult to capture with existing cross-national survey data. Such
research designs, therefore, are believed to be more error-prone (Hirczy 1994; Selb and
Lachat 2009).
Single Country Studies
Another empirical approach is to evaluate some of the patterns in political
engagement in countries where compulsory voting already exists. One option is to take
advantage of subnational variation in compulsory voting laws. Switzerland and Austria
are the only countries that have had, at some point in time, subnational variation in where
voting is compulsory. All other countries employ compulsory voting at the national level.
Shineman (2009) takes advantage of the Austrian case, and using survey data from 1999
(in which two provinces still maintained CV), she finds that citizens living under CV
laws were more politically interested and engaged with politics.
A second option in single country studies of CV is to hypothetically estimate
whether an individual would still vote if voting were no longer compulsory. Multiple
studies have used this approach primarily to estimate the direct impact of CV on voter
turnout—by asking citizens of Belgium or Brazil whether they would still turn out to vote
if voting was no longer compulsory (Elkins 2000; Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998). Specific
to political engagement, however, Singh, Roy, and Fournier (2017) use an experiment in
Australia to show that individuals who identified as not being willing to vote if voting
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was no longer compulsory were also less likely to spend time searching for additional
information for a simulated election. They conclude, therefore, that those who do not turn
out to vote voluntary “spend less time arriving at their vote choices, and engage with less
political information when doing so” (Singh, Roy, and Fournier 2017, 2).
While designs of this nature are compelling and considered superior to crossnational studies for drawing causal inferences (Selb and Lachat 2009), it is still not ideal
to estimate the legal requirement to vote by using a counterfactual estimate of whether an
individual would vote under a different system. This measure raises doubts regarding the
construct validity of the study—is this hypothetical estimate a proper operationalization
of the presence/absence of compulsory voting laws? As Singh, Roy, and Fournier (2017)
recognize, this counterfactual approach can be subject to a social desirability bias.
Respondents in the study may be hesitant to identify not being willing to vote in fear of
being perceived as a non-law abiding citizen. We know, for instance, that respect for
compulsory voting laws relies not solely on a monetary penalty, but also partially on
social norms and the wish to be perceived as a good citizen (Funk 2007). We also know
that when confronted with questions about voter turnout, individuals in general tend to
over-report positive voting behavior (Karp and Brockington 2005; Silver, Anderson, and
Abramson 1986).28 Therefore, such research design might underreport the number of
people who are most likely driven by the simple requirement to vote. It might, in turn, be
capturing only those who are especially against the compulsory voting law or politics in
general, which could explain the negative results.
28

Research also shows that individuals tend to underreport undesirable behavior. For
instance, in a study of vote buying in Nicaragua, Gonzales-Ocantos et al. (2012) show
that while 24% of registered voters were offered something for their vote, only 2% of
respondents reported the behavior when asked about it.
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A more recent approach in single-case studies has been to take advantage of
instances where the law actually varies within the population. In Brazil, for instance,
voting is initially voluntary for those between 16-18 years old, and then becomes
compulsory when the individual turns 18. De Leon and Rizzi (2014) employ a regression
discontinuity approach to estimate whether individuals react to the introduction of CV at
18 years old by acquiring more information and consequently becoming more
knowledgeable about politics. They find no significant differences in levels of political
knowledge or information consumption. A similar statistical approach used by Holbein
and Rangel (2016) also reports that CV has no impact on a wider range of engagement
variables.29 This approach, however, does not consider that many other exogenous shocks
happen at the exact time when voting becomes compulsory (such as starting college,
leaving the home, etc.), which could obfuscate the causal effect of CV. Also, restricting
the sample to those individuals around the age of 18 may not be representative of the
effect of CV on the broader population. This is important because studies show that
young people vote less often than older individuals (Leighley 1995) and even when
voting is compulsory, young individuals are still less likely to vote and engage with
politics (Singh 2011). This implies that any byproducts of CV might not immediately
apply at voting age, and instead be part of a longer learning process.
Experimental Designs
In order to better establish causality, some scholars have used experiments to
estimate the impact of a legal requirement to vote on political engagement. Loewen,
Milner, and Hicks (2007) place a sample of students in Quebec, Canada into two groups,
29

Such as political interest, participating in civic associations (such as unions or political
parties), and political knowledge
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and all participants are asked to complete two surveys—one prior and one following the
2007 provincial election. All individuals are then offered a $25 gift card for completing
both surveys. One of the two groups, however, was told that in order to get the gift card,
the individual must also vote in the election. This was a way to simulate coercion by
saying that if the individual did not vote, they would have incurred the cost of not
receiving the promised gift card. When comparing the treatment group to the control
group that was not required to vote, the authors found no significant effect in the amount
of knowledge, news consumption, and political discussion between the groups. A very
similar experiment done by Shineman (forthcoming) in San Francisco’s 2011 municipal
elections, however, does find a positive effect on individuals’ investment in information
when compelled to vote.
Although experiments are better at estimating causal effects, it is debatable
whether the treatment conditions used in such studies accurately approximate compulsory
voting as an institution. Even by subjecting individuals to a future penalty for not having
voted, the financial burden still constitutes an additional amount that they simply forgo
by not following the voting requirement. Under compulsory voting systems, the financial
burden is more direct in the sense that it is actually removing existing resources from
people’s pockets, which could represent stronger incentives to comply with the law. This
calculation resonates with prospect theory, which argues that individuals are more loss
averse, and that “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 279; Vis
2011). Further, as previously discussed, research has also shown that adhering to the
voting law under CV may be a function of not only fines or financial burdens that are
implemented, but also social desirability and the wish to be perceived as a law-abiding
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citizen (Funk 2007; Geys 2006). Therefore, the treatments simulating financial burdens
fail to capture adherence to CV due to social pressure that is prevalent when all
individuals are bound by the law, which could in turn also affect these second-order
effects.
In order to circumvent some of the shortcomings in existing studies, I take
advantage of a rare instance where compulsory voting has been abolished: Chile. This
design would account for any variation at the aggregate or country-level that cannot be
captured in cross-national studies, minimize the possibility that additional exogenous
shocks might be taking place, and provide a direct and explicit measure of what happens
in the presence and absence of compulsory voting that is representative of the broader
population. Indeed, Selb and Lachat (2009) suggest that such design would be preferable
over other approaches. They note, however, that apart from the rare instances of election
law reform, survey data expanding a sufficient time frame before and after reform are
nonexistent, making this task a difficult if not impossible one. Fortunately, in the case of
Chile, detailed individual-level survey data capturing several aspects of political
engagement are available from 2005 to 2016. Given that the election law reform took
place in 2011, these data demonstrate enough variation before and after the reform in
which to uncover any potential effects. This feature presents a major contribution of this
study, especially for those aiming to establish the benefits or shortcomings of introducing
and abolishing compulsory voting.
Another existing gap in this literature, however, concerns the link between
theoretical expectations and observed outcomes. Many theories as to why CV would
influence engagement exist, but often scholars will simply list the distinct theoretical
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mechanisms, and combine them to arrive at one expectation in regards to political
engagement. By aggregating all different expectations and outcomes, scholars have made
inferences as to how CV influences overall political engagement (which can mean several
different things), but ignore that CV may influence certain aspects of engagement and not
others. This approach hinders our ability to truly understand how and when CV may or
may not affect political outcomes beyond voter turnout. In this paper, I draw careful
distinctions as to how certain measures of political engagement are qualitatively different,
and thus correspond to different theoretical mechanisms. This discussion helps clarify
when we should expect CV to have second-order effects and why that should be the case.
In the section below, I engage in an in-depth discussion of the proposed theoretical
mechanisms. Following the theoretical discussion, I explain how the case of Chile allows
me to text my expectations, covering the particular characteristics of the data and
research design.
Compulsory Voting and Political Engagement: Theoretical Mechanisms
Mandatory voting rules should affect political engagement beyond the ballot box
for several reasons. These mechanisms include (1) personal investment in information,
(2) a change in the information environment, and (3) spill-over effects from turnout
behavior. Few studies have made distinctions in regards to which specific outcomes are
expected to arise from each potential mechanism. For instance, when studies test the
impact of CV on multiple aspects of political engagement and find significant effects for
one but not six other outcomes, their conclusion is that CV has a negligible effect on
engagement (e.g., Carreras 2016; Loewen, Milner, and Hicks 2007). But, it could be that
CV affects one aspect of engagement and not another, and that can be better understood if
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we link theoretical expectations with specific proposed outcomes. I discuss each of the
mechanisms in turn.
Compulsory Voting and Information Seeking
The first reason why one might expect CV to increase political engagement
originates from the idea that once an individual is required to vote by law, they will likely
seek out information in order to make an informed decision (Córdova and Rangel 2017;
Shineman, forthcoming). In other words, when individuals are required to show up to the
polls and cast a ballot (either valid or blank/null) regardless of their willingness to do so,
they will likely want to learn something about the candidates or the election (Birch 2009;
Engelen 2007). This is because individuals have an incentive to cast an informed vote. By
seeking information on how to maximize their vote at the polls, individuals are provided
with increased marginal benefits as the chances of an optimal outcome taking place
increases. Making an informed vote may also increase an individuals’ utility of voting
and provide some psychological benefit.
Although this argument may not seem plausible since acquiring information itself
is a costly act, this decision can be represented as a rational one. Just as individuals under
voluntary voting laws calculate the costs and benefits associated with turning out to vote
(Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968b), individuals that are compelled to vote via
CV also consider the cost-benefit structure associated with voting. When voting is
voluntary, individuals are essentially subject to two costs: the costs of going to the polls
and of acquiring the information to do so. Under compulsory voting, however, the cost of
voting is much lower, because instead, abstention is the costlier action. Therefore, the
costs of voting under CV are perceived as non-recoverable (i.e., sunk cost), which in turn
incentivizes individuals to then invest resources to gather information in order to avoid
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wasting their vote (Arkes and Blumer 1985; Córdova and Rangel 2017; Shineman,
forthcoming). In sum, when the combined costs of voting and information seeking
decrease under compulsory voting, individuals may find it rational and worthwhile to
spend resources on acquiring information.
If the implication of this mechanism is that additional political engagement
beyond turning out to vote will come from individuals actively seeking out information
and investing additional resources to make an informed choice, we should observe CV
affecting measures of engagement that particularly relate to the private behavior of
acquiring information. The easiest way to gather such information would be to read about
politics or watch political news. This represents a private and direct initiative from the
individual, consistent with the idea that such initiative is a response to a personal and
independent calculation of the costs and benefits described above. As such, my first
expectation to test this specific mechanism is as follows:
H1 (Information Seeking Hypothesis): Compulsory voting laws should increase
individuals’ propensity to watch or read news about politics.
Compulsory Voting and the Information Environment
A second argument for how CV might increase political engagement focuses on
the information environment under both systems. When all eligible citizens are required
to turn out to vote, the saliency of political discussion increases, and there is a higher
probability that an individual will be exposed to political discussion (Birch 2009;
Shineman 2012). When simply increasing the total number of people that are required to
vote, there is a higher chance that an individual gets exposed to political information and
discussion. Electoral information is especially likely to disseminate through informal
conversations. This should be the case even for those who are not typically associated
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with civic groups or networks that facilitate political discussion (Huckfeldt and Sprague
1995). In a setting where all individuals are required to turn out, political discussion can
disseminate not only in settings where we may typically expect them to (such as union
meetings or even religious groups), but also in more informal settings, such as a
conversation with neighbors.
Political discussion may also increase due to the fact that compulsory voting may
eliminate a taboo associated with the discussion of politics. When all individuals are
required to vote and one can assume that the other is likely to do so, it may decrease the
chance that someone may feel uncomfortable when confronted with a political
conversation. Finally, political parties are likely to contribute to the dissemination of
information by reaching out to a larger and wider set of voters under compulsory voting
(Lijphart 1997). As such, political parties contribute to the change in the information
environment and the salience of political conversation. In order to capture this
phenomenon, one must be able to observe whether political discussion is indeed
heightened under compulsory voting system. This logic leads be to the following
hypothesis:
H2 (Information Environment Hypothesis): Compulsory voting laws should
increase levels of political discussion.
Compulsory Voting and Spill Over Effects from Turnout
The most cited mechanism through which CV should increase political
engagement is the simple fact that taking part in one political activity may spur activism
in other areas of politics (Lijphart 1997; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1995). The legal
requirement to turn out to vote in every election consequently creates a habit of voting,
directly influencing individual political behavior (Blais and Achen 2010; Gerber, Green,
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and Schachar 2003). Once voting becomes a habit, participation patterns are likely to
spill over into other types of political involvement, and politics becomes a more
significant part of citizens’ lives (Jakee and Sun 2006; Wertheimer 1975). For instance,
voting in an election may spur political interest, and subsequently encourage individuals
to remain active in politics, perhaps in order to try to hold politicians accountable, or to
check on their progress. Requiring all eligible citizens to turn out to vote should also
boost higher levels of political efficacy, which would then translate into greater political
participation (Birch 2009; Hill 2006, 2014). By actively showing up at the voting booth,
individuals feel that they matter and are part of the political system, therefore
encouraging them to continue to play a role in the political domain.
This mechanism specifically focuses on the potential for CV to spur political
activities beyond the ballot box. Hence, these effects should translate into political
engagement in the form of direct political activism. This logic leads to my next
hypothesis:
H3 (Spill Over Hypothesis): Compulsory voting laws should increase an
individual’s likelihood of participating in political acts.
Compulsory Voting and the Engagement of Low Probability Voters
A crucial argument against the idea that compulsory voting promotes political
engagement is that compelling citizens to turn out by law would only force uninformed
individuals to go to the polls without making them more engaged (Brennan and Hill
2014; Briggs and Chelis 2010; Denemark 2015). In other words, individuals who are
unlikely to turn out when voting is voluntary would simply show up at the polls and
either cast a blank ballot or choose at random. Indeed, research has found that rates of
invalid voting are higher under compulsory voting than when voting is voluntary (Hill
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and Young 2007; Uggla 2008). But, this argument simply assumes that an actor’s level of
political information is fixed and would not change based on institutional design. This
assumption is problematic because, as Shineman (forthcoming, 4) puts it, “it neglects to
account for information acquisition to be endogenous to participation.”
In fact, it could be the case that under compulsory voting, less sophisticated voters
would be particularly likely to become politically engaged, since they require more
information and are more subject to consuming information via informal discussions
(Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008; Sheppard 2015). It would be reasonable to expect,
then, that although compulsory voting should increase overall levels of political
engagement, this effect should be particularly strong for those that are typically unlikely
to engage with politics. Research has established that individuals with lower
socioeconomic status (SES) are less likely to engage with politics (Smets and van Ham
2013; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1995), and would thus be particularly likely to need to engage
with politics further. This logic leads to the final hypothesis:
H4 (Socioeconomic Impact Hypothesis): The impact of compulsory voting on
political engagement should be particularly strong for those of lower
socioeconomic status.
The Case of Chile
As previously discussed, election law reform is rare, and countries have very
seldom decided to abandon compulsory voting all together. The Netherlands abolished
CV in 1970, as did Italy and Venezuela in 1994. The most recent reform, however, took
place in Chile in 2011. Previously, Chile had a system of compulsory voting for those
registered to vote—although registration was voluntary. Still, when Chile transitioned to
democracy in the early 1990’s, an astounding 92 percent of the population was registered
74

to vote and thus subject to compulsory voting laws (Barnes and Rangel 2014). Although
registration rates decreased gradually over time, Chile was still generally considered to
have a mandatory voting law.30 In most datasets of compulsory voting, Chile is
considered to have an enforced compulsory voting system prior to 2011 (Electoral
Commision 2006; IDEA 2017; Singh 2011). Even though the registration requirement
under the old system is not a common characteristic of most compulsory systems, Chile’s
electoral reform provides a rare and unique opportunity to evaluate patterns of political
behavior prior to and after the abolition of CV.
In 2010, Chile’s Senate voted to formally remove the existing compulsory voting
laws. Now, the system consists of voluntary voting, but also automatic registration. The
change to automatic registration in particular was expected to mobilize large amounts of
voters to the polls. However, in the 2012 municipal elections—the first election following
the reform—turnout declined by about 20 percent (Barnes and Rangel 2014). The
following presidential election also saw the lowest voter turnout rate of any presidential
election held in almost 20 years. Overall, it is clear that the election reform had a
profound impact on patterns of participation.
The reform in Chile presents a great opportunity to improve our understanding of
how compulsory voting laws shape political behavior. First, the availability of survey
data over a number of years increases the chances of observing any causal effects. It can
be argued, for instance, that a change in behavior might not be immediate after electoral
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While this aspect of Chile’s compulsory voting is unique, the reform that took place in
Chile still presents a rare opportunity to examine patterns of behavior under voluntary
and compulsory voting. I also conduct robustness checks in order to account for some of
the unique features of Chile’s compulsory voting system in a later section titled
“Robustness Checks.”
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reform, and therefore enough information needs to be gathered following an institutional
change. In this study, data are available for 6 years prior to and 5 years following the
reform, increasing the chances that any patterns will be captured. Second, data are
available on a number of factors related to political engagement. This variety of possible
outcomes allows us to parse out which aspects of political engagement are particularly
affected by CV, and to determine which mechanisms are actually driving this
relationship.
Most importantly, these analyses allow for many contextual, historical, and
cultural variables to be accounted for given that the institutional reform is taking place in
the same country and over time. During the time frame of the study, few things changed
in Chile’s political system—there were no other major institutional reforms, and
whatever major changes occurred (i.e. economic downturns) can be controlled for.
Therefore, this design better captures the impact of compulsory voting itself, unlike
aggregate cross-national studies, which can only compare average patterns of behavior at
one moment in time (Selb and Lachat 2009).
Data and Methods
The survey data come from the Centro De Estudios Públicos (CEP) in Chile—a
private academic think tank. The organization conducts several individual surveys
throughout the years on topics related to politics, the economy, and elections. Data is
available starting in 2005, and the most recent published survey took place in November
of 2016. Not all surveys include the variables of interest to this study, however. The items
related to political engagement were available in 11 different surveys, each containing
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approximately 1,500 individual respondents.31 Six surveys were conducted prior to
Election Reform in 2011, while five were conducted afterwards. This totals to
approximately 11,000 individuals over the 11-year period.
Dependent and Independent Variables of Interest
Political engagement can be captured in many ways. As discussed in the
theoretical framework, different mechanisms can influence different types of political
engagement. The CEP survey data allow me to capture six different indicators of
engagement, and two of each combine to represent a specific concept.32 First, in order to
capture individuals seeking information, I use variables related to reading or watching of
political news. The CEP surveys ask the following questions: “Please indicate whether
you…. Watch political shows on television? … Read news about politics?” I create two
variables: Watch Politics and Read Politics, which are both ordinal variables that take the
value of (1) if respondent indicated never partaking in such activity, (2) if respondent
indicates sometimes partaking in such activity; and (3) if the respondent indicated
frequently partaking in such activity. While these variables are good indicators of an
individual’s own willingness to engage in politics, another advantage is that the question
specifically refers to political news. The majority of previous research that has used
“attention to news” as an indicator of political engagement typically relies on questions
that simply ask whether individuals watch the news (Birch 2009; Carreras 2016; Holbein
and Rangel 2016). Even though this is a close indicator of the gathering of political
information, my measure explicitly captures the political aspect, whereas other more
general measures of newsgathering could pertain to a diverse set of information.
31

Table B1 in Appendix B includes a list of each of the surveys and when they were
carried out.
32
See Table B2 in Appendix B for a Spanish translation of all outcome variables.
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Second, in order to capture political discussion as a change in the information
environment, I use two variables that relate to the discussion of politics. The CEP survey
asks: “Please indicate whether you… Talk to family about politics?... Talk to friends
about politics?” Both Talk Politics with Family and Talk Politics with Friends are coded
in the same way as the information seeking variables—a value of 1 indicates never doing
it, and a 3 frequently doing it.
Finally, in order to capture engagement in direct political activity, I use the
following questions: “Please indicate whether you… try to persuade someone of what
you believe politically?.... Work or have worked for a political party or candidate?”
These variables are also coded in the same way as previous ones. In order to test my
expectations, the main explanatory variable is compulsory voting, which is a simple
dichotomous variable coded as a 1 prior to 2011, and a 0 after 2011. I also interact
compulsory voting with an education variable in order to test hypothesis 4, which argues
that patterns of engagement under both systems may also change given a respondent’s
socioeconomic status. Education ranges from 0 to 9, where high levels indicate higher
levels of degree completion.
Control Variables
In addition to the change in voting system, I control for several variables that
might influence an individual’s level of political engagement. At the individual level,
socioeconomic status is known to affect citizen political participation (Verba, Nie, and
Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Thus, I control for education and
income. Even though women have made gains in terms of voter turnout, they are still
found to be less politically engaged in many types of political activities (Kittilson and
Schwindt-Bayer 2014), which leads to me to include a control variable labeled female.
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Age is also a factor in predicting political engagement—older individuals are much more
likely to read or watch politics, and also to participate in political activity (Smets and van
Ham 2013). Lastly, those living in rural locations may have a harder time reaching
information or participating in political activities, so I include a rural term in the model.
All individual-level control variables come from the same CEP survey as the dependent
variables.33
At the country level, I control for three important factors. It is expected that any
type of political engagement may be heightened during election years. Thus, I control for
both presidential and municipal elections since they do not take place concurrently.
Although I expect presidential elections to have a stronger impact on political
engagement, local campaign efforts during municipal elections might also prompt
individuals to further engage in politics. Another factor that could influence political
engagement is the economy. Research finds that when the economy is doing well,
citizens are more likely to be politically engaged (Norris 2004). This consideration is
especially important since Chile’s economic growth took a negative turn due to the
financial crisis in 2009, and has gradually improved since. Because this shock took place
at a similar time as the election reform, it is important to account for any potential
confounding effects.34 Table B4 in the Appendix reports the descriptive statistics for all
variables of interest.
Methodology
To empirically test my expectations, an estimation technique that takes into
account both the individual-level respondents and the country-level factors is needed. As
33
34

See Table B3 in the Appendix for a description of all control variables.
The variable GDP growth is lagged by a year.
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such, I employ a series of hierarchical models (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). One aspect
of this analysis is somewhat unique given that hierarchical models used to evaluate the
effect of contextual variables on individual behavior are usually applied in spatial
analyses (either via cross-national, regional, or state analyses). This study, however, has a
temporal component—individuals 𝑖 are nested within surveys 𝑗 that were carried out at
different points in time. Therefore, given my interest in estimating the main impact of a
country-level variable (compulsory voting) on individual level behavior (political
engagement) and their interaction with individual SES that vary both within and across
surveys, a hierarchical modeling technique is the most appropriate (Peffley, Hutchison,
and Shamir 2015; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). I use a multilevel ordered logit model to
account for the ordered structure of the dependent variables.35 Below, the first model
specification (1) is used to test Hypotheses 1-3, while the second model specification (2)
is used to test Hypothesis 4:
(1) 𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑗 + 𝛾10 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾20 𝐴𝑔𝑒2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾30 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒3𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾40 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒4𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾50 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙5𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾02 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2𝑗
+ 𝛾03 𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3𝑗 + 𝛾04 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ4𝑗 + 𝑈0𝑗 + 𝑅𝑖𝑗

(2) 𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑗 + 𝛾10 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾11 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑖𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑗 + 𝛾20 𝐴𝑔𝑒2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾30 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒3𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾40 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒4𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾50 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙5𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾02 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2𝑗
+ 𝛾03 𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3𝑗 + 𝛾04 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ4𝑗 + 𝑈0𝑗 + 𝑅𝑖𝑗
35

The second model specification to test hypotheses 4 posits a cross-level effect
(between education and compulsory voting). I test its statistical significant without
assuming a random slope for the education variable. As such, the models only assume
random effects for the intercept. Snijders and Bosker (2012, 106) explain that cross-level
interaction effects can be tested through an interaction regardless of whether the
individual-level variable has a random slope or not.
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where 𝑈0𝑗 represents the random effects for the intercept across countries, and 𝑅𝑖𝑗 are
errors at the individual level.
Does Compulsory Voting Promote Engagement? Empirical Evidence
The results from a series of hierarchical models are presented in Table 3.1. The
coefficients for compulsory voting are positive for all forms of political engagement. But,
they are only statistically significant (p<.05) in 3 out of the 6 measures—read politics,
watch politics, and talk politics with family. Altogether, the results observed in the table
suggest that compulsory voting does exert some influence on political engagement.
A better way to evaluate the individual hypotheses and interpret the results is to
graph the predicted probabilities of an individual selecting a certain level of political
engagement in each of the categories they have been presented with. Figures 3.1 through
3.3 show the predicted probabilities of political engagement under both compulsory and
voluntary voting while holding all other control variables at their means. The confidence
intervals surrounding the means indicate whether the differences between groups are
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.36 Focusing on information seeking
variables in Figure 3.1, the probability of never watching politics when voting is
voluntary reaches almost 50 percent. By contrast, individuals living under compulsory
voting are much less likely to identify never watching politics. Instead, they are
significantly more likely to “sometimes” watch politics, and also 4 percentage points
more likely to frequently watch politics than those under voluntary systems.

36

Research indicates that graphing 84% confidence intervals allow one to determine
whether the differences between groups are statistically significant at the 95% confidence
level. Thereby, a statistically significant difference can be inferred if the confidence
intervals in the figure do not overlap (Julious 2004).
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Table 3.1. The Effect of Compulsory Voting on Political Engagement
Talk
Talk
Read
Watch
Persuade
Work
Politics w/ Politics w/
Politics
Politics
Others
w/ Party
Family
Friends
Compulsory Voting
0.387*
0.408*
0.142*
0.066
0.027
0.072
(0.061)
(0.051)
(0.043)
(0.065)
(0.085)
(0.126)
Female
-0.375*
-0.402*
0.022
-0.508*
-0.236* -0.166*
(0.041)
(0.039)
(0.041)
(0.042)
(0.054)
(0.074)
Age
0.005*
0.011*
-0.001
-0.004*
-0.007*
0.012*
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.002)
Education
0.332*
0.233*
0.272*
0.283*
0.110*
0.190*
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.014)
(0.018)
Income
0.055*
0.034*
0.044*
0.055*
0.014
0.030*
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.010)
(0.014)
Rural
-0.471*
-0.184*
-0.187*
-0.235*
-0.275* -0.267*
(0.059)
(0.052)
(0.056)
(0.060)
(0.080)
(0.117)
Presidential
0.130
0.175*
0.180*
0.264*
0.289*
0.088
Election
(0.084)
(0.071)
(0.058)
(0.091)
(0.119)
(0.175)
Municipal Election
-0.037
-0.138*
0.076
0.170*
0.197
-0.061
(0.073)
(0.062)
(0.051)
(0.078)
(0.103)
(0.152)
GDP growth
0.045*
0.037*
0.028*
0.031
0.012
0.037
(0.017)
(0.015)
(0.012)
(0.019)
(0.025)
(0.037)
Constant
2.009*
1.399*
1.702*
1.613*
1.865*
4.010*
(0.114)
(0.105)
(0.104)
(0.118)
(0.151)
(0.217)
# of Observations
11,014
11,023
11,012
11,011
11,010
10,997
# of Surveys
11
11
11
11
11
11
Note: Hierarchical Ordered Logit Models. Coefficients are statistically significant at
*p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses.
The pattern is remarkably similar for reading about politics—individuals under
compulsory voting are significantly less likely to never read about politics, but instead
more likely to sometimes or frequently engage in such activities. Overall, the findings
presented in Figure 3.1 lend strong support for the Information Seeking Hypothesis
(H1)—when voting is compulsory, individuals are much more prone to seek out
additional political information, likely in order to make an informed decision when at the
polls.
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Figure 3.1. Predicted Probabilities of Seeking Information, by Voting System

Notes: Figure 3.1 shows the predicted probability of never, sometimes, or frequently
watching/reading politics, based on whether individual is subject to voluntary or
compulsory voting. Confidence intervals indicate statistical significant differences at the
95% confidence level. Estimates were calculated based on Models 1-2 presented in Table
3.1.
Turning to the second theoretical expectation, Figure 3.2 displays levels of
political discussion under both types of systems. Individuals living under the compulsory
system appear to be slightly less likely to identify never discussing politics with their
family, and slightly more likely to sometimes discuss politics. For discussing politics
with friends, however, the differences are not statistically signficant, as the confidence
intervals overlap. This evidence lends partial support to the Information Environment
Hypothesis (H2). If political discussion is heigthened under compulsory voting, it is likely
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because family members are discussing politics slightly more often, and not through
more informal channel like conversations with friends.
Figure 3.2. Predicted Probabilities of Discussing Politics, by Voting System

Notes: Figure 3.2 shows the predicted probability of never, sometimes, or frequently
discussing politics with family and friends, based on whether individual is subject to
voluntary or compulsory voting. Confidence intervals indicate statistical significant
differences at the 95% confidence level. Estimates were calculated based on Models 3-4
presented in Table 3.1.
The third expectation highlights the dissemination of political engagement
through the act of voting. I capture this aspect of engagement by estimating whether CV
increases the probability that individuals will act to persuade someone on their political
views, and whether they are likely to work for a political party or candidate. Figure 3.3
shows that the probability that anyone will act to persuade others and work with parties at
any level is extremely small. This is consistent with other literature that notes these types
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of political activities are rare (Birch 2009). Nonetheless, there are no apparent patterns in
relation to the impact of CV on these political activities. Predicted probabilities for
persuasion and working for a party are essentially the same under both systems, and
confidence intervals. This provides no support for the Spill Over Hypothesis (H3),
suggesting that compulsory voting does not necessarily increase overall levels of political
activism.
Figure 3.3. Predicted Probabilities of Political Activism, by Voting System

Notes: Figure 3.3 shows the predicted probability of never, sometimes, or frequently
persuading others or working with a party, based on whether individual is subject to
voluntary or compulsory voting. Confidence intervals indicate statistical significant
differences at the 95% confidence level. Estimates were calculated based on Models 5-6
presented in Table 3.1.
Taken together, the results show that compulsory voting does have an impact on
political engagement—primarily in aspects that capture an individual’s own action to
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acquire political information, and their decisison to share their political thoughts with
family members. This suggests that the impacts of CV promote more private forms of
political engagement, and do not spill over into more public forms, such as open
discussions with friends or active political work. In other words, it seems that CV
enhances personal political development, but does not necessarily contribute to an
enhanced politically engaged society.
Next, I investigate whether the higher levels of information seeking associated
with compulsory voting are a product of a larger amount of uninformed voters entering
the electorate, who need to acquire more information about politics.37 Figure 3.4 displays
the predicted probabilities of reading and watching politics by voting system and levels
of education. The patterns indicate that the increased propensity in seeking information is
not simply amongst those with lower levels of education. Under both systems, those with
higher levels of education are more likely to engage with political information. But, when
considering the likelihood that one “sometimes” discusses politics, it appears that while
at low levels of education, individuals in compulsory voting are more likely to seek
information, that gap disappears at the highest levels of education.
This suggests that individuals with high levels of education will engage with
political information regardless of whether voting is mandatory or not. But, when voting
is compulsory, there is a higher probability that even the non-educated will attempt to
gather information. This difference is robust, as someone with no formal education is
almost 10 percentage points more likely to sometimes watch politics. Still, that is not to
say that any gaps in political engagement are erased when voting is compulsory—there is
37

Table B5 in Appendix B includes an interaction term between compulsory voting and
education to predict political engagement.
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still a clear disproportional probability that education increases one’s likelihood of
engaging with politics even under compulsory voting countries. Also, it seems that the
differences between socioeconomic status are only present for the “sometimes” category,
and not frequently. Meaning, compulsory voting encourages individuals of lower
socioeconomic status to superficially attain information about politics, but does not
prompt them to frequenly engage with such information.
Figure 3.4. Predicted Probabilities of Seeking Information, by Voting
System and Levels of Education

Notes: Figure 3.4 shows the predicted probability of never, sometimes, or frequently
watching/reading politics, based on whether individual is subject to voluntary or
compulsory voting and conditioned by the level of education. Confidence intervals
indicate statistical significant differences at the 95% confidence level. Estimates were
calculated based on results presented in Table B5 in Appendix B.
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While this indicates that CV does not encourage frequent political engagement,
this is consistent with the expectation that individuals are likely to seek additional
information in order to make an informed vote. Due to the existance of political parties
and campaigns, it may be easy for a voter to quickly identify a vote choice when
watching or reading about politics. If the goal of engaging in order to not waste a vote,
then we should not expect abundant engagement, but rather superficial. Also consistent
with the fact that CV appears to motivate engagement in more prviate forms of
information acquisition and discussion, it is unlikely that the mechanisms through which
CV increases engagement is a simple wish to further engage with the polity in a
meaningful way. Rather, it is a more pragmatic, superficial, and personal investment that
likely voters are making, and it does not carry over to more frequent or active forms of
engagment.
Robustness Checks
One of the main contributions of this study is its novel research design and the
ability to observe the effects of institutional change on public opinion within the same
country, while holding constant a variety of confounding factors. This is only possible
due to an extremely rare institutional reform in Chile and the unique availability of
appropriate survey data over time. Prior to election law reform, however, Chile’s
compulsory voting system was rather unique in the sense that it was voluntary to register,
but compulsory to vote once registered. For this reason, there is criticism that Chile’s CV
system is not an ideal representation of typical mandatory voting laws. In order to
attenuate this concern, I have conducted some additional analyses that confirm the
robustness of my results even when considering Chile’s CV system in particular.
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If simply looking at overall effects prior to and after reform in the case of Chile
does not accurately represent individuals who were subject/not subject to mandatory
voting laws, one must find ways to capture specifically the individuals who are likely to
have been subject by the compulsory voting law in the first place. To do so, I take three
separate approaches. First, I simply control for whether the individual identified as
having been registered to vote prior to 2011 when voting was compulsory. All individuals
after 2011 were automatically registered to vote under the voluntary voting system. Table
B6 in Appendix B shows that when accounting for whether individuals were registered to
vote or not prior to reform, we get the same effects—compulsory voting increases
information seeking, and also discussion of politics. Second, I restrict the analyses to only
those who are registered to vote, both prior and after reform. Table B7 in Appendix B
shows that the main results are robust to this specification.
Still, it may not be surprising that engagement declines after the abolishment of
CV even when only considering those who were registered before, because once voting
becomes voluntary everyone is automatically registered. When voting was compulsory
for those registered, it was likely that only those who actually were interested in politics
registered to vote, and once all individuals were incorporated into the voter registries
upon abolition of CV, it is likely that overall levels of engagement would decrease.
Therefore, I take a different approach to examining this effect under Chile’s unique
system. Previous research shows that while overall registration rates had been steadily
declining since democratization in Chile, it was largely a product of younger voters
entering the electorate and failing to register. Registration rates actually remained fairly
steady for those in the 40 and above age cohort (Barnes and Rangel 2014).
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Table B8 in Appendix B show the results when restricting the analyses to only
those of age 40 or above, and the results remain robust. Meaning, even when we compare
only those who, under CV, were most likely to have been subject to compulsory voting
laws to those of that same age cohort after voting becomes voluntary, we get the same
patterns. These analyses add confidence that the case of Chile is an accurate way to
understand the effects of mandatory voting, and that the effects of CV on political
engagement presented in this research are robust.
Conclusion
Currently, approximately 26 countries in the world hold elections under
compulsory voting. The institution has particularly gained attention in countries
considering its introduction, such as Canada, Colombia, and India. Other countries have
started to contemplate its abolition. Unfortunately, our understanding of the second order
effects of compulsory voting is still unclear, making it difficult for scholars and
practioners to evaluate the benefits of a legal requirement to vote. The lack of consistent
empirical evidence only fuels the existing debate on the implications of compulsory
voting. This research helps inform this existing debate by providing convincing evidence
of the effects of compulsory voting on several forms of political engagement. By taking
advantage of a rare election law reform and unique individual survey data, I show that
CV does indeed increase political engagement, but only for certain aspects of political
engagement.
Specifically, the impact of CV on engagement works through a personal channel
in which individuals are encouraged to seek additional political information, likely in
order to make an informed vote once at the polls. This is particularly the case for lesseducated individuals, who require more information in order to cast an informed ballot.
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These findings suggest that compulsory voting does not necessarily lead to a more
politically active society overall, but does promote individual engagement with
information and close-knit discussions.
The data limitations in this study do not allow for a deeper investigation of how
the increases in information seeking translate into levels of political sophistication. While
political knowledge can be considered a form of cognitive political engagement (Carreras
2016; Zukin et al. 2006), political sophistication often refers to factual knowledge about
the political system and political issues (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). We could
assume that when individuals devote more attention to watching or reading political
news, they will inherently become more knowledgeable about these factual outcomes.
But, in doing so, we would also be making assumptions as to what kind of content was
promoted, and an individual’s ability to absorb such information and translate it into
factual knowledge. As shown, levels of frequently engaging in any of the forms of
political engagement studied here are relatively small, and most of the differences
between the different systems occur in the middle category, in which individuals identify
as “sometimes” engaging in politics. This is certainly better than no engagement at all,
but it could suggest that the higher level of engagement under CV is superficial and does
not translate into major changes in citizens’ knowledge of the political domain. Still, the
increase in information seeking (however superficial)—especially among low-educated
voters—could significantly affect an individuals’ vote choice, and has implications for
how political parties and elite might choose to engage with the electorate.
Relatedly, the theory and analyses presented in this research speak directly to one
of the main objections to compulsory voting—that the introduction of millions of
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“uninformed” voters to the electorate would have a negative impact on election
outcomes. Consistent with Shineman (forthcoming), I show that political information is
not fixed and can change once the turnout calculus shifts. In fact, it is under voluntary
voting that citizens are less likely to seek political information. Shineman’s (forthcoming)
experiment allows for a further investigation on whether that political information
translates into higher levels of political knowledge, and the findings indicate that it does.
Future research could benefit from a further analysis of whether this next step holds in a
naturally occurring scenario, such as the case of Chile.
One possible concern in interpreting the findings presented in this chapter is that
higher rates of reported political engagement under the compulsory voting system were a
product of a social disability bias towards reporting higher rates of political involvement.
In other words, when voting is compulsory people may feel pressured to report that they
are indeed paying attention to politics since we know they are required to vote. While this
could be the case, we would need to see convincing evidence that it is indeed more
socially desirable to be politically engaged under CV than under VV, and most
importantly in this case that the election reform changed the perceived desirability of
reporting attentiveness to politics in a significant way. While data limitations in this study
constrain the ability to conduct a nuanced investigation on the social desirability of such
political activities, future research should assess any changes in public opinion regarding
what individuals believe to be a socially acceptable level of political engagement and
how important they believe engaging in politics is to being considered a good citizen, for
instance.

92

It is interesting to note that in the case of Chile, support for compulsory voting
had dropped to incredibly low levels prior to reform. For instance, in 2010, only 22
percent of the population supported CV, while almost 78 percent opposed it (CEP 2016).
The most recent survey in 2016, however, reported that support for CV has surged back
up again to almost 50 percent, suggesting that Chile’s own population might be starting
to regret the reform. Other countries in the process of debating the merits of CV can look
to Chile to draw more insights as to what kinds of changes to expect. This paper provides
answers to one part of this puzzle.
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Chapter 4
Campaigning Under Compulsory Voting: A Multilevel Analysis of Party Outreach
Political campaigns are crucial components of the political process. It has been
argued that the main goal of political parties and candidates is to win elections (Kollman,
Miller, and Page 1992; Wittman 1973), and to do so they must ensure that individuals
turn out at the polls and cast favorable ballots while there. Research shows that political
elites spend significant amounts of time and money on mobilization efforts (Farrell and
Schmitt-Beck 2002; Holbrook and McClurg 2005; Overton 2004). Current literature
tends to focus on the impacts of party outreach efforts on getting people to turn out to
vote (e.g., Arcenaux and Nickerson 2009; Gerber and Green 2000; Green and Gerber
2015; Green and Schwam-Baird 2016). More recent efforts have been aimed at
understanding more about the strategic component of party outreach and when parties
engage in campaign activity (Enos and Hersh 2015; Enos, Fowler, and Vavrek 2014;
Karp and Banducci 2007; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008).
An important component underplayed in this research is how institutional design
shapes parties’ outreach decisions. Research has investigated how overall levels of party
outreach change based on democratic experience (Karp and Banducci 2007) and electoral
system (Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008), but one institutional design that presents a
particular puzzle as to partisan strategy is compulsory voting. How do political elites
modify their campaign strategies when turnout is already amplified due to the legal
mandate to vote?
I argue that compulsory voting (CV hereafter) can affect three main elements of
campaign strategy: (1) how much party outreach there is; (2) who is the target of
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outreach; (3) who is leading the outreach. Thus, this study makes several contributions, as
existing research on how institutions condition party outreach strategies focuses primarily
on overall levels of party outreach. Here, I consider not only how overall levels should
change, but also how differences may arise in who the targets or leaders of outreach
efforts are. I thus develop nuanced theoretical expectations for how compulsory voting
can affect several aspects of elite strategic behavior in the context of election campaigns.
The argument that mandatory voting laws should alter the ways political parties
campaign and promote their policies has appeared in previous works, but has received
little theoretical and empirical attention thus far (Birch 2009; Keaney and Rogers 2006;
Lever 2010a; Lijphart 1997). Most studies focused on the impact of CV on elite behavior
examine whether mandatory voting laws benefit Left-leaning parties over conservative
ones. Even in this aspect, empirical research presents mixed results (e.g., Fowler 2013;
Jackman 1999; Jensen and Spoon 2011; Miller and Dassonneville 2016). What has not
received as much attention are the ways in which political parties might update their
campaigning strategies, given the knowledge that turnout is likely to be higher and more
equal under compulsory voting. This could help explain why we have yet to reach a
consensus on whether compulsory voting benefits the left. Thus, this study contributes to
our understanding of how and why certain political parties may benefit from compulsory
voting rules.
I develop several theoretical expectations. First, an intuitive expectation is that the
lack of need for turnout mobilization under CV will significantly decrease the overall
level of partisan outreach in a given country. This expectation overlooks the fact that the
goal of party outreach may not only be mobilization, but also persuasion. When voting is
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mandatory, it is possible that parties will simply shift from mobilization to persuasion
tactics, leaving outreach levels unchanged. It is also conceivable that when the pool of
likely voters expands under CV, parties will need to invest additional resources towards
outreach, thereby increasing overall levels of campaign contact. While these expectations
are theoretically possible, I empirically investigate which outcome is likely to take shape
under compulsory voting rules. I find that overall levels of party outreach are not
significantly different under voluntary and compulsory voting rules, failing to support the
view that perhaps campaigns should be less costly under CV when parties feel no need to
mobilize. I also show evidence that when voting is mandatory, parties are likely to shift
their outreach strategy from mobilization to persuasion, by reaching out to voters that are
less partisan and thus can be more easily persuaded.
Second, because turnout is not only higher but also more equal under CV, parties
are encouraged to reach out to a wider net of voters in order to secure their votes (Lever
2010a; Plutzer 2002; Singh and Thorton 2013), and we should expect outreach to be less
skewed towards high-probability voters. Individuals with lower levels of education may
also be easier to be persuaded, encouraging parties under compulsory voting to target
them more than when voting is voluntary. I find that there is a clear, skewed pattern to
which voters get targeted under voluntary voting, but not under compulsory voting.
Finally, CV can also change which parties engage in outreach. Because CV
encourages marginalized groups to turn out at the polls at significantly higher levels,
right-leaning parties may step up campaign outreach in order to offset any gains from a
traditionally more liberal electorate, and reach out to more moderate voters to win their
votes. Using individual-level survey data across 27 countries, I find that overall levels of
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party outreach are similar under compulsory and voluntary voting countries, and that
under CV parties tend to reach out to individuals with lower socioeconomic status at
higher rates than their counterparts. A further analysis of whether parties are targeting
individuals with strong party attachments provides evidence that parties under CV are
more likely to engage in persuasion rather than mobilization via party outreach. When
considering the different types of parties, however, it does not appear that right-leaning
parties are substantially changing their strategy in order to offset potential gains by the
left.
Although the empirical evidence presented here contributes directly to our
understanding of how compulsory voting laws have effects that extend beyond voter
turnout, this research also speaks to the potential of institutions to effectively transform
the political realm. Scholars have often focused on examining how institutions influence
individual patterns of political participation, but a burgeoning body of research shows
that institutions can also constrain or motivate elite behavior (e.g., Bugarin and Portugal
2015; Taylor-Robinson 2010). Only by considering both types of outcomes, which could
be occurring simultaneously, do we have a better understanding of the overall impact of
institutional design. In the case of compulsory voting, thorough knowledge of how parties
update their strategies can help us better predict electoral outcomes and patterns of
political engagement under this institutional variation.
This research also alludes to issues of political inequality across the world. The
exclusion of certain groups as targets of parties can exacerbate the marginalization of
some from political involvement (Enos, Fowler, and Vavrek 2014). If parties lessen
efforts to mobilize or appeal to a particular group, such group might suffer from a lack of
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representation (Andrews, Fry, and Jakee 2005; Ballinger 2006). Also, systematic lack of
contact with political parties may decrease individuals’ feelings of efficacy towards the
political system, and also lower political knowledge and engagement overall (Keaney and
Rogers 2006; Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994). When all citizens are required by law to
turn out—regardless of race, socioeconomic status, or age—parties are incentivized to
reach out to a wider net of potential voters, ultimately improving the quality of
representative democracy (Dahl 2006).
Political Mobilization and Institutional Context
As rational actors, a political party’s main goal is to win elections (Kollman,
Miller, and Page 1992; Wittman 1973). In order to do so, political elites are tasked with
two challenges: (1) mobilizing voters to turn out at the polls (referred to as mobilization),
and (2) convincing voters to choose their party when they go to the polls (referred to as
persuasion) (Schmitt-Beck 2007). First, getting people to show up to the polls can be a
difficult task. Turning out to vote is a costly action (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook
1968), and previous research has argued that individuals make rational calculations in
deciding whether their vote will make enough of a difference to warrant such cost (Geys
2006). Therefore, it is important that parties invest in “Get Out the Vote” (GOTV)
campaigns—specific efforts to “transform nonvoters into voters” (Green and Gerber
2008, 7). When doing so, parties decrease the costs of voting for individuals by providing
them with informational shortcuts (Lupia 1994; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) and also
influence the intrinsic value citizens attach to voting as voters feel more wanted when
they are contacted by parties (Green and Gerber 2008).
GOTV efforts are fairly successful in mobilizing turnout (Enos, Fowler, and
Vavreck 2014; Green, Macgrath, and Aronow 2013). Certain tactics are more efficacious
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than others, however. The more personal the contact is, the more likely it is to have a
mobilizing effect. Door to door canvassing, for instance, is found to significantly increase
turnout rates (Arcenaux and Nickerson 2009; Green, Gerber, and Nickerson 2003).
Campaign phone calls that do not include a prepared transcript also motivate turnout
(Green and Gerber 2015; Ha and Karlan 2009). Impersonal emails or TV ads, however,
do not have much of an effect. All in all, research finds that parties do indeed invest
significant amounts of resources on GOTV efforts (Farrell and Schmitt-Beck 2002; John
and Brannan 2008; Holbrook and McClurg 2005).
A second dimension of political campaigning is voter persuasion. Persuasion
involves any attempt to convert opposing voters into supporting one’s own party, or most
importantly, attracting undecided or independent voters to become one’s supporters
(Green and Gerber 2015). While mobilization efforts used to be the focus of campaigns
in the past, persuasion has become increasingly important in modern elections (Harmel
and Janda 1994, Rohrschneider 2002). How effective persuasion efforts are, however, is
difficult to measure. The impact of mobilization can be clearly observed as rates of voter
turnout. It is harder to capture whether someone was convinced to vote a certain way due
to partisan persuasion. Furthermore, while persuasion may be productive when targeting
undecided voters, research argues that on average, political campaigns hardly work to
change people’s views, but rather reinforce them (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee 1954).
Because of these concerns, comparative studies of partisan outreach rarely distinguish
between mobilization and persuasion (Karp and Banducci 2007; Karp, Banducci, and
Bowler 2008).
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Although most of the existing literature focuses on the byproducts of party
mobilization, scholars have begun to empirically explore more of what factors shape
campaigning strategies (Enos, Fowler, and Vavrek 2014; Enos and Hersh 2015). Because
parties have limited time and funds during political campaigns, they must allocate their
resources strategically (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Green and Schwam-Baird 2016).
Parties are likely to focus their resources on strategies that will maximize their gains and
generate the most benefit. According to Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), these include
strategies that target individuals who are already familiar to parties, who have strong
social networks, who are influential, and who have resources. In general, individuals that
fit these characteristics are typically the wealthy and educated, who are much more likely
to be responsive to campaign measures and turn out to vote. Indeed, an abundance of
empirical research finds support for the proposition that individuals with higher
socioeconomic status are more likely to participate (Leighley 1995; Smets and van Ham
2013).
Given the existing knowledge that individuals with higher SES are those most
willing to turn out, parties likely shift their resources and outreach to groups that exhibit
higher socioeconomic status. In turn, individuals of lower status will likely be excluded
or receive less attention from partisan outreach efforts. Plutzer (2002) argues that
individuals with little disposable income are not attractive to parties, who doubt their
ability to actively engage with the political process. This problem may be even more
exacerbated in more recent years, as developing technology allows for parties to gather
detailed data on likely voters. As parties become more sophisticated at identifying
potential voters, they are able to narrow their range of partisan outreach (Ballinger 2006).
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This biased pattern of mobilization can cause meaningful problems for the representation
and advocacy of marginalized individuals (Rogers 2006).
Beyond what we can infer regarding which individual characteristics may
motivate partisan outreach, we still lack detailed knowledge of how political institutions
change partisan strategies of campaigning. Taylor-Robinson (2010) notes that elites’
choices are largely shaped by institutional context. In the United States, Huckfeldt and
Sprague (1992) note that parties are faced with legal and institutional constraints, and that
this varies by state. For instance, the presence of primaries in a given state may alter how
much or when parties choose to allocate their resources for partisan outreach.
Unfortunately, few studies have considered the impact of institutional design on
party outreach in a comparative perspective outside the United States. In a
comprehensive study of 24 countries, Karp and Banducci (2007) find that rates of party
outreach are significantly lower in new democracies than old democracies, partly due to
lower rates of party institutionalization. Other research shows that rates of party contact
are significantly higher in candidate-based electoral systems as opposed to proportional
representation systems (Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008). The authors argue that this is
because under PR systems, candidates have less of an incentive to campaign on a
personal level given the larger district magnitude. But, under single-member-districts,
candidates have an incentive to cultivate a more personal relationship and, therefore,
should be more likely to contact potential voters.
Aside from a few studies, we still lack detailed knowledge of how institutional
context shapes campaigning behavior. One institution in particular presents us with a
puzzle when it comes to party outreach. If a crucial part of political party campaigns is to

101

mobilize voters to turn out at the polls, what happens when turnout is already high?
Under compulsory voting, all eligible citizens are required by law to show up at the polls.
Although turnout is not universal under these systems, a plethora of research has found
that CV laws considerably boost turnout rates anywhere from 10 to 18 percentage points
(Baek 2009; Jaitman 2013; Singh 2011). This could yield a substantial shift in partisan
strategies when it comes to partisan outreach.
The overwhelming majority of studies of compulsory voting examine how
mandating turnout affects voter turnout. More recently, scholars have begun to study the
more substantive effects of CV for overall individual political behavior (e.g., Córdova
and Rangel 2017; Hooghe and Stiers, forthcoming). Few studies, however, focus on CV’s
impact on elite behavior. The focus of this existing research is primarily on how nearuniversal voter turnout produced by CV laws may disproportionally benefit one party
over the other in terms of electoral outcomes. Liberal parties, who are more likely to
draw support from citizens of low income and education (Anderson and Beramendi 2012;
Pontusson and Rueda 2010), are thought to benefit from mandatory voting laws, as
marginalized voters are encouraged to turnout at higher rates (Lijphart 1997). Empirical
studies, however, have found mixed support for the proposition that higher and more
equal voter turnout would benefit left-leaning parties.
Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid (2016) show that support for leftist policies in a
Swiss canton was greater during times where individuals were subject to compulsory
voting laws. In the context of Australia, Fowler (2013) finds that the gradual adoption of
compulsory voting in different states boosted the seat shares of the left-leaning Labor
Party by 7-10 percent. Jensen and Spoon (2011), however, find that leftist parties are
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benefitted only when CV is coupled with high turnout. By contrast, other studies fail to
find any political gains from the left under compulsory voting. Jackman (1999) shows
that if Australia were to abolish compulsory voting, the Liberal Party would still report
small political gains. A subnational study of Austria shows that no substantial gains are
made by the right in the absence of compulsory voting (Ferwerda 2014). Most recently,
Miller and Dassonneville (2016) find that the vote share of left-leaning parties actually
increased when CV was abolished in the Netherlands in 1970. The authors, then, suggest
that “the logic underlying the conventional wisdom is in need of reevaluation” (p. 132).
One of the problems might be that this research assumes a kind of mechanical
relationship between increased voter turnout and more votes for left-leaning parties, with
little attention to how political elites may strategically adjust to the legal requirement to
vote. A shift in campaigning strategy could potentially influence electoral outcomes,
which may be a reason for the lack of consistent evidence of which parties benefit from
maximized turnout. In other words, scholars have not yet considered the in-depth
dynamics on how a voting law affects the strategies employed by political parties. In the
next section, I discuss how party elites are expected to shift their campaigning strategies
under compulsory voting, and develop expectations for the patterns of party outreach
observed under different voting systems.
Compulsory Voting and Partisan Outreach: Theoretical Mechanisms
Many different elements of partisan outreach can be expected to change when
countries require voter turnout by law. The existing comparative studies of political
campaigning focus primarily on overall levels of party contact, and what explains those
patterns (Karp and Banducci 2007; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008). In this research, I
provide a much more detailed account of partisan outreach by focusing on three distinct
103

aspects: (1) how much outreach there is; (2) who is the target of outreach; and (3) who is
leading the outreach. By investigating all three elements of party contact, I am able to
provide a more nuanced picture of how compulsory voting affects campaign behavior.
How much outreach is there?
As previously discussed, political parties whose goal is to win elections have two
specific tasks: to mobilize individuals and to persuade voters. In considering overall
levels of partisan outreach, we first must understand how compulsory voting can alter a
party’s incentive to devote money and resources to campaign efforts. One line of thought
is intuitive: when voting is compulsory, the need for mobilization essentially disappears.
Because turning out at the polls is mandatory by law, political elites no longer have to
devote efforts to mobilization via GOTV campaigns (Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008;
Lever 2010a). Norris (2004) suggests that parties under CV should invest less on
mobilizing efforts. Lijphart (1997) and Lever (2010) both suggest that because the need
for mobilization is lacking, CV laws would significantly decrease levels of campaign
spending. This logic suggests that those living under compulsory voting laws are
significantly less likely to report having been contact by a party during electoral
campaigns.
This view focuses solely on mobilization as a goal of parties, assuming that the
mere fact that voting is mandatory will discourage parties from contacting voters at all.
Assuming that mobilization is the leading motivation for party outreach, we should
expect that when a country makes mobilization a legal or constitutional requirement,
parties no longer have an incentive to invest their resources on party outreach. This leads
to my first hypothesis:
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H1a: Overall levels of partisan outreach in countries with compulsory voting laws
should be lower than in countries with voluntary voting.
At the same time, it may not be the case that political parties simply forego
spending their resources when the need for mobilization disappears. Mobilization is only
one part of the campaign equation—parties may also engage in persuasion tactics.
Therefore, political elites are likely to divert their resources into convincing potential
voters to choose them at the polls. Lever (2010, 902) describes this process as a shift in
parties’ goals, stating that “compulsion means that the battle is not, any more, to make
sure that your supporters actually get to the polls, or to deter those of your opponents
from doing so… but to ensure that of those who turn out, as many vote for you as
possible.” Therefore, rather than decreasing overall levels of party outreach, compulsory
voting can simply encourage parties to divert their resources from mobilization to
persuasion, leaving average rates of party contact unchanged (Hooghe and Pelleriaux
1998; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008). This logic leads to the following hypothesis:
H1b: Overall levels of partisan outreach in countries with compulsory voting laws
should be similar to levels in countries with voluntary voting.
At the same time, we know that when voting is voluntary only a fraction of the
electorate turns out to vote. In this case, parties only have to target a small set of the
population that they know is likely to turn out. When voting is mandatory, however, the
pool of potential voters increases significantly, increasing the need for partisan outreach
as parties are tasked with winning over a much larger electorate. In arguing why rates of
party attachment might be higher under compulsory voting, Singh and Thorton (2012,
193) highlight that parties have much more to gain from reaching out in instances where

105

the probability that one will vote is high, thus encouraging parties to “step up their efforts
to promote their brand.” Under voluntary voting rules, even amongst individuals with the
characteristic of those who should be more likely to turn out (higher SES), there is still
much uncertainty whether one will actually go to the polls, which makes the marginal
benefit of partisan outreach more uncertain. Under CV, however, the probability that an
individual will go to the polls is substantially higher, making outreach a “good
investment” for parties. In the aggregate, the certainty associated with the pool of
potential voters is much higher under CV, encouraging higher levels of partisan outreach.
In other words, under voluntary voting where turnout is not mandatory, parties
target a smaller and more specific sector of the population. Therefore, even if parties
under this system need to persuade voters to both turnout and vote for their platform, the
lack of necessity to reach out to a broader sector of the population generates a modest
need for partisan outreach. Under compulsory voting, the pool of potential voters
increases significantly as all citizens are required to turn out by law, and the certainty
attached to their probability of turning out makes partisan outreach a good investment for
parties attempting to win over votes. An alternative expectation, then is the following:
H1c: Overall levels of partisan outreach in countries with compulsory voting laws
should be higher than in countries with voluntary voting.
Who is the target of outreach?
Apart from changing the overall rate of party outreach, institutional design may
also affect whom parties target. Compulsory voting has been proposed as a strategy to
reduce patterns of unequal participation based on socioeconomic status (Lijphart 1997).
This is because when all individuals are required by law to turn out, regardless of age,
gender, income, or education level, turn out is expected to be less biased. Empirical
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evidence shows that mandatory turnout decreases participation gaps in socioeconomic
status (Fowler 2013; Gallego 2015), age (Singh 2011) and gender (Córdova and Rangel
2017). Amongst these studies, a common theoretical expectation is that under
compulsory voting, parties are encouraged to reach out to marginalized citizens, since
there is a higher likelihood that they will turn out to vote.
The logic is as follows. As the pool of potential voters increases under
compulsory voting, individuals who are typically not likely to turnout under VV are now
more likely to do so. Because all eligible citizens are required to turn out by law, parties
do not have an incentive to only focus on one specific sector of the population (Ballinger
2006; Hill 2014; Lijphart 1997). Rogers (2006, 24) summarizes that “where turnout can
be taken more or less for granted, the political parties will have an incentive to attempt to
win over undecided or less engaged groups.” Therefore, parties are required to reach out
to all potential voters, regardless of socioeconomic status. This means that partisan
outreach should be more consistent across all socioeconomic groups under compulsory
voting. By contrast, when voting is voluntary, parties would divert their efforts to those
more likely to turn out (i.e. higher socioeconomic status) (Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998).
When analyzing GOTV efforts in a number of experiments, Enos, Fowler, and Vavrek
(2014) conclude that mobilization efforts in the United States tend to widen the
disparities between low and high propensity voters.
This is not to say, however, that partisan outreach should be completely equal
under CV laws—indeed, some research does find that certain electoral inequalities still
persist when voting is mandatory (Power 2009; Quintelier, Hoodhe, and Marien 2011).
But, given the heightened probability that marginalized voters will turn out at the polls if
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required to by law when compared to the counterparts when voting is voluntary, we
should expect partisan outreach to be significantly less skewed under CV systems. This
logic leads me to the following hypothesis:
H2: Levels of partisan outreach in countries with compulsory voting laws should
be significantly less skewed towards individuals with higher socioeconomic
status than in countries with voluntary voting laws.
Who is leading the outreach?
It is important to consider that although all parties may have incentives to adapt
their campaigning strategies when subjected to compulsory voting laws, different types of
parties may adapt differently. Given that certain ideologies appeal more to specific
sectors of the population, it is important to consider how those distinctions may matter.
As previously discussed, research shows that especially under voluntary voting,
individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to turn out, and thus more
likely to get targeted by parties. Individuals with higher socioeconomic status tend to be
more conservative (Tucker, Vedlitz, and DenNardo 1986). Because higher SES
individuals are already more likely to turn out under voluntary voting, right-leaning
parties are less likely to need strong mobilization efforts.
But, when voting is compulsory, the introduction of many more marginalized
citizens may shift the balance in the electorate. Low propensity voters under voluntary
voting are much more likely to turn out under compulsory voting given that they are now
faced with penalties. These low-propensity voters, however, are likely to support more
left-leaning parties, creating problems for conservative parties. This is essentially why
some studies of electoral outcomes under CV posit that left-leaning parties should benefit
from mandatory voting laws (Jackman 1999; Hoffman, León, and Lombardi 2017). But,
108

this expectation does not consider that right-leaning parties could then adapt their
strategies in order to account for the introduction of left-leaning voters into the electorate.
Right-leaning parties should adapt in two ways. In terms of mobilization, rightleaning parties have an incentive to amplify their partisan outreach in order to ensure that
each and every one of their strong supporters will turn out to vote. In terms of persuasion,
right-leaning parties under CV have a higher incentive to go after moderate or
independent voters in order to win their vote. In other words, right-leaning parties will
need to make sure they can count on a large percentage of their voters to turn out, while
simultaneously trying to persuade undecided or moderate voters. We should expect that
mobilization from the right to be higher when turnout is required by law in order to offset
the gains made by the left when a larger and more equal electorate is expected under
compulsory voting. My final hypotheses are as follows:
H3a: Overall levels of right-leaning partisan outreach in countries with
compulsory voting laws should be higher than in countries with voluntary
voting.
H3b: Right-leaning parties in countries with compulsory voting should be more
likely to reach out to moderate potential voters than right-leaning parties in
countries with voluntary voting.
Data & Methods
To evaluate partisan outreach to potential voters, I use survey data from the most
recent module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project. The fourth
module of the post-election survey has thus far been conducted in 28 different countries
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between 2011 and 2015.38 The decision to focus on the fourth wave is based primarily on
the availability of a survey question that approximates party outreach. One way to
measure party contact would be to survey political parties and gather their own data on
campaign efforts. But, because detailed data in a comparative perspective on this matter
are not available, the best way to capture party outreach is to record whether an
individual reports being contacted by a political party during a campaign. Note that this
does not involve an individual’s own willingness to initiate a contact with a political
party member (a question that is often asked in political surveys), but whether a member
of a political party contacted the individual in any form.
The dependent variable, party outreach, is based on the following question:
“during the campaign, did a party or candidate contact you in person or by any other
means?” The respondent had the option to select yes, no, or to abstain from answering
(missing). This question is used to create my dependent variable, party outreach, which
takes the value of 1 when the respondent indicated having been contacted by a party or
candidate during the campaign, and 0 otherwise.
I am also interested in which political party in particular contacted an individual
in order to be able to test Hypotheses 3a and 3b. As a follow-up to the general question of
whether an individual was contacted by a party, the next question asks individuals to
identify which parties contacted them. Individuals can list up to 10 different parties that

38

While the survey has been conducted in 28 different locations, one of those in
particular lacks a variety of data in other dimensions (Taiwan). Thus, empirical analyses
for H1a-c and H2 in this chapter exclude Taiwan, bringing the total number of countries to
27. Due to missing data in some countries, the empirical analyses for H3a-b include 24
countries.
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may have contacted them during the campaign.39 In order to identify whether a specific
party was left-leaning or right-leaning, I followed the following steps: First, I used the
Manifesto Project, which identifies the policy positions of political parties across the
world. The project rates each political party on a left-right scale ranging from -100 (very
liberal) to 100 (very conservative). But, it might not be accurate to simply choose a cutoff
point (i.e. 0), to indicate that anything positive should be considered a right-leaning party,
and anything negative a left-leaning party. For instance, in the context of the United
States, both of the Democratic and Republican parties scored positive numbers in the leftright scale (7 for the democrats and 24 for republicans). If that were the case, both parties
would be considered “right-leaning.”
Instead, I am more interested in understanding where the parties stand relative to
one another in the context of their own country. Therefore, I created an average of the
scores for each political party for each country within the MP dataset, and then identified
whether each party was to the right of the average (right-leaning), or to the left of that
average (left-leaning). I then merged these data to the specific parties that were
mentioned by each individual in the CSES survey as having contacted them. Two
dependent variables were created—right-leaning contact received a 1 if any party that
had a more conservative policy agenda within that country had contacted that individual
(and zero otherwise), and left-leaning contact received a 1 if any party that had a more
liberal policy agenda within that country had contacted that individual (and zero
otherwise). Individuals who did not report having been contacted by a right or left
39

Although individuals can name up to 10 different parties, I only considered whether the
respondent identified having been contacted by one of the 5 major parties in their given
country. The CSES classifies the 5 major parties based on their seat share in the current
legislature.
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leaning party, or contacted by a party at all, were coded as zeroes for each of these
dependent variables.40
The main independent variable indicates whether a country has a compulsory
voting system. Compulsory Voting is a dichotomous measure coded 1 if voting is
compulsory in a particular country and a 0 if voting is voluntary. These data were drawn
from the International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), which
identifies which countries around the world practice compulsory voting. In my sample, 6
out of the 27 countries have compulsory voting laws, and 7 post-election surveys have
been carried out under compulsory voting laws.41
Because I am interested in how the institution of compulsory voting conditions
the relationship between partisan outreach and marginalized voters, I use a measure of
socioeconomic status in order to test Hypothesis 2. Specifically, I use levels of education
as a representation of socioeconomic status (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1995). Education
ranges from 1 to 4 and records whether the individual reported having: (1) none or less
than primary schooling; (2) completed primary or incomplete secondary schooling; (3)
completed secondary and some tertiary schooling; (4) completed college or more. In
order to account for the conditional effect of compulsory voting on SES and partisan
outreach, I include an interaction term between the compulsory voting variable and the
education variable in the model.

40

The follow-up question asking about which parties contacted the individual were not
asked in Canada, and Ireland. The MPD data did not have information for Thailand. This
brings the total number of countries in this analysis to 24.
41
In the sample, the countries of Mexico, Greece, Australia, Brazil, Thailand, and Turkey
all have compulsory voting laws. See Table C1 in Appendix C for a full description of
the surveys and countries included in the data.
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Control Variables
I control for several variables that might affect an individuals’ propensity to be
contacted by a political party. At the individual level, age can be an important factor, as
older individuals are found to turn out to vote at higher levels and thus be targeted by
parties (Blais 2000). It has also been argued that gender may play a role in political
activism, and that women are less likely to engage with politics (Verba, Burns, and
Schlozman 1997). Therefore, I include a variable that identifies whether the respondent
was female. Finally, in order to account for the fact that those being targeted by parties
are merely the ones that have closer partisan ties, I control for whether a respondent
identified being close to a political party (party attachment) (Singh and Thorton 2012).
All individual-level variables were drawn from the same CSES post-election survey from
which the dependent variable was drawn.42
At the country level, I control for several other factors that are thought to alter
partisan strategies. I control for whether the election was a presidential, and whether the
country employed a proportional representation system—which could encourage the
targeting of marginalized citizens. I also control for the level of democracy and economic
development for each country. Data on democracy come from the Freedom House’s civil
liberties and political rights ratings (Freedom House 2016). This variable was
transformed in order to report states with higher scores in the freedom house scale as
more democratic, while lower scores reflect less democratic states. Economic
development is measured as Gross Domestic Product GDP per capita from the World
Development Indicators (World Bank 2016), with higher levels indicating more

42

See Table C2 in Appendix C for a full description of the control variables.
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developed countries. Descriptive Statistics of all variables are available in Table C3 of
Appendix C.
Methodology
One important feature of the data in this study is that observations are clustered at
different levels of analysis. The data are clustered at two levels: individual respondents
(level 1) within post-election surveys within countries (level 2). The main variable of
interest, compulsory voting, is recorded at the country level. The outcome variables,
however, are drawn from public opinion data and are thus recorded at the individual
level. To account for the nested nature of the data, I estimate a hierarchical model across
two levels of analysis: respondents 𝑖 nested within countries 𝑗 (Raudenbush and Bryk
2002). Because the analyses use a dependent variable that is dichotomous (whether one
was contacted by a party or not), I employ a hierarchical logit model to test my
expectations. Below, the first model specification (1) is used to test Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c,
and 3a, the second model specification (2) is used to test Hypothesis 2, and the third
model specification is used to test Hypothesis 3b:43
(1) 𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾01 + 𝛾01 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑗 + 𝛾10 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾20 𝐴𝑔𝑒2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾30 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒3𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾40 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡4𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾02 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2𝑗
+ 𝛾03 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3𝑗 + 𝛾04 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠4𝑗
+ 𝛾05 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙5𝑗 + 𝛾06 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎6𝑗 + 𝑈0𝑗 + 𝑅𝑖𝑗

43

The second and third model specifications to test hypotheses 2 and 3b posit a crosslevel effect (between education and compulsory voting and between ideology and
compulsory voting). I test its statistical significant without assuming a random slope for
the education variable. As such, the models only assume random effects for the intercept.
Snijders and Bosker (2012, 106) explain that cross-level interaction effects can be tested
through an interaction regardless of whether the individual-level variable has a random
slope or not.
114

(2) 𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾01 + 𝛾01 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑗 + 𝛾10 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾11 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑖𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑗 + 𝛾20 𝐴𝑔𝑒2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾30 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒3𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾40 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡4𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾02 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2𝑗
+ 𝛾03 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3𝑗 + 𝛾04 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠4𝑗
+ 𝛾05 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙5𝑗 + 𝛾06 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎6𝑗 + 𝑈0𝑗 + 𝑅𝑖𝑗

(3) 𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾01 + 𝛾01 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑗 + 𝛾10 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦1𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾11 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦1𝑖𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑗
+ 𝛾20 𝐴𝑔𝑒2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾30 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒3𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾40 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡4𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾50 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛5𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾02 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2𝑗 + 𝛾03 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3𝑗
+ 𝛾04 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠4𝑗 + 𝛾05 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙5𝑗
+ 𝛾06 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎6𝑗 + 𝑈0𝑗 + 𝑅𝑖𝑗

where 𝑈0𝑗 represents the random effects for the intercept across countries, and 𝑅𝑖𝑗 are
errors at the individual level.
Descriptive Statistics
A descriptive look at the data shows some of the expected patterns previously
discussed. Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics of overall levels of party contact by
compulsory and voluntary voting. Overall average levels of party contact are very similar
for both systems, around 33 and 35 percent. This could be an initial indication that party
outreach may not be significantly lower or higher in countries with compulsory voting.
Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics of Overall Levels of Party Contact by Voting Law
Voting Law

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Voluntary

30,078

.331

.471

0

1

Compulsory

14,094

.358

.479

0

1
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Figure 4.1 graphs the average rate of party contact by level of education without
taking into account different voting systems. For those who have none or less than
primary education, the rate of partisan outreach is at around 17 percent. For those with
primary education, approximately 25 percent report being contacted by a party. Once the
respondent’s education level reaches a complete secondary degree, the rate increases to
35.6 percent. Finally, the biggest jump is seen for those who have complete college,
almost 11 points higher than the previous level of education (46.6 percent).
Figure 4.1. Average Rates of Party Outreach by Levels of Education

Notes: Figure 4.1 shows overall average levels of party outreach by education in the
27 countries included in the sample.
Table 4.2 breaks down the percentage of contacted individuals by education level
in each voting system. For instance, out of all individuals that were contacted by a
political party under voluntary voting, 10.59 percent had no education, 20.59 percent had
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primary education, 35.6 percent had secondary education, and 42.25 percent had a
college education. In the case of compulsory voting, there is a lot more parity at the
middle levels of education, but still large gaps in terms of those with low and high levels
of education (no education and college). These descriptive statistics show that while
under voluntary voting, patterns of outreach follow a linear increase based on levels of
education (similar to what we see in Figure 4.1), compulsory voting patterns are less
linear and more varied.
Table 4.2. Percentage of Contacted Individuals, by Education Level
Education Levels
No
Education

Primary

Secondary

College

Voluntary

10.59%

20.59%

35.6%

42.25%

Compulsory

3.9%

29.17%

22.45%

44.48%

When taking into account outreach by the left and the right separately, we see that
levels of outreach are slightly higher for both types of parties under compulsory voting
than under voluntary voting (see Table 4.3). Also, there are no apparent differences when
comparing left-leaning and right-leaning contact under both systems. This could suggest
that different types of parties are not behaving significantly difference than one another
under compulsory voting. While these data distributions hint at some possible
relationships, these descriptive statistics do not account for any other factors known to
influence partisan outreach, so it is more appropriate to examine these effects in a fully
specified model. In the next section I discuss in detail the results from the hierarchical
models.
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Table 4.3. Percentage of Individuals Contacted by Left-Leaning or
Right-Leaning Parties
Left-Leaning
Contact

Right-Leaning
Contact

Voluntary

17.68%

18.06%

Compulsory

25.81%

26.88%

Empirical Results
I first evaluate whether compulsory voting changes overall political party
behavior, by empirically testing Hypotheses 1a-1c and Hypothesis 2. The results are
presented in Table 4.4. The first element to be investigated is whether overall levels of
party outreach are different under compulsory or voluntary voting. Turning to Model 1,
we see that the coefficient for CV is negative, but not statistically significant. This
indicates support for Hypothesis 1b—while compulsory voting laws lower the need for
mobilization, it does not mean political parties will simply decrease their outreach efforts.
Instead, it is likely they will divert their resources to persuasion, leaving overall levels of
outreach unchanged. It is also possible that CV does not necessarily erase the need for
mobilization. Given that CV does not generate universal turnout, there is still room for
mobilization. Gerber and Green (2008) note that “even when turnout is high… the
capacity to mobilize large numbers of voters can be decisive.” I provide an additional
empirical investigation into whether we can establish the trade-off between mobilization
and persuading taking place under compulsory voting in the next section.
This finding may cast doubt on claims that compulsory voting has the potential to
significantly decrease campaign costs (Keaney and Rodgers 2006; Lijphart 1997). In
2015, former President Barack Obama was asked to comment on the idea of compulsory
voting. His initial response was that “It would be transformative if everybody voted—that
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would counteract money more than anything” (Somin 2015). These results suggest that
although it is possible that compulsory voting decreases campaign spending in several
other dimensions, it is unlikely that efforts and resources directed to party outreach would
be substantially different given a mandatory voting law.
Table 4.4. The Influence of Compulsory Voting on Party Outreach
(1)
(2)
Overall
Overall
Party Outreach
Party Outreach
Compulsory Voting
-0.452
-0.111
(0.616)
(0.628)
Education
0.292***
0.334***
(0.017)
(0.021)
CV *Education
-0.106**
(0.033)
Female
0.011
0.009
(0.023)
(0.023)
Age
0.004***
0.004***
(0.001)
(0.001)
Party Attachment
0.558***
0.557***
(0.025)
(0.025)
Presidential Election
-1.194***
-1.202***
(0.135)
(0.136)
PR System
-1.158**
-1.148**
(0.376)
(0.378)
Effective # of Parties
0.176*
0.174*
(0.074)
(0.075)
Democracy Level
-0.659
-0.629
(0.443)
(0.445)
GDP per capita
0.801*
0.788*
(0.353)
(0.355)
Constant
-5.952**
-6.135**
(2.308)
(2.318)
Num. Individuals
42,308
42,308
Num. Countries
27
27
Note: Hierarchical logit models. Coefficients are statistically
significant at *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Standard errors in
parentheses.
The second element focuses on explaining who is the target of campaigns given
the institutional context. The expectation (H2) is that rates of party outreach will be less
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skewed towards those with higher SES under compulsory voting than under voluntary
voting. In other words, we should expect that all individuals under compulsory voting
rules—regardless of level of education—will be contacted at similar rates given that there
is higher probability that they are potential voters. Model 2 in Table 4.4 takes into
account an interactive effect between compulsory voting and education levels. Because
the significance of interactions are difficult to interpret from the table, Figure 4.2 graphs
the mean predicted probability of being contacted by a political party given your level of
education and whether the system is compulsory or not. The confidence intervals
surrounding the means indicate whether the differences between groups are statistically
significant at the 95% confidence level.44
While it does appear that under both systems, there is an increasing trend in terms
of the probability that an individual with higher levels of education will get contacted by
a party, this rate is not statistically significant under compulsory voting when discerning
between the first three levels of education. In other words, there is not apparent difference
in the probability of being contacted by a party under CV if an individual has no
education, primary education, or secondary education. College graduates do appear to
have a slightly statistically significant higher chance to be contacted when compared to
those with no education, but not in comparison to other levels.

44

Research indicates that graphing 84% confidence intervals allow one to determine
whether the differences between groups are statistically significant at the 95% confidence
level. Thereby, a statistically significant difference can be inferred if the confidence
intervals in the figure do not overlap (Julious 2004).
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Figure 4.2. Predicted Probability of Party Outreach by Voting Law and
Levels of Education

Notes: Figure 4.2 shows the predicted probability of having been contacted by a party
during the campaign, based on whether individual is subject to voluntary or compulsory
voting and conditioned by the level of education. Confidence intervals indicate statistical
significant differences at the 95% confidence level. Estimates were calculated based on
results presented in Model 2 in Table 4.4.
When voting is voluntary, by contrast, there is a clear statistically significant
increasing trend in the probability an individual will be contacted based on their
education level. Individuals with a college degree are significantly more likely to be
contacted than any other individual with a lower level of education. For someone with
low levels of education (none or less than primary), the probability that they will get
contacted is relatively small (approximately 18 percent). For someone with a college
degree, that probability increases to around 49 percent. These patterns lend support for
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Hypothesis 2—the bias in partisan contact by socioeconomic levels is clearly present
under voluntary voting, but much less apparent under compulsory voting.
The results presented so far do not take into account any characteristics of parties,
instead treating them all as similar in their strategic behavior. But, it is important to
consider that the introduction of a larger and more equal electorate under compulsory
voting may be more troublesome for right-leaning parties—who theoretically should
benefit from low and skewed turnout. Table 4.5 presents the results of hierarchical
models predicting left-leaning outreach and right-leaning outreach separately.45
Hypothesis 3a posits that right-leaning parties have a stronger interest to mobilize
under compulsory voting in order to offset the inclusion of typically marginalized voters
into the electorate. Models 3 and 4 in Table 4.5 present the results focusing on leftleaning outreach and right-leaning outreach, respectively. As observed in Model 3,
compulsory voting is not a statistically significant predictor of left-leaning outreach. The
same is the case in Model 4 for right-leaning parties. Meaning, right-leaning parties are
no more likely to significantly increase their party outreach efforts when voting is
compulsory. This does not provide support for Hypothesis 3a. In other words, it is not the

45

The dependent variables here indicate whether an individual reported being contacted
by a party on the left (Model 3) or the right (Model 4). In a small number of cases,
individuals reported being contacted by both parties. These individuals receive the value
of 1 on both dependent variables. Because there is a possibility that the errors in both
equations are correlated, a statistical technique such as seemingly unrelated regression
may be appropriate to account for the cross-equation error correlation. This is not
possible, however, considering the multilevel structure of the data. In order to circumvent
this issue, I run the same analyses excluding those individuals that reported being
contacted by both parties and present the results in Table C4 in Appendix C. The results
are similar to the ones presented in Table 4.5.
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case that right-leaning parties (or left-leaning parties) behave significantly different under
CV than VV. 46
Table 4.5. The Influence of Compulsory Voting on Left-Leaning and
Right-Leaning Party Outreach
(3)
(4)
Left-Leaning Outreach Right-Leaning Outreach
Compulsory Voting
-0.186
0.400
(0.740)
(0.596)
Education
0.246***
0.263***
(0.022)
(0.022)
Female
-0.025
-0.029
(0.030)
(0.029)
Age
0.003**
0.003**
(0.001)
(0.001)
Party Attachment
0.444***
0.354***
(0.033)
(0.032)
Ideology
-0.047***
0.049***
(0.006)
(0.006)
Presidential Election
-0.946***
-1.359***
(0.161)
(0.141)
PR System
-1.613***
-1.163**
(0.485)
(0.388)
Effective # of Parties
0.131
0.117
(0.090)
(0.073)
Democracy Level
-0.408
-0.457
(0.572)
(0.459)
GDP per capita
0.375
0.913**
(0.426)
(0.341)
Constant
-3.260
-9.131***
(3.101)
(2.533)
Num. Individuals
31,753
31,753
Num. Countries
24
24
Note: Hierarchical logit models. Coefficients are statistically significant at
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
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These analyses consider whether parties on the right under CV behave different than
parties on the right under CV (and vice-versa for left-leaning parties). This is because my
theoretical expectations suggest that parties on the right will need to change their
behavior under CV compared to what they were doing in the absence of CV. It does not
consider whether right-leaning parties behave differently than left-leaning parties under
each system. In a separate analysis presented in Table C5 in Appendix C, I consider this
possibility by conducting a multinomial analysis using type of contact as the dependent
variable. This analysis shows that it is also not the case that right-leaning parties behave
significantly different than left-leaning parties under compulsory voting.
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It could be the case that while overall levels of party outreach for each given type of
party are similar under both systems, the strategy behind outreach changes when voting is
mandatory. Hypothesis 3b posits that right-leaning parties should make stronger efforts to
reach out to more moderate voters in order to persuade them to vote compared to their
efforts under voluntary voting. Table C6 in Appendix C presents the results when taking
into account the individuals’ reported party ideology and the likelihood they will be
contacted by a party on either side of the political spectrum. In order to better represent
the results, I graph the predicted probabilities on being contacted by a Left-leaning or
Right-leaning party when considering the individual’s ideology and the voting system in
Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3. Predicted Probability of Party Outreach by Voting Law and
Individual Ideology

Notes: Figure 4.3 shows the predicted probability of having been contacted by a leftleaning or right-leaning party during the campaign, based on whether individual is
subject to voluntary or compulsory voting and conditioned by the individual’s ideology.
Confidence intervals indicate statistical significant differences at the 95% confidence
level. Estimates were calculated based on results presented in Table C6 in Appendix C.
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Figure 4.3. shows no apparent differences between the targets of outreach for both
parties under different systems. This does not provide support Hypothesis 3b. The results
presented indicate that right-leaning parties do not appear to be behaving differently
under CV when it comes to party outreach. One reason for this may be that while rightleaning parties may not be updating their outreach strategies when it comes to
compulsory voting, they could still be engaging in strategic behavior in other forms of
campaigning. For instance, it is possible that instead of changing their mobilization or
targeting strategy, right-leaning parties are changing their policy agenda and position in
order to appeal to this new electorate under CV. While this type of investigation is
beyond the scope of this paper, further investigation into other campaigning strategies
based on ideological party differences may be a fruitful avenue for future research.
Mobilization Versus Persuasion
They hypotheses and empirical tests presented so far make it difficult to discern
whether parties are engaging in more mobilization or persuasion. The null finding that
party outreach does not seem to be lower or higher under CV suggests that parties under
CV are simply shifting resources from mobilization to persuasion, because in theory,
mobilization is no longer needed when voting is compulsory. In this section, I provide
additional evidence supporting the notion that under CV, party outreach is mostly in the
form of persuasion, and that campaigns might not necessarily be cheaper when voting is
mandatory because parties continue to invest resources in contacting individuals—albeit
having a different goal in mind.
First, in order to see whether mobilization via outreach is indeed a successful
mobilizer of voters, I predict whether being contacted by a political party increases the
chances that someone will turn out to vote. This should matter primarily when voting is
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voluntary, and should have no significant effect on turnout choice under compulsory
voting. Figure 4.4 shows that while having been contacted by a political party during the
campaign is a strong and significant predictor of an individuals’ choice to turn out to vote
when under voluntary voting, it has virtually no effect on an individuals’ choice to turn
out under CV.47 While this is expected given that voting is mandatory under CV, it shows
that mobilization is much less of a factor under CV, therefore discouraging parties to
spend significant resources on mobilization. But, when voting is voluntary, it is clearly
worthwhile to still invest in contacting voters with the goal to mobilize them to the polls.
Figure 4.4. Predicted Probability of Voting by Voting Law and Party Contact

Notes: Figure 4.4 shows the predicted probability of reporting having voted based on
whether individual is subject to voluntary or compulsory voting and whether they were
contacted by a party or not during the campaign. Confidence intervals indicate statistical
significant differences at the 95% confidence level. Estimates were calculated based on
results presented in Table C7 in Appendix C.
47

Predicted probabilities were generated from results presented in Table C7 in Appendix

C.
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Karp and Banducci (2007) note that one way to specifically distinguish whether
parties are engaging in mobilization versus persuasion efforts is to see whether they are
targeting individuals that are already partisan or not. If parties are targeting mostly
individuals who have strong party attachments—and hence are less likely to be
persuaded—then it is likely that parties are engaging in mobilization efforts, and simply
ensuring that those individuals turn out to vote. But, if parties are reaching out to a
broader electorate and not only targeting individuals with high party attachments, it could
mean that they are reaching out to those who are more likely to persuaded. Using my
sample, I test whether parties under compulsory and voluntary voting are more likely to
target those with low or high party attachment.
Figure 4.5 shows that there is a clear increasing trend in the probability that
parties under voluntary voting will contact an individual based one their level of party
attachment.48 Specifically, the probability of being contacted by a political party under
VV when you report not being very close to a political party is about 35 percent. That
probability increases to approximately 50 percent when an individual reports being very
close to a party. These differences, however, are non-existent under compulsory voting—
individuals have similar probabilities of being contacted by a political party regardless of
their party attachment, as average levels are comparable and confidence intervals overlap.
Altogether, this evidence provides support for the theoretical expectation that even
though parties under compulsory voting do not have an incentive to invest resources on
mobilization, they still engage in party outreach with the goal to persuade voters and
secure their votes.
48

Predicted probabilities were generated from results presented in Table C8 in Appendix

C.
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Figure 4.5. Predicted Probability of Party Contact by Voting Law
and Party Attachment

Notes: Figure 4.5 shows the predicted probability of reporting having been
contacted by a party based on whether individual is subject to voluntary or
compulsory voting and the individuals’ reported level of party attachment.
Confidence intervals indicate statistical significant differences at the 95%
confidence level. Estimates were calculated based on results presented in Table
C8 of Appendix C.
Conclusions and Implications
This study directly contributes to our lack of detailed understanding of how elite
behavior can be conditioned by institutional design. By simply requiring citizens to turn
out at the polls, compulsory voting laws can significantly alter many aspects of the
political sphere. Unfortunately, most studies of compulsory voting focus solely on its
effects on individuals who are subject to the laws and their behavior at the polls. The few
studies investigating the impact of CV at the elite level focus on what kinds of electoral
outcomes might arise from mandatory voting laws, largely overlooking the fact that elites
will strategically update their strategies when presented with such institutional design.
128

The results of this analyses show that political parties do adjust to their institutional
environment. When voting is mandatory, parties continue to invest their resources in
campaign outreach, and are also less likely to focus significantly more on those
individuals with higher socioeconomic status. Yet, right-leaning parties do not appear to
substantially change their strategy in order to offset potential gains by the left.
Of particular importance are the differences in party outreach based on education.
College graduates will be the target of parties no matter what voting laws are present,
highlighting that SES is still an important determinant of party mobilization. But,
compulsory voting can be an effective tool to prevent parties from severely skewing their
target population. These findings have important implications for countries that have
considered either adopting or abandoning compulsory voting laws. In Chile, for example,
compulsory voting was recently abolished, and one of the factors cited in support of the
change is that under voluntary voting, parties would be encouraged to reach out to
marginalized voters in other to get them to turn out (Barnes and Rangel 2014). But, as
Hooghe and Perilaux (1998, 423) argue, “although some proponents of abolishing the
compulsory vote state that after abolishment, political parties will try to convince voters
to actually go to the polls, it is much more likely that they will try to win voters from
other parties, rather than to try to motivate the disinterested.” The results presented in this
paper corroborate this argument, suggesting that voluntary voting may only exacerbate
political marginalization.
The analyses show that right-leaning parties do not substantially change their
outreach strategy as theoretically expected. This could be because when voting is
voluntary, right-leaning parties may update their campaign strategy in a different way.
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Instead of changing their outreach efforts or who to target, they may simply shift policy
positions to appeal to the new electorate. The data limitations in this study do not allow
us to investigate how CV may shape campaign platforms and ideology. Some studies
have begun to investigate whether this second component of political campaigning is
conditioned by institutional context (Bugarin and Portugal 2015; Fowler 2013). Scholars
could also reach out to political elites in CV countries and obtain feedback as to how their
political strategies are shaped by this institutional design. Therefore, the further
consideration of how other aspects of campaign behavior are shaped by mandatory voting
laws appears to be a fruitful avenue for future research.
This research provides evidence of an association between compulsory voting and
party outreach strategies. At the same time, further research is necessary to investigate
the causal relationship between these political features. A lack of elite or survey
campaign data expanding a long period of time in a number of countries where
compulsory voting was abolished or implemented makes it difficult to infer how strong
the causal effect of CV is. Future experimental or qualitative work could be useful in
addressing this shortcoming. Meanwhile, this research presents a comprehensive and
novel attempt to establish how patterns of elite behavior can be shaped by institutional
context.
Still, the findings of this research also speak to other potential implications that
can come out of the patterns observed under the two different systems. When
marginalized individuals are forgotten in the political process, they may feel abandoned
by the system and powerless vis-à-vis the more educated, privileged class. Their interests
might not get represented and public policy will skew away from those who might need it
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the most. By contrast, when political parties are making an effort to reach out to those
who are not part of the mainstream, individuals’ own sense of importance and efficacy
might increase, encouraging them to engage with the polity in a deeper and more
meaningful way. Further, as discussed by Lijphart (1997) and Lever (2010), mandatory
turnout and the shift of parties’ focus away from encouraging or depressing mobilization
towards winning over individuals’ votes can decrease the need for negative campaigning
and attack ads, which are typically used in efforts to increase turnout. This would in turn
promote a more honest and inclusive campaign, which could have positive impact for the
country’s political system overall.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Implications
One of the most commonly studied questions in political science is when and why
people turn out to vote. This is because citizen participation remains a central component
of the democratic process, determining who gets elected and influencing what policies
are implemented by elected officials. Some countries deem voter turnout important
enough to require it by law. This dissertation has focused on understanding how citizens
and elites respond to the legal requirement to vote. From a citizens’ perspective, I
investigated attitudinal consequences of compulsory voting laws, as well as political
behavior beyond voting on election day. From an elite perspective, I propose and test
expectations regarding campaign behavior when elites are faced with a mandatory
requirement to vote. In doing so, I engage different sets of data and research designs.
In chapter two, I developed a detailed theoretical framework that highlights
whether compulsory voting increases citizens’ feelings of civic duty, or generates
resentment amongst eligible voters. I also posited that compulsory voting could decrease
the novelty attached to voting, increasing levels of indifference. I use a hierarchical
modeling technique and survey data from the 2010 Latin American Public Opinion
Project, which includes over 17,000 individuals in 18 different countries. Results show
that voters living under CV are no more likely to report either increased feelings of civic
duty or higher rates of resentment, compared to their counterparts under voluntary voting.
Instead, individuals who are required to turn out by law are slightly more likely to feel
indifferent towards electoral participation.
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Chapter three takes advantage of the recent abolition of compulsory voting in
Chile in order to evaluate whether CV laws promote political engagement beyond
election day. I construct a dataset using novel survey-data from Chile’s Centro de
Estudios Publicos, by combining 11 waves of public opinion surveys conducted from
2005 to 2016, totaling over 11,000 respondents over an 11 year period. I also investigate
the impact of CV on six different elements of political engagement, related to information
seeking, the discussion of politics, and political activism. This unique research design
contributes directly to our understanding of how and when political engagement is
affected by a legal requirement to vote. I show that under compulsory voting, individuals
are significantly more likely to read and watch political news, and also to discuss politics
with friends. This effect is stronger for those with lower levels of education.
Finally, in chapter four I investigate whether mandatory voting laws alter elite
campaign behavior and encourage political parties to reach out to a wider set of the
electorate. I conduct cross-national hierarchical analyses using data from the latest wave
of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems—a comprehensive dataset of postelection surveys of over 40,000 individuals in 27 different countries. I also combine party
ideology data from the Manifesto Project to construct measures of party outreach for left
and right-leaning political organizations. I find that levels of partisan outreach are similar
under both systems, and that this is likely because parties under compulsory voting are
more likely to change their outreach strategy form mobilization to persuasion. These data
show that while compulsory voting, intuitively, should minimize mobilization efforts,
levels of party outreach are actually similar to when voting is voluntary. Further evidence
shows that this is likely because parties under CV are shifting their strategy from
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mobilization to persuasion. At the same time that overall levels of party contact are
similar, some interesting differences between compulsory and voluntary voting systems
do emerge. When voting is voluntary, parties are significantly more likely to reach out to
individuals with higher levels of education, while these differences are not apparent
under compulsory voting. Outreach strategies do not seem to vary when taking into
account party ideology, though this could be because party platforms may shift when
voting is mandatory.
Taken together, these findings speak directly to the potential of compulsory
voting to affect different aspects of the democratic process that extend beyond simply
increasing voter turnout rates on election day. Compulsory voting does not necessarily
alter citizens’ attitudes towards voting in a positive or negative way, but it does alter
patterns of political behavior when it comes to engaging with politics. This indicates that
increased political engagement under CV is not necessarily a product of psychological or
attitudinal changes per se, but likely a more rational calculation of when to invest on
obtaining additional political information given the institutional context. At the same
time, we know that it’s not only citizens that respond to the institutional contexts—elites
also take into account institutional design when making rational calculations on how to
best achieve their goals. Given that campaign strategies can be different under
compulsory voting, many more aspects of the political landscape (such as party
ideological positions, and consequently, electoral gains) could be shaped by mandatory
voting laws. The contributions this dissertation makes to our understanding of the
impacts of compulsory voting laws also suggest several policy implications.
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Policy Implications and Avenues for Future Research
The proposed theories and empirical evidence in this dissertation, first and
foremost, offer interesting suggestions to practitioners in places where voting is
voluntary. These implications speak to two different situations: occasions where adopting
compulsory voting might be an appealing institutional innovation, and situations where a
country might be considering abolishing compulsory voting. In the former case, a country
with waning turnout rates should not necessarily be assumed to desire higher turnout.
Voter ID laws and other efforts to suppress turnout in the United States are an example of
a clear resistance against promoting electoral participation. Despite these concerns,
research has shown that higher turnout in the United States may cause modest changes in
electoral outcomes (Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003; Highton and Wolfinger 2001),
suggesting that higher turnout could increase legitimacy and bolster participation but not
be as damaging to the Republican Party as it may seem. For countries that welcome a
reform like this, however, higher turnout via CV laws may come with additional
ramifications.
These ramifications, in turn, could be viewed as either beneficial or detrimental.
The fact that CV does not necessarily promote strong attitudinal effects amongst citizens
could be a positive thing for those who fear the implementation of compulsory voting
will lead to immediate attitudinal backlash. At the same time, it may be disappointing for
some who believe instituting a legal requirement to vote will awaken feelings of civic
duty amongst individuals. If anything, compulsory voting may slightly increase
indifferent feelings towards voting, turning voting into a mundane task rather than
extraordinary act.
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While we can observe patterns of average levels of specific attitudes in a given
country with or without compulsory voting, it is less clear whether adopting compulsory
voting at the present moment would lead to a stronger change in attitudes towards voting.
This is because in the sample studied in Chapter 2, compulsory voting has been existent
for a long period of time and, therefore, become an ingrained part of society. Most
individuals taking the surveys, for example, lived under compulsory voting rules their
whole lives. It would thus be interesting to investigate how voters might react if
compulsory voting were implemented in countries with a long-standing culture of voting
as a voluntary act. It could be that in today’s society, where democratic values of freedom
and individual liberty are touted as essential, individuals would react more negatively to a
legal requirement to vote. In the United States, for example, several Gallup surveys from
1960 to 2004 have consistently shown that approximately 70 percent of Americans
believe compulsory voting to be a “poor law” (Panagopoulos, 2004). If the Colombian
government decides to adopt compulsory voting laws in the near future, as it has recently
debated, a closer examination of citizen attitudes towards voting pre and post reform in a
context of long-standing voluntary practice could be a prominent avenue for future
research. In the meantime, experimental work that simulates a legal requirement to turn
out via the imposition of penalties (i.e., Shineman, forthcoming) could also be helpful in
predicting not only political behavior, but also attitudinal outcomes.
It is perhaps harder to argue that having more individuals seeking out political
information under compulsory voting could be a negative thing. If we believe that any
information—however superficial it may be—can contribute to a more educated vote
choice, then countries should welcome a more engaged citizenry. This finding provides
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an answer to skeptical individuals who raise concerns about having a large pool of
uninformed voters enter the electorate by implementing CV laws. I show that when
voting is required, individuals (especially those with lower levels of education) tend to
engage with political information at significantly higher rates. Given data limitations I am
not able to show that this information will subsequently lead to higher rates of political
knowledge or valid voting at the polls, but it does tells us that the likelihood individuals
will blindly go to the polls when voting is mandatory is lower than what opponents of CV
might argue.
At the same time, this research shows that while CV does have an impact on
engagement beyond the ballot box, the impact is not as widespread as some proponents
of this institutional design might argue. Compulsory voting does not necessarily lead a
more politically active society in terms of direct political action. As my results in Chapter
3 demonstrate, compulsory voting does not promote discussion of politics among friends,
or engaging in political activities such as working with parties or persuading others to
think a certain way about politics. The effects of CV are primarily private and do not
extend beyond the individual or the family. In this vein, the legal requirement to vote
does not necessarily transform aggregate levels of political activity beyond turnout in a
country, but can to a certain extent alter individual political engagement or even decisions
at the ballot box.
Another important implication of this dissertation is that it also gives elites an
idea of how they would be influenced if compulsory voting were to be implemented.
Often, during debates on this institutional design, legislators will argue on many points
regarding the influence it will have on voters, some of which were addressed in Chapters
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2 and 3 (Senado 2012). But, it is also important for legislators to consider the effects CV
may have on political campaigns and the political landscape. Evidence presented here
suggests that, contrary to certain beliefs (Keaney and Rogers; Lijphart 1997), compulsory
voting may not drive the costs of campaigns down. Former President Obama, for
instance, was recently quoted saying “other countries have mandatory voting…it would
be transformative if everybody voted—that would counteract money more than anything”
(Somin 2015). If we focus solely on campaign spending on party outreach, that is likely
not to be the case. Legislators will have to broaden their mobilization strategy to reach
out to marginalized citizens, and will still invest in trying to persuade them for their
votes. Given that party outreach is not the only aspect of campaign spending, however,
future research should expand on our understanding of campaign investments once voting
is compulsory.
The data limitations in this study do not permit a further investigation into
changing campaign platforms and ideology under compulsory voting. A productive way
to move this literature forward would be to survey or interview political elites in CV
countries and obtain feedback as to how their political strategies are shaped by this
institutional design. A closer examination into subnational campaign spending patterns in
Chile, for example, could also provide useful information into how the abolition of
compulsory voting altered campaign behavior. Research could also investigate campaign
speeches and platforms before and after reform to capture any particular changes in how
politicians have chosen to appeal to voters when presented with different institutional
contexts.
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While it is common to think about the evidence presented here and in related
literature as a way to inform scholars and practioners on the benefits or consequences of
adopting compulsory voting, it is also important to consider how this research can also
inform those countries that have compulsory voting laws and may consider abandoning
it. In fact, the abolition of compulsory voting has been more common than the adoption
of it in the past 40-50 years. Chile, the most recent example of abandoning this
institutional design, may have inspired other countries in the region to reconsider their
election laws. Public opinion surveys conducted in Brazil, for example, have shown that
compulsory voting is becoming increasingly unpopular amongst the population.
Datafolha (2015), a public-opinion think thank in Brazil, shows that the percentage of
people who are against the compulsory voting law has risen from 43 percent in 2008 to a
high of 66 percent in 2015. Average rates of disapproval are highest amongst those with
higher levels of education and income. This could be puzzling—perhaps indicating that
even though those with lower socioeconomic status are more likely to suffer from the
costs of turning out to vote under CV, they do not seem to resent the system as much. A
deeper examination into the reasoning behind support or opposition to CV could also
present an interest research agenda.
If a country like Brazil chooses to follow public opinion and abolish compulsory
voting, however, they should be prepared to experience some of the patterns that are
presented in this research. Overall rates of political engagement may decrease—
particularly among less educated individuals. Campaign strategies will shift, and likely be
less inclusive, but won’t necessarily be less extensive, as we see that rates of outreach are
similar under each system. A country like Brazil could also look to Chile’s experience in
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considering election reform. Prior to abandoning CV in 2010, about 78 percent of Chile’s
population opposed the legal requirement to vote while only 22 percent supported it,
suggesting similar levels of disapproval of the current system in Brazil. But, levels of
support for compulsory voting in Chile have recently risen up to almost 50 percent,
suggesting Chilean citizens may be starting to regret the reform (CEP 2016). Carey and
Horiuchi (2013) suggest that this buyer’s remorse may be even stronger for Progressive
Chileans, as public opinion towards economic redistribution appears to have shifted after
the large drop-offs in participation. Drawing from the findings in this research, it could
also be due to lower levels of political engagement now that voting is voluntary, and a
shift on partisan strategies that have minimized efforts to mobilize marginalized citizens.
Because the reform in Chile is still recent, other trends may be observed in future years
that could help inform countries considering abolition. The theories and evidence
presented in this dissertation, however, provide broader empirical answers to some of the
debates surrounding the maximization of voter turnout through a legal requirement to
vote.
Overall, this dissertations shows that the legal requirement to vote do not
necessarily promote strong positive or negative feelings towards the democratic process,
but does in fact increase levels of political engagement, and keeps political parties active
and engaging with all types of voters. These findings help inform the debate on whether
countries should adopt or abolish compulsory voting, by mitigating concerns on whether
the adoption could have significant negative effects, and at the same time highlighting
some of the beneficial aspects of CV that countries considering abolition may regret
losing (e.g., lower rates of political engagement, more unequal party outreach).
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Going forward, efforts to test some of the existing causal mechanisms that can’t
be properly captured through observational research designs will aid in our understanding
of how maximizing turnout via CV laws influences the political realm. Yet, this
dissertation has directly contributed to our understanding of how political institutions can
affect political behavior, and the importance of electoral participation for the democratic
process—which Dahl (1989, 322) considers “the most reliable means for protecting and
advancing the good and interests of all the persons subject to collective decisions.”
Requiring that all citizens participate, then, may be a way to ensure that such interests get
advanced.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Chapter 2 Additional Tables and Figures
Table A1. Spanish Translation of the Dependent Variable
Language
Question
Answer Options
Source
Spanish
“¿Cuál de
1=Tengo un sentimiento de
Latinobarometro
éstas frases
satisfacción
2010
esta más
2=Lo hago sólo porque es mi
cerca de sus
deber
sentimientos 3=Me siento molesto, es un
cuando va a
desperdicio de tiempo
las urnas a
4=No siento nada en particular
votar?
5=No voto
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Table A2. Countries in the Sample by Voting System
Country
Colombia
El Salvador
Guatemala
Nicaragua
Venezuela
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Honduras
Mexico
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay

Voting System
Voluntary
Voluntary
Voluntary
Voluntary
Voluntary
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
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Enforced?
Enforced
Unenforced
Enforced
Enforced
Unenforced
Unenforced
Enforced
Unenforced
Unenforced
Unenforced
Unenforced
Enforced
Enforced

Table A3. Description of Control Variables
Variable
Name
Age

Description & Coding

Source

“Age of the Respondent.”

Female

“Sex of the Interviewee.”
1=female; 0=male

Latinobarometro
2010
Latinobarometro
2010

Education

“What level of education do you have? What was
the last year you completed?”
0 years= 1(none or illiterate); 1-11 years=2 (less
than HS); 12 years=3 (completed HS); more than
12 years=4 (some college or more)
“How interested are you in politics?”
4=very interested; 3=some interested; 2=few
interested; 1=not at all interested
“In general, would you say that you are very
satisfied, quite satisfied, not very satisfied or not
at all satisfied with the working of the democracy
in (country)?”
1=not at all satisfied; 2=not very satisfied; 3=quite
satisfied; 4=very satisfied
“If elections were held this Sunday, which party
would you vote for?”
0= Wouldn’t Vote; 1=everything else
I use principle component factor analysis to
generate quintiles of wealth based on household
assets. See Cordova (2009) for detail.
“Ethnic group (code by observation).”
1=asian, black, indigenous, mestizo, mulato, or
other race; 0=white
The Log of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per
capita for 2010

Political
Interest
Satisfaction
with
Democracy

Voter
Income

Minority
GDP per
capita
Democracy
Level

Freedom House Civil Liberties and Political
Rights Ratings (1-7). The variable was
transformed in order to report states with higher
scores in the FH Scale as more democratic, while
lower scores reflect less democratic states
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Latinobarometro
2010

Latinobarometro
2010
Latinobarometro
2010

Latinobarometro
2010
Latinobarometro
2010
Latinobarometro
2010
World
Development
Indicators 2016
Freedom House,
2016

Table A4. Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Age
Female
Education
Political Interest
Satisfaction with
Democracy
Voter
Income
GDP per capita
Democracy Level

Min
16
0
1
1

Max
96
1
4
4

Mean
40.1
0.52
2.34
1.93

S.D.
16.49107
0.50
0.84
0.94

N
20,204
20,204
20,204
19,946

1

4

2.41

0.87

19,316

0
1
7.31
3

1
5
9.5
7

0.78
2.96
8.64
5.33

0.41
1.39
0.67
1.12

19,420
20,204
20,204
20,204
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Table A5. The Impact of Compulsory Voting on Individual Attitudes Towards
Voting (Abstention as the Baseline)
Civic Duty
Resentment
Indifference
Satisfaction
Compulsory Voting
0.771
0.946
1.260*
0.680
(0.616)
(0.588)
(0.589)
(0.421)
Age
0.037*
0.035*
0.025*
0.041*
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
Female
-0.004
0.041
-0.008
-0.011
(0.079)
(0.098)
(0.088)
(0.082)
Education
0.254*
0.168*
0.149*
0.250*
(0.058)
(0.071)
(0.064)
(0.060)
Political Interest
0.279*
0.227*
0.170*
0.691*
(0.051)
(0.062)
(0.056)
(0.052)
Satisfaction with Democracy
0.121*
-0.195*
-0.024
0.317*
(0.047)
(0.060)
(0.053)
(0.049)
Voter
1.684*
1.065*
1.297*
2.320*
(0.081)
(0.102)
(0.092)
(0.090)
Income
0.062*
0.088*
0.073*
0.137*
(0.031)
(0.038)
(0.034)
(0.032)
Minority
0.062
-0.147
0.122
0.087
(0.093)
(0.114)
(0.104)
(0.094)
GDP per capita
-0.096
-0.059
0.040
0.039
(0.365)
(0.349)
(0.349)
(0.249)
Democracy Level
-0.144
-0.025
-0.261
-0.213
(0.270)
(0.258)
(0.258)
(0.184)
Constant
-0.341
-1.978
-1.298
-3.911*
(2.789)
(2.668)
(2.668)
(1.904)
Number of Observations
17,020
Number of Countries
18
Estimated coefficients indicate the impact of each independent variable on the probability of
selecting one of the options listed above over the baseline response of Abstention. Coefficients
are statistically significant at *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A6. The Impact of Compulsory Voting on Individual Attitudes Towards
Voting (Resentment as the Baseline)
Civic Duty
Indifference
Satisfaction
Abstention
-0.175
0.314*
-0.266
-0.946
(0.114)
(0.127)
(0.202)
(0.588)
Age
0.002
-0.010*
0.006*
-0.035*
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.002)
(0.003)
Female
-0.045
-0.049
-0.052
-0.041
(0.068)
(0.079)
(0.072)
(0.098)
Education
0.086
-0.019
0.082
-0.168*
(0.046)
(0.054)
(0.049)
(0.071)
Political Interest
0.052
-0.056
0.465*
-0.227*
(0.040)
(0.047)
(0.041)
(0.062)
Satisfaction with Democracy
0.316*
0.171*
0.512*
0.195*
(0.042)
(0.048)
(0.044)
(0.060)
Voter
0.619*
0.232*
1.255*
-1.065*
(0.074)
(0.086)
(0.084)
(0.102)
Income
-0.026
-0.014
0.049
-0.088*
(0.026)
(0.031)
(0.028)
(0.038)
Minority
0.209*
0.270*
0.234*
0.147
(0.079)
(0.092)
(0.083)
(0.114)
GDP per capita
-0.036
0.100
0.099
0.059
(0.071)
(0.078)
(0.121)
(0.349)
Democracy Level
-0.119*
-0.236*
-0.188*
0.025
(0.051)
(0.056)
(0.089)
(0.258)
Constant
1.637*
0.680
-1.933*
1.978
(0.564)
(0.622)
(0.942)
(2.668)
Number of Observations
17,020
Number of Countries
18
Estimated coefficients indicate the impact of each independent variable on the probability of
selecting one of the options listed above over the baseline response of Resentment. Coefficients
are statistically significant at *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses.
Compulsory Voting

147

Table A7. The Impact of Compulsory Voting on Individual Attitudes Towards
Voting (Satisfaction as the Baseline)
Civic Duty
Resentment
Indifference
Abstention
0.091
0.266
0.580*
-0.680
(0.211)
(0.202)
(0.193)
(0.421)
Age
-0.004*
-0.006*
-0.016*
-0.041*
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.003)
Female
0.008
0.052
0.004
0.011
(0.038)
(0.072)
(0.056)
(0.082)
Education
0.004
-0.082
-0.101*
-0.250*
(0.025)
(0.049)
(0.038)
(0.060)
Political Interest
-0.413*
-0.465*
-0.521*
-0.691*
(0.020)
(0.041)
(0.032)
(0.052)
Satisfaction with Democracy
-0.196*
-0.512*
-0.341*
-0.317*
(0.022)
(0.044)
(0.034)
(0.049)
Voter
-0.635*
-1.255*
-1.023*
-2.320*
(0.056)
(0.084)
(0.071)
(0.090)
Income
-0.075*
-0.049^
-0.063*
-0.137*
(0.015)
(0.028)
(0.022)
(0.032)
Minority
-0.025
-0.234*
0.036
-0.087
(0.045)
(0.083)
(0.068)
(0.094)
GDP per capita
-0.135
-0.099
0.001
-0.039
(0.125)
(0.121)
(0.114)
(0.249)
Democracy Level
0.069
0.188*
-0.048
0.213
(0.092)
(0.089)
(0.084)
(0.184)
Constant
3.570*
1.933*
2.613*
3.911*
(0.965)
(0.942)
(0.890)
(1.904)
Number of Observations
17,020
Number of Countries
18
Estimated coefficients indicate the impact of each independent variable on the probability of
selecting one of the options listed above over the baseline response of Satisfaction. Coefficients are
statistically significant at *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses.
Compulsory Voting

148

Table A8. The Impact of Compulsory Voting on Individual Attitudes Towards
Voting (Dichotomous Outcomes)
Duty
Resentment
Indifference
Satisfaction
Don’t Vote
-0.037
0.178
0.560***
-0.137
-0.716
(0.193)
(0.178)
(0.162)
(0.232)
(0.528)
Age
0.003***
0.001
-0.011***
0.008***
-0.037***
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.003)
Female
0.001
0.047
-0.003
-0.014
0.006
(0.031)
(0.067)
(0.050)
(0.036)
(0.078)
Education
0.036
-0.049
-0.078*
0.062*
-0.299***
(0.021)
(0.046)
(0.035)
(0.024)
(0.059)
Political Interest
-0.205***
-0.151***
-0.220***
0.447***
-0.385***
(0.017)
(0.039)
(0.029)
(0.019)
(0.050)
Satisfaction with
-0.035
-0.327***
-0.165***
0.235***
-0.112*
Democracy
(0.019)
(0.041)
(0.030)
(0.022)
(0.047)
Voter
0.147***
-0.552***
-0.300***
0.888***
-1.724***
(0.039)
(0.073)
(0.057)
(0.054)
(0.080)
Income
-0.037**
0.009
-0.010
0.070***
-0.073*
(0.012)
(0.026)
(0.019)
(0.014)
(0.030)
Minority
0.038
-0.189*
0.055
0.011
-0.035
(0.040)
(0.081)
(0.064)
(0.046)
(0.092)
GDP per capita
-0.117
-0.079
0.060
0.095
0.041
(0.115)
(0.112)
(0.098)
(0.137)
(0.314)
Democracy Level
0.055
0.159*
-0.110
-0.076
0.099
(0.085)
(0.081)
(0.072)
(0.101)
(0.232)
Constant
0.965
-1.531
-0.852
-4.153***
0.685
(0.882)
(0.857)
(0.754)
(1.054)
(2.405)
# of Observations
17,020
17,020
17,020
17,020
17,020
# of Countries
18
18
18
18
18
Notes: Estimated coefficients indicate the impact of each independent variable on the probability of selecting the
dependent variable listed at the top. Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001. Standard
errors in parentheses.
Compulsory Voting
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Table A9. The Impact of Enforced Compulsory Voting on Individual Attitudes
Towards Voting (Civic Duty as the Baseline)
Resentment
Indifference
Satisfaction
Abstain
0.195
0.501***
-0.019
-0.613
(0.117)
(0.090)
(0.207)
(0.612)
Enforced CV
0.131
0.463***
-0.274
-1.074
(0.127)
(0.098)
(0.240)
(0.719)
Age
-0.002
-0.012***
0.004***
-0.037***
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.003)
Female
0.045
-0.004
-0.007
0.004
(0.068)
(0.052)
(0.038)
(0.079)
Education
-0.086
-0.105**
-0.003
-0.256***
(0.046)
(0.035)
(0.025)
(0.058)
Political Interest
-0.052
-0.108***
0.412***
-0.280***
(0.040)
(0.031)
(0.020)
(0.051)
Satisfaction with
-0.316***
-0.145***
0.196***
-0.122*
Democracy
(0.042)
(0.031)
(0.022)
(0.047)
Voter
-0.617***
-0.387***
0.638***
-1.687***
(0.074)
(0.059)
(0.056)
(0.081)
Income
0.025
0.011
0.075***
-0.061*
(0.026)
(0.020)
(0.015)
(0.031)
Minority
-0.214**
0.059
0.016
-0.055
(0.080)
(0.063)
(0.046)
(0.093)
GDP per capita
0.053
0.145**
0.196
0.209
(0.075)
(0.054)
(0.127)
(0.376)
Democracy Level
0.121*
-0.115**
-0.053
0.160
(0.051)
(0.038)
(0.088)
(0.262)
Constant
-1.782**
-1.042*
-4.140***
-0.675
(0.604)
(0.446)
(1.003)
(2.958)
# of Observations
17,020
# of Countries
18
Notes: Estimated coefficients indicate the impact of each independent variable on the
probability of selecting one of the options listed above over the baseline response of Civic
Duty. Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001. Standard
errors in parentheses.
Unenforced CV

150

Table A10. The Impact of Compulsory Voting on Individual Attitudes Towards Voting,
Conditional on Voting Behavior (Civic Duty as the Baseline)
Compulsory Voting
Voter
Compulsory Voting*Voter
Age
Female
Education

Resentment
0.091
(0.171)
-0.675*
(0.170)
0.081
(0.188)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.046
(0.068)
-0.088

Indifference
0.133
(0.131)
-0.748*
(0.126)
0.455*
(0.142)
-0.012*
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.052)
-0.105*

Satisfaction
0.007
(0.259)
0.725*
(0.117)
-0.111
(0.133)
0.004*
(0.001)
-0.011
(0.038)
0.031

Abstain
-0.825*
(0.140)
-1.795*
(0.139)
0.167
(0.168)
-0.037*
(0.003)
0.020
(0.077)
-0.171*
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-0.050
-0.107*
0.416*
-0.288*
(0.040)
(0.031)
(0.020)
(0.050)
Satisfaction with Democracy
-0.322*
-0.149*
0.184*
-0.137*
(0.042)
(0.031)
(0.022)
(0.046)
Income
0.025
0.011
0.069*
-0.093*
(0.026)
(0.020)
(0.015)
(0.029)
Minority
-0.235*
0.042
-0.019
-0.350*
(0.078)
(0.061)
(0.047)
(0.085)
GDP per capita
0.024
0.129*
0.116
0.032
(0.069)
(0.049)
(0.137)
(0.072)
Democracy Level
0.127*
-0.110*
-0.074
0.201*
(0.049)
(0.036)
(0.101)
(0.052)
Constant
-1.489*
-0.637
-3.506*
0.968
(0.552)
(0.406)
(1.053)
(0.590)
Number of Observations
17,020
Number of Countries
18
Notes: Estimated coefficients indicate the impact of each independent variable on the probability of selecting the dependent
variable over the baseline (Civic Duty). Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses.
Political Interest

Table A11. The Impact of Compulsory Voting on Individual Attitudes Towards Voting, Conditional on Political
Interest (Civic Duty as the Baseline)
Compulsory Voting
Political Interest
Compulsory Voting*Political Interest
Age
Female
Education
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Satisfaction with Democracy
Voter

Resentment
0.142
(0.208)
-0.051
(0.091)
0.005
(0.100)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.045
(0.068)
-0.088
(0.047)
-0.322*
(0.042)
-0.612*
(0.074)

Indifference
0.254
(0.155)
-0.202*
(0.069)
0.120
(0.076)
-0.012*
(0.002)
-0.004
(0.052)
-0.105*
(0.035)
-0.149*
(0.031)
-0.383*
(0.058)

Satisfaction
-0.363
(0.247)
0.321*
(0.039)
0.130*
(0.045)
0.004*
(0.001)
-0.011
(0.038)
0.031
(0.025)
0.184*
(0.022)
0.643*
(0.056)

Abstain
-0.821*
(0.205)
-0.328*
(0.090)
0.054
(0.107)
-0.037*
(0.003)
0.018
(0.077)
-0.172*
(0.053)
-0.136*
(0.046)
-1.676*
(0.078)

(0.026)
(0.020)
(0.015)
(0.029)
-0.235*
0.041
-0.017
-0.350*
(0.078)
(0.061)
(0.047)
(0.085)
GDP per capita
0.025
0.134*
0.122
0.037
(0.069)
(0.049)
(0.136)
(0.072)
Democracy Level
0.126*
-0.114*
-0.077
0.198*
(0.049)
(0.036)
(0.100)
(0.052)
Constant
-1.537*
-0.761
-3.264*
0.945
(0.554)
(0.407)
(1.047)
(0.594)
Number of Observations
17,020
Number of Countries
18
Notes: Estimated coefficients indicate the impact of each independent variable on the probability of selecting one of the options listed
above over the baseline (Civic Duty). Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses.
Minority

Table A12. The Impact of Compulsory Voting on the Civic Duty to Vote
Civic Duty
to Vote
Compulsory Voting
0.041
(0.191)
Age
0.003**
(0.001)
Female
0.103**
(0.036)
Education
0.005
(0.025)
Political Interest
0.054**
(0.020)
Satisfaction with Democracy
0.098***
(0.022)
Voter
0.341***
(0.043)
Income
0.019
(0.014)
Minority
-0.001
(0.045)
GDP per capita
0.155
(0.115)
Democracy Level
-0.158
(0.084)
Constant
-0.297
(0.878)
Number of Observations
16,984
Number of Countries
18
Notes: Hierarchical Logit Models. Coefficients are statistically significant at
*p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001 *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure A1. Predicted Probability of Selecting “I Don’t Vote” by Voting System and
Voting Behavior

Notes: Figure A1 shows the predicted probability of selecting “I Don’t Vote,”
conditioned by being a voter or not. Confidence intervals indicate statistical
significant differences at the 95% confidence level. Estimates were calculated
from results presented in Table A10 in Appendix A.
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Appendix B: Chapter 3 Additional Tables and Figures
Table B1. List of Surveys Available Pre and Post Election Reform
# of
Voting
Survey #
Year
Month
Individuals
Compulsory?
2005
June
1,501
Yes
Survey 1
2007
November
1,492
Yes
Survey 2
2008
November
1,492
Yes
Survey 3
2009
October
1,495
Yes
Survey 4
2010
June
1,488
Yes
Survey 5
2011: Compulsory Voting Abolished
2013
July
1,471
No
Survey 6
2014
July
1,434
No
Survey 7
2015
August
1,389
No
Survey 8
2015
November
1,425
No
Survey 9
2016
June
1,392
No
Survey 10
2016
November
1,453
No
Survey 11
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Table B2. Spanish Translations of Dependent Variables
Language
Spanish

Primary Question
“Para cada actividad que le nombraré
indique si Ud. la realiza frecuentemente, a
veces, o nunca.”

Variable

Sub-Question

Watch
Politics

“Mira programas politicos en television”

Read Politics

“Lee noticias sobre politica”

Talk Politics
with Family

“Conversa en familia sobre politica”

Talk Politics
with Friends

“Conversa con Amigos sobre politica”

Persuade

“Trata de convencer a alguien de lo que Ud.
Piensa politicamente”

Work with
Party

“Trabaja o ha trabajado para un partido o
candidato”
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Source
CEP (Centro de
Estudios Públicos)
Answer Options
1=Nunca
2=A Veces
3=Frequentemente
1=Nunca
2=A Veces
3=Frequentemente
1=Nunca
2=A Veces
3=Frequentemente
1=Nunca
2=A Veces
3=Frequentemente
1=Nunca
2=A Veces
3=Frequentemente
1=Nunca
2=A Veces
3=Frequentemente

Table B3. Description of Control Variables
Variable
Name
Female
Age

Education

Income*

Rural
Presidential
Election
Municipal
Election

Description & Coding

Source

“Sex”
1=female; 0=male

CEP (Centro de
Estudios Publicos)

“What is your age?”
age of the respondent

CEP (Centro de
Estudios Publicos)

“What is your educational level?”
0=none; 1=primary incomplete; 2=primary
complete; 3=middle incomplete; 4=middle
complete; 5=high school incomplete; 6=high
school complete; 7=university incomplete;
8=university complete; 9=post-graduate
“What is your monthly income”
1=less than $35000; 2=35001-56000; 3=5600178000; 4=78001-101000; 5=101001-134000;
6=134001-179000; 7=179001-224000; 8=224001291000; 9=29101-358000; 10=358001-448000;
11=48001-1000000; 12=10000012000000;
13=2000001-3000000;14=more than 3000000
“Urban or Rural zone?”
1=rural; 0=urban
“Did a presidential election take place the year of
the survey?”
1=yes; 0=no
“Did a municipal election take place the year of
the survey?”
1=yes; 0=no

CEP (Centro de
Estudios Publicos)

CEP (Centro de
Estudios Publicos)

CEP (Centro de
Estudios Publicos)
Servicio Electoral de
Chile (SERVEL)
Servicio Electoral de
Chile (SERVEL)

World Development
Indicators (World
Bank)
Note: *Income is measured in Chilean pesos. To compare, 1,000 Chilean Pesos equals
approximately $1.51 US Dollars. A value of 1 in this measure would indicate a monthly
income of approximately $52 dollars.
GDP
growth

GDO growth (annual %); lagged by one year
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Table B4. Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Female
Age
Education
Income
Rural
Presidential Election
Municipal Election
GDP Growth

Min
0
18
0
1
0
0
0
-1.03

Max
1
98
9
14
1
1
1
6.04
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Mean
0.59
47.50
3.70
6.49
0.16
0.27
0.27
3.26

S.D.
0.49
18.00
2.22
3.23
0.36
0.44
0.44
1.97

N
16,176
16,168
15,929
11,211
16,176
16,176
16,176
16,176

Table B5. The Effect of Compulsory Voting on Political Engagement, Conditional
on Education
Watch
Read Politics
Politics
Compulsory Voting
0.498***
0.498***
(0.092)
(0.081)
Education
0.346***
0.246***
(0.014)
(0.014)
Compulsory Voting * Education
-0.029
-0.025
(0.018)
(0.017)
Female
-0.373***
-0.402***
(0.041)
(0.039)
Age
0.005***
0.011***
(0.001)
(0.001)
Income
0.056***
0.034***
(0.007)
(0.007)
Rural
-0.469***
-0.181***
(0.059)
(0.052)
Presidential Election
0.130
0.175*
(0.084)
(0.072)
Municipal Election
-0.038
-0.139*
(0.074)
(0.063)
GDP per capita
0.045**
0.037*
(0.017)
(0.015)
Constant
2.072***
1.449***
(0.120)
(0.111)
# of Observations
11,014
11,023
# of Surveys
11
11
Note: Hierarchical Ordered Logit Models. Coefficients are statistically
significant at *p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses
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Table B6. The Effect of Compulsory Voting on Political Engagement, Controlling for Registration
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Read
Watch
Talk Politics
Talk Politics
Persuade
Work w/
Politics
Politics
w/ Family
w/ Friends
Others
Party
Compulsory Voting
0.469*
0.475*
0.224*
0.138*
0.045
0.142
(0.063)
(0.054)
(0.046)
(0.067)
(0.088)
(0.128)
Female
-0.380*
-0.408*
0.018
-0.512*
-0.234*
-0.168*
(0.041)
(0.039)
(0.041)
(0.042)
(0.054)
(0.074)
Age
0.003*
0.008*
-0.003*
-0.006*
-0.007*
0.010*
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.002)
Education
0.329*
0.231*
0.269*
0.281*
0.110*
0.188*
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.014)
(0.019)
Income
0.053*
0.033*
0.042*
0.053*
0.014
0.027*
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.010)
(0.014)
Rural
-0.480*
-0.190*
-0.195*
-0.242*
-0.275*
-0.274*
(0.059)
(0.052)
(0.056)
(0.060)
(0.080)
(0.117)
Registered
0.364*
0.296*
0.367*
0.308*
0.067
0.405*
(0.068)
(0.066)
(0.069)
(0.071)
(0.090)
(0.141)
Presidential Election
0.129
0.173*
0.177*
0.262*
0.290*
0.083
(0.085)
(0.072)
(0.059)
(0.091)
(0.119)
(0.176)
Municipal Election
-0.033
-0.136*
0.080
0.173*
0.199
-0.057
(0.074)
(0.063)
(0.053)
(0.079)
(0.103)
(0.153)
GDP per capita
0.042*
0.035*
0.025*
0.029
0.012
0.035
(0.018)
(0.015)
(0.012)
(0.019)
(0.025)
(0.037)
Constant
2.209*
1.563*
1.910*
1.786*
1.909*
4.262*
(0.120)
(0.112)
(0.112)
(0.125)
(0.159)
(0.236)
# of Observations
10,999
11,008
10,997
10,996
10,995
10,982
# of Surveys
11
11
11
11
11
11
Note: Hierarchical Ordered Logit Models. Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<.05. Standard errors in
parentheses.

Table B7. The Effect of Compulsory Voting on Political Engagement, Only Registered Voters
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Read
Watch
Talk Politics
Talk Politics
Persuade
Work w/
Politics
Politics
w/ Family
w/ Friends
Others
Party
Compulsory Voting
0.465*
0.474*
0.226*
0.155*
0.070
0.123
(0.066)
(0.054)
(0.045)
(0.065)
(0.088)
(0.134)
Female
-0.386*
-0.423*
-0.004
-0.523*
-0.242*
-0.158*
(0.044)
(0.042)
(0.044)
(0.045)
(0.058)
(0.077)
Age
0.003*
0.009*
-0.002
-0.006*
-0.006*
0.010*
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.002)
Education
0.339*
0.242*
0.284*
0.291*
0.118*
0.203*
(0.012)
(0.011)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.015)
(0.019)
Income
0.055*
0.035*
0.043*
0.057*
0.021*
0.023
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.011)
(0.014)
Rural
-0.438*
-0.169*
-0.151*
-0.197*
-0.198*
-0.204
(0.062)
(0.055)
(0.059)
(0.064)
(0.084)
(0.119)
Presidential Election
0.141
0.183*
0.186*
0.233*
0.260*
0.162
(0.092)
(0.076)
(0.062)
(0.091)
(0.123)
(0.187)
Municipal Election
-0.059
-0.155*
0.068
0.170*
0.171
-0.063
(0.079)
(0.065)
(0.053)
(0.077)
(0.104)
(0.161)
GDP per capita
0.040*
0.029
0.021
0.030
0.001
0.023
(0.019)
(0.016)
(0.013)
(0.019)
(0.026)
(0.040)
Constant
1.932*
1.354*
1.622*
1.563*
1.954*
3.878*
(0.126)
(0.115)
(0.114)
(0.126)
(0.164)
(0.233)
# of Observations
9,673
9,681
9,675
9,673
9,671
9,659
# of Surveys
11
11
11
11
11
11
Note: Hierarchical Ordered Logit Models. Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<.05. Standard errors in
parentheses.

Table B8. The Effect of Compulsory Voting on Political Engagement, Age 40 or Above
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Read
Watch
Talk Politics Talk Politics
Persuade
Work w/
Politics
Politics
w/ Family
w/ Friends
Others
Party
Compulsory Voting
0.460*
0.447*
0.188*
0.091
-0.027
-0.046
(0.067)
(0.054)
(0.054)
(0.087)
(0.106)
(0.165)
Female
-0.391*
-0.443*
-0.014
-0.611*
-0.325*
-0.210*
(0.053)
(0.050)
(0.053)
(0.055)
(0.073)
(0.093)
Age
0.007*
0.010*
-0.004
-0.006*
0.002
0.012*
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.004)
Education
0.329*
0.237*
0.269*
0.278*
0.113*
0.203*
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.015)
(0.019)
(0.023)
Income
0.080*
0.047*
0.062*
0.073*
0.040**
0.039*
(0.011)
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.015)
(0.019)
Rural
-0.434*
-0.175*
-0.145*
-0.178*
-0.268*
-0.170
(0.073)
(0.063)
(0.070)
(0.076)
(0.104)
(0.138)
Presidential Election
0.206*
0.202*
0.174*
0.283*
0.368*
0.132
(0.092)
(0.073)
(0.074)
(0.123)
(0.149)
(0.228)
Municipal Election
-0.051
-0.149*
0.057
0.175
0.207
-0.132
(0.080)
(0.064)
(0.064)
(0.104)
(0.126)
(0.196)
GDP per capita
0.033
0.023
0.018
0.027
0.006
0.053
(0.019)
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.026)
(0.031)
(0.049)
Constant
2.323*
1.432*
1.605*
1.548*
2.509*
4.120*
(0.183)
(0.167)
(0.176)
(0.199)
(0.257)
(0.343)
# of Observations
6,972
6,978
6,978
6,973
6,972
6,965
# of Surveys
11
11
11
11
11
11
Note: Hierarchical Ordered Logit Models. Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<.05. Standard
errors in parentheses.

Appendix C: Chapter 4 Additional Tables and Figures
Table C1. List of Countries in the Sample
Post-Election
Compulsory
Country
Survey Year
Voting
Australia
2013
Yes
Austria
2013
No
Brazil
2014
Yes
Bulgaria
2014
No
Canada
2011
No
Czech Republic
2013
No
France
2012
No
Germany
2013
No
Greece
2012
Yes
Iceland
2013
No
Ireland
2011
No
Israel
2013
No
Japan
2013
No
Mexico
2012
Yes
Mexico
2015
Yes
Montenegro
2012
No
New Zealand
2011
No
Norway
2013
No
Poland
2011
No
Portugal
2015
No
Serbia
2012
No
Slovenia
2011
No
South Korea
2012
No
Sweden
2014
No
Switzerland
2011
No
Taiwan*
2012
No
Thailand
2011
Yes
Turkey
2015
Yes
United States
2012
No
*Because important aggregate level data is missing
for Taiwan, it is not included in the main empirical
analyses
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Table C2. Description of Control Variables
Variable
Name

Education

Female
Age

Description & Coding
“Highest level of education of the
respondent”
1=none or less than primary; 2= primary or
incomplete secondary; 3=secondary
complete and some tertiary; 4=college or
more
“Gender of the respondent”
1=female; 0=male
“Age of respondent in year”

Party
Attachment
Presidential
Election

“are you close to any political party?”
1=yes; 0=no
“type of election prior to survey”
1= presidential; 0=parliamentary

PR System

“Does the country have a proportional
representation system?”
1=yes; 0=no

Effective #
of Parties
Democracy
Level
GDP per
capita

Effective number of electoral parties
(ENEP)
Freedom House Scores
1=full autocracy; 7=full democracy
Log of GDP per capita during election year
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Source

CSES

CSES
CSES
CSES
CSES
Database of
Political
Institutions
(DPI)
CSES
Freedom House
World
Development
Indicators
(World Bank)

Table C3. Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Education
Female
Age
Party Attachment
Presidential Election
PR System
Effective # of Parties
Democracy Level
Log of GDP per capita

Min
1
0
16
0
0
0
2.19
4
8.54

Max
4
1
103
1
1
1
14.1
7
11.53
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Mean
2.92
0.52
49.00
0.45
0.22
0.54
5.24
6.53
10.26

S.D.
0.80
0.50
17.48
0.50
0.42
0.50
2.68
0.81
0.833

N
49259
49670
49296
46126
49837
49837
49837
49837
49837

Table C4. The Influence of Compulsory Voting on Left-Leaning and Right-Leaning
Party Outreach (excluding those contacted by both parties)
(3)
(4)
Left-Leaning Outreach Right-Leaning Outreach
Compulsory Voting
-0.918
0.428
(0.827)
(0.577)
Education
0.234***
0.260***
(0.033)
(0.031)
Female
0.015
-0.001
(0.045)
(0.042)
Age
0.001
0.001
(0.001)
(0.001)
Party Attachment
0.618***
0.407***
(0.049)
(0.046)
Ideology
-0.080***
0.113***
(0.009)
(0.009)
Presidential Election
-0.379*
-1.191***
(0.186)
(0.173)
PR System
-1.419**
-0.429
(0.543)
(0.378)
Effective # of Parties
0.130
0.093
(0.100)
(0.071)
Democracy Level
-0.876
-0.650
(0.637)
(0.445)
GDP per capita
0.341
1.091***
(0.474)
(0.331)
Constant
-0.714
-11.234***
(3.453)
(2.505)
Num. Individuals
27,351
27,351
Num. Countries
24
24
Note: Hierarchical logit models. Coefficients are statistically significant at
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C5. Compulsory Voting and Type of Party Outreach (Multinomial Models,
Left Outreach as the Baseline)
(3)
(4)
No Outreach
Right-Leaning Outreach
Compulsory Voting
-6.916
-6.511
(11.305)
(10.590)
Education
-0.291***
0.024
(0.030)
(0.039)
Female
0.005
-0.030
(0.042)
(0.053)
Age
-0.000
0.000
(0.001)
(0.002)
Party Attachment
-0.711***
-0.159**
(0.045)
(0.058)
Presidential Election
-1.297
-2.911
(2.052)
(1.926)
PR System
-6.361
-6.537
(7.421)
(6.972)
Effective # of Parties
-1.624
-1.381
(1.330)
(1.251)
Democracy Level
-12.957
-12.987
(8.782)
(8.306)
GDP per capita
5.179
5.732
(6.454)
(6.057)
Constant
57.810
47.376
(48.514)
(45.604)
Num. Individuals
37,420
37,420
Num. Countries
24
24
Notes: Estimated coefficients indicate the impact of each independent variable on
the probability of selecting one of the options listed above over the baseline (LeftLeaning Contacted). Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<.05; **p<.01;
***p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C6. The Influence of Compulsory Voting on Left-Leaning and Right-Leaning
Party Outreach, by Individual Ideology
(3)
(4)
Left-Leaning Outreach Right-Leaning Outreach
Compulsory Voting
-1.055
0.651
(0.836)
(0.585)
Ideology (Middle)
-0.590***
0.415***
(0.070)
(0.079)
Ideology (Right)
-0.657***
0.853***
(0.076)
(0.080)
CV*Ideology(Middle)
0.195
-0.200
(0.122)
(0.126)
CV*Ideology(Right)
0.209
-0.340**
(0.126)
(0.129)
Female
0.012
0.004
(0.045)
(0.042)
Age
0.001
0.001
(0.001)
(0.001)
Party Attachment
0.569***
0.410***
(0.050)
(0.047)
Education
0.230***
0.254***
(0.033)
(0.031)
Presidential Election
-0.397*
-1.160***
(0.187)
(0.173)
PR System
-1.436**
-0.430
(0.547)
(0.378)
Effective # of Parties
0.129
0.093
(0.101)
(0.071)
Democracy Level
-0.863
-0.660
(0.641)
(0.445)
GDP per capita
0.350
1.081**
(0.477)
(0.331)
Constant
-0.780
-10.936***
(3.476)
(2.505)
Num. Individuals
27,351
27,351
Num. Countries
24
24
Note: Hierarchical logit models. Coefficients are statistically significant at
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C.7. The Influence of Party Contact on Voting, by Voting Law
(1)
Voted
Compulsory Voting
0.591
(0.516)
Party Contact
0.561***
(0.044)
Compulsory Voting*Party Contact
-0.051
(0.094)
Education
0.457***
(0.022)
Female
-0.038
(0.030)
Age
0.019***
(0.001)
Party Attachment
1.117***
(0.036)
Presidential Election
0.402**
(0.132)
PR System
0.238
(0.315)
Effective # Parties
-0.027
(0.062)
Democracy Level
-0.687
(0.370)
GDP per capita
0.660*
(0.294)
Constant
-3.257
(1.931)
# of Observations
41,781
# of Countries
27
Note: Hierarchical Logit Models. Coefficients are
statistically significant at *p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001 *p<.05.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C8. The Influence of Party Attachment on Party Contact, by Voting Law
(1)
Party Contact
Compulsory Voting
-0.434
(0.600)
Party Attachment (Somewhat Close)
0.193***
(0.049)
Party Attachment (Very Close)
0.580***
(0.059)
Compulsory Voting*Party Attachment
0.131
(Somewhat Close)
(0.083)
Compulsory Voting*Party Attachment
-0.193*
(Very Close)
(0.096)
Education
0.296***
(0.021)
Female
-0.003
(0.030)
Age
0.004***
(0.001)
Presidential Election
-1.493***
(0.147)
PR System
-1.347***
(0.366)
Effective # Parties
0.199**
(0.072)
Democracy Level
-0.651
(0.431)
GDP per capita
0.621
(0.343)
Constant
-3.814
(2.243)
# of Observations
24,103
# of Countries
27
Note: Hierarchical Logit Models. Coefficients are statistically significant
at *p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001 *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses.
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